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Summary
Network protocols have become deeply ingrained into our everyday lives. Each form of
internet communication involves a series of protocols, as do many of the applications
we have come to use. These applications include web browsers and servers, mail
clients, chat programs, etc. Note how these applications communicate with each other
to provide a desired service. A web browser for example, communicates with a web
server to retrieve a desired web page. It is this very communication that is governed
by protocols implemented in the applications’ software. Unsurprisingly, verifying that
these protocols are properly implemented is of crucial importance, especially when
security is considered. Performing such a verification is an arduous task, more so in a
black-box setting, where the protocol’s source code is not accessible. Let us expand on
some of the tasks required by testing techniques commonly used in verification.
Classical testing techniques require the constant manual maintenance of a large test
suite, and may fail to spot corner cases where implementations are wrong. Model-based
testing uses a model of the protocol to automatically generate tests. Unfortunately,
such a model is rarely provided by the protocol’s specification, so it needs to be manu-
ally constructed and maintained. The technique known as model learning can provide
significant relief, as it allows for the automatic generation of models from implementa-
tions. The models can then be checked against properties extracted from the protocol
specification. This can be done manually by inspecting the models, or automatically
via model checking. Either way, the tester’s task is greatly facilitated.
One goal of this work is to promote model learning as a viable technique for verifying,
or in broader terms, analyzing practical software such as protocol implementations. To
that end, in Chapters 2 and 3, we use model learning with abstraction to obtain models
of TCP and SSH implementations, respectively. We then perform model checking on
these models, in order to analyze the adherence of the learned implementations to the
corresponding protocol specifications. This analysis helps uncover various standard
violations and bugs.
Another goal is to ease verification of protocol implementations by improving model
learning techniques. The challenge posed is that while model learning techniques are
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useful, their application to verification is made difficult by the many restrictions they
impose on the system we want to verify. Such restrictions may require the system
to have parameter-less input/output interfaces, to be deterministic, or to have no
temporal dependencies. Overcoming these restrictions may not be possible, or may
involve significant manual work. The fewer the restrictions, the easier and wider
application of learning techniques becomes. So it is a goal of this work to lift some of
these restrictions by expanding or developing new learning techniques.
Many current learning algorithms require the system’s behavior to be completely
deterministic, and as a result, restrict systems from generating arbitrary, unrelated
values in outputs. This restriction greatly limits applicability of learning, as many
systems, particularly network protocols, output these values in the form of nonces,
sequence numbers and identifiers. Chapter 4 introduces an extension of a well-
known framework by which we largely lift this restriction. This extension and other
optimizations are integrated in Tomte, the learner implementing this framework, and
tested over a series of benchmarks.
Network protocols also commonly perform a wide range of arithmetic operations on
data, whereas learning algorithms typically limit these operations to assignments and
equality checks. A different learning framework provides means of supporting more
advanced operations. RALib, the framework’s implementation, supports equality
and inequality operations. In Chapter 5, we integrate into RALib extensions for
handling inequalities over sums with constants, as well as the extension developed in
Chapter 4. Integrating these extensions allows us to infer more detailed models of
TCP client implementations. Upon analyzing these models, we find bugs which were
made discoverable by the new extensions, and could not have been discovered in our
earlier experiments on TCP.
Chapters 4 and 5 shed light on more foundational problems. Active learning algorithms
are complex and often tied to the restrictions they impose. This makes them difficult
to extend, or to adapt for specific usage scenarios, such as learning a system that
cannot be reset. They also require optimization before they can be put to practice
due to inefficiencies in the traditional framework. Chapter 6 proposes a learning
framework based on SMT for confronting these problems. Within this framework,
learning algorithms are expressed by more compact logical formulas. This enables
quick prototyping of learning for even advanced formalisms. Breaking away from
the traditional framework, our framework also removes the need for optimization
and achieves high adaptability. We present extensions of our framework for various
formalisms and scenarios. We provide an open-source implementation and use it to
assess the framework’s effectiveness over a series of benchmarks.
Over the course of this thesis we explore different approaches for learning practical
systems. Research on each approach is supported by implementations, experiments or
case studies. Future work should evolve these approaches in order to further facilitate
and widen their application to practical systems. In doing so, it should make it possible
to verify even complex implementations with the simple click of a button.
Samenvatting
Netwerkprotocollen worden steeds belangrijker: bij elke vorm van internetcommunicatie
worden diverse protocollen gebruikt. Bij veelgebruikte applicaties, zoals webbrowsers,
e-mailclients en chatprogramma’s, zien we dat deze applicaties onderling communiceren
om een dienst te verlenen. De wijze waarop deze communicatie plaatsvindt, wordt
beschreven door protocollen, welke ge¨ımplementeerd zijn in de applicaties. Het is
niet verwonderlijk dat het verifie¨ren of deze protocollen correct ge¨ımplementeerd zijn,
erg belangrijk is. Helaas is dit verifie¨ren een zware taak, vooral in een black-box-
omgeving waarin de code niet beschikbaar is. Technieken van model-leren kunnen de
taak faciliteren. Deze technieken kunnen worden gebruikt om automatisch modellen
voor protocolimplementaties te genereren. Deze modellen kunnen dan handmatig of
automatisch gecontroleerd worden op eigenschappen, afgeleid van specificaties zoals
RFC’s.
Een van de doelen van dit proefschrift is om model-leren toe te passen bij het verifie¨ren
van protocolimplementaties. Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 staan in het teken van dit doel. Hierin
gebruiken wij model-leren met abstractie om modellen af te leiden van verschilende
implementaties van TCP en SSH. Vervolgens gebruiken we de model-check-technieken
om te analyseren of de implementaties zich aan de specificaties houden. Deze analyse
hielp bij het vinden van bugs. Echter was abstractie in beide case-studies door hand-
matige ”mapper”-componenten ge¨ımplementeerd. Het maken van deze componenten
was tijdrovend.
Een ander doel is om model-leeralgoritmen te verbeteren zodat ze volledig automatisch
kunnen worden toegepast op echte systemen. Met dat doel introduceert Hoofdstuk 4
een uitbreiding op een bekend algoritme dat het mogelijk maakt om systemen te
leren die willekeurige waarden genereren als uitvoer. De meeste model-leeralgoritmen
beperken de operaties die in een systeem zijn toegestaan tot testen van gelijkheid
en toekenningen. Er is echter ook een leeralgoritme dat geavanceerde operaties
ondersteunt. RALib is een implementatie van dit algoritme. Het ondersteunt zowel
testen van gelijkheid als ongelijkheid. In Hoofdstuk 5, voegen wij de ondersteuning
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van optellingen met constanten aan RALib toe. Daarna hebben wij RALib gebruikt
om getailleerde modellen te genereren voor implementaties van TCP. Analyse van
deze modellen bracht twee fouten aan het licht.
Een probleem met de geavenceerde model-leeralgoritmen zoals die van Hoofdstuk 5
is dat zij moeilijk zijn om aan te passen en te optimaliseren. In hoofdstuk 6 geven
we een alternatief leerraamwerk, gebaseerd op SMT, om dit probleem aan te pakken.
In dit raamwerk kunnen model-leeralgoritmen worden uitgedrukt door compactere
logische formules. Dit maakt snelle prototyping van algoritmen met geavanceerde for-
malismen mogelijk. Bovendien vereist ons raamwerk geen optimisatie. Wij presenteren
uitbreidingen van ons raamwerk voor verschillende formalismen en scenario’s. Deze
uitbreidingen implementeren wij in een open-source tool. We hebben de effectiviteit
van ons raamwerk beoordeeld door deze tool te benchmarken.
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt verschillende benaderingen voor het genereren van modellen
voor praktische systemen met behulp van model-leren. Deze benaderingen moeten in
de toekomst verder ontwikkeld worden. Alleen dan is het mogelijk om systemen te
verifie¨ren door eenvoudig op een knop te drukken.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
People are becoming increasingly reliant on protocols. Whether it’s drawing money
from an ATM or purchasing from a vending machine, our interactions with automated
systems follow some form of protocol these systems implement. Indeed, a protocol
can be seen as the set of rules which govern our interaction with these systems. These
rules define the format and order of messages exchanged with the machines, as well as
any action they take on the receiving/sending of each message. The rules forming a
protocol are defined in the protocol’s specification.
To give an example of such rules, a banking protocol is likely to direct an ATM to
only display a balance screen if the user has entered a valid PIN. Similarly, a vending
machine’s underlying protocol is likely to direct the machine to only issue a product
if the user has both pressed a button and inserted a coin. Viewing the insertion of
a coin, press of a button and issue of a product, as separate messages we describe
in Figure 1.1 normal and abnormal scenarios of interaction between the user and
vending machine. By giving the user a free soda, the vending machine deviates from its
protocol and costs its maintainers the price of a soda. Failure of systems to correctly
implement their respective protocols can lead to problems whose cost far exceeds that
of a soda.
The protocols described so far involve people’s interaction with machines. Network
protocols differ in that the interacting entities are solely hardware or software com-
ponents. To give an example, let us consider what happens when we access some
Figure 1.1: Various scenarios of interaction
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arbitrary web page. To open the web page in our browser, we first type in the link
referring to that web page and press ’Enter’. Our browser then sends a request message
(or a GET message) to some remote web server asking it for the web page at the given
link. The server receives this request, looks up the link in its resource folders, and
transmits back a response message containing the web page content or an appropriate
error. Our browser receives the content or an error, and displays it nicely on screen.
The mechanism of requesting and providing these textual resources between clients
(our browser) and servers (the remote server contacted) is governed by the HTTP
protocol.
This is just one example. The simple transfer of data involved in an HTTP interaction
relies on many other protocols. All these protocols are included in the TCP/IP protocol
suite, the suite whose protocols govern all forms of interaction over the Internet. Many
of these protocols are implemented in our operating systems today. Some are used by
popular applications such as Skype, web browsers like Google Chrome or Microsoft
Edge, mail clients like Thunderbird or Microsoft Outlook and so on. It is outside the
scope of this thesis to delve into the details of this suite, or indeed, into its constituent
protocols, hence we refer to [134] for more details.
As in the ATM and vending machine examples, it would be highly problematic if the
HTTP implementations of the browser or server would not meet the HTTP protocol’s
specification. Imagine if our browser occasionally sent malformed requests. The
receiving server would then likely reply with error responses even if we supplied valid
links, hindering our browsing experience. The consequence of such bugs can be much
more severe however. It is only recently that the Heartbleed vulnerability [103] was
discovered in a widely used implementation of TLS, the protocol designed to secure
traffic over the Internet. Exploiting this vulnerability allowed the theft of passwords
and other confidential information. It is said that an estimated 17% of the Internet’s
secure web servers were vulnerable at the moment of Heartbleed’s discovery [104]. More
thorough conformance testing could have prevented Heartbleed from happening [105].
But what is conformance testing?
Conformance testing is a branch of testing which sees that protocol implementations
meet their specifications. It therefore helps reduce the likelihood of these unwanted
scenarios. Conformance testing is a form of black-box testing, which means it checks
the external behavior of an implementation without referring to its internal structure.
This contrasts white-box testing, which additionally analyzes the program structure.
Comparing the two, black-box testing does not require access to the implementation’s
code, making it more widely applicable. Viewing the system as a black box also has
the advantage of decoupling testing from particularities of the actual implementation,
such as code structure or the programming language used. This makes testing possible
even without prior knowledge of the actual implementation.
There are many ways of performing conformance testing, with each offering a certain
degree of automation. Automation in turn reduces the work load of the tester, the
person involved in testing the implementation. Work in this thesis focuses on a
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conformance testing approach relying on model learning which provides a great degree
of automation and thus significantly reduces the burden on the tester.
1.1 Ways of Conformance Testing
Checking that implementations conform to their specifications is a classical problem.
It is hence unsurprising that many approaches have been developed to tackle it.
Perhaps the simplest approach one can adopt is to derive a set of tests from the
specification and run them on the implementation. A test compares the behavior of
the implementation to a series of stimulus (or inputs) to the one expected, as according
to its specification. Tests initially had to be run manually by the tester. Developments
in test methodologies (like keyword driven testing [128]), tools (like Selenium [185])
and frameworks (like JUnit [125]), have made it possible to more easily formulate tests,
execute them automatically and to even automatically trace the location of test failure
(see [70]). Nevertheless, a problem left unsolved is that a large number of tests have
to be manually derived and maintained. This in itself is costly. It is also questionable
whether manually written tests cover the corner cases of a specification.
In light of these shortcomings, model-based testing [47] has been proposed as a new
form of conformance testing which automates both generation and execution of tests
based on the model of the specification. This model is a formal description of the
expected behavior according to the specification. Assuming the model covers all
important aspects of the specification, this form of testing can provide high confidence
that the implementation, indeed, adheres to its specifications. There are a wide range
of tools designed for model-based testing (e.g. Conformiq [71], GraphWalker [97]...).
Unfortunately, their application, as is the application of model-based testing in general,
is limited by the existence of a suitable model. Specifications are generally textual,
even for protocols or other important systems. They do not normally include a
formalized model, and if they do, the model generally describes the system at a high
level in terms of its normal usage, leaving abnormal usage out. Deriving an adequate
model from a specification is therefore far from trivial. And like tests in the previous
approach, this model also has to be continuously maintained.
The approach this thesis follows leverages model learning [19, 170,205] to lift the need
of providing a model. Model learning is a technique which given a black-box system,
can automatically generate (or infer) a model corresponding to the system’s behavior.
This combined with model checking [23], a technique enabling the automated checking
of models against formal properties, should ideally reduce the manual task of a tester to
that of formalizing a set of properties from the protocol specification. While protocol
specifications don’t generally include models, most do formulate a series of requirement
statements describing expected behavior (MUST, SHOULD, MAY statements [45]).
This lends itself well to the presented approach, as each statement can be encoded in
a formal property, which is then verified by performing model checking on the inferred
model.
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1.2 Research Challenges
A combination of model learning and model checking would appear to provide a
near-automated test approach. Unfortunately, challenges in both techniques prevent
this appearance from translating to the real world. This work focuses on the learning
challenges. That’s not to say model checking is free of challenges, on the contrary,
state explosion is an active line of research [69]. Currently, however, all that can
be learned can be model checked, while the converse is far from true, giving further
motivation for our direction.
Perhaps the biggest challenge in model learning comes in the form of the many
unrealistic restrictions the technique imposes on the system it is applied to (the system
should be simple enough for learning to work). Overcoming these restrictions, if even
possible, may require limiting testing to only a subset of the system’s functions, or may
require a significant amount of manual work, greatly reducing the applicability of model
learning. Examples of these restrictions include requiring the system to give the same
responses when receiving the same messages (determinism), to be time independent,
or implement a reset function. It is a challenge of this work to lift or weaken some
of these restrictions, thus making model learning more applicable. More specifically,
our work tackles restrictions which prevent systems from generating non-deterministic
(e.g. random) values in outputs, and also limit their internal operations to equality
checks and assignments. Protocols in particular, do generate non-deterministic values
and also implement other arithmetic operations.
Another challenge lies in the development of adaptable learning frameworks that can
readily support advanced formalisms. Learning algorithms for advanced formalisms
are complex and difficult to adapt. They are often tightly bound to the restrictions
they impose on the system. Moreover, they can suffer from a blow-up in the number of
tests needed due to inefficiencies relating to counterexamples inherent to the classical
learning framework. This hinders their applicability to real software. Having this in
mind, we propose a framework which, by leveraging SMT solvers, facilitates prototyping
of learning for even advanced formalisms. The framework also enables easy adaptations
to scenarios in which many other learning approaches are impractical. Such scenarios
are when the system cannot be reset, or when only logs of its operation are available.
Finally, our framework is free of the inefficiencies affecting the classical framework.
Unsurprisingly, benchmarks show it to be competitive with even advanced learning
algorithms.
While widening the scope of learning is important, equally important is showing that
model learning is a viable strategy for conformance testing (it can help discover bugs
or inconsistencies). To that end, we show the usefulness of model learning through
case studies on two widely used protocols, TCP and SSH.
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1.3 Formalisms for Modeling Software Behavior
As our testing approach involves models, we touch on the formalisms for modeling
software behavior featured in this work. With this purpose in mind we define two
conceptual client-server protocols, A and B. We then use variations of Finite State
Machines (FSMs) to model servers of both protocols. We end by outlining some key
characteristics of the models.
Protocol A allows a client to connect and send messages to a server. The server
ignores any messages prior to a connection. The server acknowledges, by way of
acknowledgement messages, the first connection attempt and any messages sent after-
ward. The server accepts at most one connection and ignores any further connection
attempts.
s1
start
s2
connect/ack
msg/ignore
connect/ignore
msg/ack
Figure 1.2: Mealy machine model for Protocol A
A server for Protocol A can be modeled adequately by a Mealy machine, as done in
Figure 1.2. Mealy machines are FSMs with states and transitions encoding abstract
inputs and outputs. Our model has two states (before and after a connection is
established), with two abstract inputs (for connecting and sending a message) and two
abstract outputs (for ignoring and acknowledging). These messages form the interface
(or alphabet) of our server. To give an interpretation of this model, suppose the server
receives a connect while in the initial state s1. The server then transitions to s2
and generates the output ack, acknowledging the client’s connection. Once in s2, the
server stays there, responding to any msg inputs by ack, and to any connect inputs
by ignore.
Protocol B is a refined version of A. It enhances the specification with aspects of
data flow. Both messages and acknowledgements now carry a sequence number.
Upon acknowledgement of a connection, an Initial Sequence Number (ISN), which is
randomly generated by the server, is communicated to the client. The server then only
acknowledges messages with sequence numbers in increasing order, starting from the
ISN. Any messages whose sequence numbers fall out of order are ignored. Moreover,
acknowledgements sent by the server have sequence numbers equal to those of the
messages they acknowledge.
A natural way of modeling servers for Protocol B is through Register Automata (RA).
Figure 1.3a gives an illustration of this. RAs are a variation of Extended Finite State
Machines (EFSM), and be can seen as expanded versions of Mealy machines. The
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s1
start
s2
connect(), true/
ack(f), seq:=f
msg(p), true/
ignore()
connect(), true/
ignore()
msg(p), p == seq/
ack(p), seq:=p + 1
msg(p),
p != seq/
ignore()
(a)
s1
start
s2
connect/
ack FRESH
msg INVALID/
ignore
connect/
ignore
msg VALID/
ack EQU
msg INVALID/
ignore
(b)
Figure 1.3: Concrete and abstract models for Protocol B. f as an output parameter
means the parameter is assigned a fresh value. In an update f refers to the fresh value.
interface of an RA (its inputs and outputs) is parameterized. Moreover, an RA can
store parameter values in state variables, and its transitions are extended to contain
guards and updates. A transition is fired only if its guard is satisfied, where a guard
is a predicate over the input parameters and state variables. Firing a transition
additionally executes any updates encoded in it. Outputs may also carry parameters
whose value is indicated symbolically by referring to input parameters in the transition,
state variables or arbitrary values. We refer to arbitrary values by fresh values.
For our example, suppose the server is in state s1 and receives connect from the client.
In reaction to the input, the server jumps to s2, initializes its state variable seq with a
fresh value, and communicates this value by packing it in an ack output. Thereafter,
it only acknowledges msg inputs with sequence numbers matching seq, and on each
acknowledgement it replicates the sequence number of the acknowledged message (i.e.
the value of p in msg is repeated in ack, hence the formulation ack(p)).
Modeling Protocol B’s server as a small Mealy machine is impractical if we consider a
large sequence number domain, as Mealy machines cannot model data flow and their
interface is abstract. However, using the notion of abstraction from [10] we can abstract
away from the sequence number parameter found in msg and ack messages. We do so
by remarking that after a client connects, there is only one valid sequence number
which is acknowledged by the server. All other numbers are invalid and ignored, as are
numbers in messages prior to a client’s connection. Moreover, the first ack generated
by the server carries a fresh value, whereas all other acks carry values equal to the
valid sequence number. Applying the parameter abstractions corresponding to these
remarks (i.e. valid, invalid, fresh, equal), we can model the protocol by the abstract
Mealy machine of Figure 1.3b. As seen in this example, abstractions provide a way
of confining the behavior of the modeled server within the constraints of a Mealy
machine.
We end by noting key characteristics of the models (and the servers they describe).
Protocol A’s model is deterministic, that is, for every sequence of inputs the model
generates a unique sequence of outputs. By contrast, Protocol B’s model is non-
deterministic in a concrete sense. This can be evidenced by the model’s response to
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the sequence of inputs connect() msg(10), which can prompt two different responses
depending on the value the model generates upon receiving connect() (i.e. if it
generates 10 or not). This non-determinism is caused solely by the arbitrary nature
in which a fresh value is generated. Abstracting away from this characteristic allows
us to produce a deterministic model, such as that in Figure 1.3b. We classify the
model in Figure 1.3a as an RA with fresh values. The ability to model fresh values
is essential in describing protocols, as many protocols generate them in the form of
nonces, identifiers or ISNs, in a similar way to Protocol B.
Protocol B’s model can also be described in terms of the arithmetics encoded in its
guard and updates. In that sense, we can characterize it as an RA with equalities
(noting equality and disequality predicates) and successors (noting the successor in
one update).
Finally, all models introduced thus far are transducers, as they generate an output on
every input. All models but the abstract one are also complete since their behavior is
defined for all inputs in every state. The abstract model is incomplete (the output for
msg VALID in s1 is undefined). A different class of models are acceptors, which for a
sequence of inputs, generate a single boolean output, which is either true or false.
This makes them suitable for describing languages, as the output captures inclusion
of a sequence of inputs (or word) to a language. The output is encoded in the state
reached: states can either be accepting or rejecting.
s1
start
s2 s3
s4 sink s5
connect ack
msgignore connect ignore
msg
*
*
*
* *
*
Figure 1.4: Protocol A as a DFA. Accepting states have two circles, rejecting states
have one.
For each state, ’*’ indicates all inputs/outputs without an outgoing transition from
the state.
Mealy machines are by definition transducers. The literature gives several definitions
for describing RA’s. Later chapters involving RAs (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) introduce their
own RA interpretation. Ultimately, a transducer can be described through an acceptor
at the expense of conciseness, by splitting each transition into two separate transitions,
connected by an output state. We then direct all uncovered transitions to a sink state,
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the acceptor’s only rejecting state. Figure 1.4 gives an acceptor representation for
Protocol A. The representation is known as a Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA).
Modeling transducers as acceptors is done in both Chapters 5 and 6.
1.4 Model Learning Framework
Model learning allows inference of models from black-box systems. There are two
settings for model learning, an active setting, where inference is done by interaction
with a system under learning by exercising the system’s interface, and a passive
setting, where inference is done solely from a set of logs the system generated. Our
focus is on an active setting tailored towards the learning of (E)FSMs, like the Mealy
machines and RAs described earlier. This setting is also known as active automata
learning.
Figure 1.5: Active Model Learning Framework
Figure 1.5 sketches the model learning framework most commonly used in practice.
The framework involves three components, the system under learning (SUL), the
learner, a software component implementing a learning algorithm, and the tester, a
software component implementing a (typically model-based) testing algorithm.
The learner’s goal is to infer a model of the SUL. It does so in an iterative process,
by generating and running tests on the SUL. Each test encodes a sequence of inputs.
Upon running a test, the learner makes an observation of the SUL’s response. The
learner runs tests until it has made enough observations that it can build a hypothesis,
a behavioral model consistent with all observations made so far. This hypothesis is
sent to the tester, whose task is to check its validity. In case the hypothesis is invalid,
the tester may find a counterexample. A counterexample is a test which when run on
the SUL, results in a different observation than on the hypothesis. The tester gives
the counterexample to the learner, which uses it to generate new tests and eventually
come up with a refined hypothesis. The refined hypothesis is put through the same
process, which continues until a hypothesis is judged to be valid by the tester (no
counterexample was found), causing learning to terminate and return the hypothesis
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as the learned model of the SUL. The tester can optionally be configured to provide
a measurement of confidence in the learned model’s correctness, noting that in a
black-box setting, correctness can never be guaranteed.
While the SUL is traditionally viewed as a black-box (only its interface is known), the
framework can benefit from white-box techniques (that is, techniques which analyze the
SUL’s internal code). This is especially true with regards to testing, where white-box
approaches may ensure coverage of all the code’s statements or branches.
1.4.1 A Look Inside the Learner
How can a learner automatically infer a model of the SUL? Learning algorithms are
several, yet they all hinge on the discernible nature of states in a model. Concretely, for
any two states in a minimal model there are distinguishing sequences of inputs which,
if run from the respective states, will prompt different responses allowing us to tell
the states apart. Take Protocol A for example, states s1 and s2 can be distinguished
by the input connect which prompts ack in s1 but ignore in s2. It is important
to emphasize the attribute minimal when describing models. Non-minimal models
have equivalent states which cannot be distinguished. Our active learning setting is
concerned with generating minimal models.
Being able to distinguish states allows us to identify them by just accruing for each
state, the sequences that differentiate it from the rest. Moreover, it helps in determining
a prefix-closed set of access sequences, where each access sequence starting from the
start state, leads to a different state in the model. For Protocol A, the only possible
set is {,connect}, where  is the empty sequence. We can verify that this set is
prefix-closed:  has no prefixes, whereas connect has a single prefix in , which is
included in the set. Having these access sequences and a means of identifying states
allows us to construct a model by just checking how the SUL transitions upon receiving
each input after each of the access sequences.
These ideas lie at the core of active learning algorithms. Yet how they are implemented
varies. Typically learners encode both access sequences and distinguishing sequences in
an internal data structure. This data structure is completed with observations made by
running tests, until a hypothesis can be generated. Upon processing a counterexample,
the learner extracts new access/distinguishing sequences which it uses to update its
data structure.
The most common algorithms, including the renowned L∗ algorithm, log all tests in
an observation table. We will use the algorithm described in [198] as reference, though
all other table-based algorithms use a similar structure. The rows of an observation
table are labeled with prefixes, comprising access sequences (we denote by S) and their
one-input extensions (or S · I, where I is the input alphabet). The columns are labeled
with suffixes, comprising distinguishing sequences (we denote by D) and singleton
sequences for each input in the alphabet. Cells contain the last output generated by
running the test formed by concatenating a prefix with a suffix. A state is uniquely
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determined by the output configuration of a row. Different configurations signal that
the respective prefixes lead to different states.
Starting from minimal information (i.e. {} the set of access sequences and an empty
set of distinguishing sequences), new access sequences are added to the table along with
their corresponding extensions until the closedness condition is met. Under closedness,
output configurations of access sequences include output configurations of one-input
extensions. This intuitively suggests that all transitions from access sequences lead to
already established states. Closedness allows construction of a hypothesis.
We perform a learning run of this algorithm on an adapted version of Protocol A. This
version following two acknowledged msg inputs enters an unresponsive state wherein it
ignores all inputs. A model of the adapted protocol is displayed in Figure 1.6. Initially,
 is our lone access sequence and we have no distinguishing sequences. We fill in
observations for  and its one-input extensions msg and connect, and obtain Table 1.1.
We notice that the table is not closed as there is no access sequence row corresponding
to the output configuration of connect. This means connect leads to a new state,
thus should be added to the set of access sequences. We do so, and complete the table
again by adding new one-input extension entries, resulting in Table 1.2. This table is
closed, which allows us to build a hypothesis resembling Protocol A’s model.
connect msg
 ack ignore
connect ignore ack
msg ack ignore
Table 1.1: Table not yet closed. D = ∅
S
S · I
I ∪D connect msg
 ack ignore
connect ignore ack
msg ack ignore
connect connect ignore ack
connect msg ignore ack
Table 1.2: First closed table
While this hypothesis is consistent with Protocol A, it’s inconsistent with the adapted
version we are learning. Suppose the tester finds the counterexample connect msg
msg msg which produces as last output ignore on the SUL but ack on the hypothesis.
A counterexample traverses one or more undiscovered states which cannot be identified
using the current set of distinguishing sequences. The learner’s goal is to find a
non-empty counterexample suffix whose addition to the table makes it unclosed. By
doing so the suffix essentially enables the learner to distinguish a new state from
existing states and build a new hypothesis. We would also like this suffix to be the
shortest, since long suffixes lead to longer, more expensive tests. Hence we iterate the
suffixes of the counterexample from shortest to longest until we reach suffix which
makes the table unclosed1. For our example, this suffix is msg msg. The learner
adds it to the table as a new distinguishing sequence. The learner then proceeds to
run tests in order to close the table again. Table 1.3 encodes the end result. From
1Note that this is one of a variation of available strategies for processing counterexamples. Other
strategies involve adding multiple suffixes or adding prefixes instead. Also note that using the
proposed strategy a counterexample may still be a counterexample for the refined hypothesis.
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this, a hypothesis consistent with the adapted protocol is built. Henceforth, no new
counterexamples are found and learning finishes.
con msg msg msg
 ack ignore ignore
con ignore ack ack
con msg ignore ack ignore
con msg msg ignore ignore ignore
msg ack ignore ignore
con con ignore ack ack
con msg con ignore ack ignore
con msg msg msg ignore ignore ignore
con msg msg con ignore ignore ignore
Table 1.3: Final table.
connect appears as con
s1
start
s2
s3s4
connect/ack
msg/ignore
connect/ignore
msg/ack
connect/ignore
msg/ack
connect/ignore
msg/ignore
Figure 1.6: Model for adapted Protocol A
Having just borne witness to a learning run, it’s important to restate that not all
learning algorithms use an observation table. Moreover, information encoded in suffixes
and prefixes may be different depending on the formalism learned, as will be the
information entered in a cell.
1.5 Model Learning Algorithms and Contributions
We shall now go over the learning algorithms and approaches relevant to this work.
We use this opportunity to also outline the main contributions.
1.5.1 Classical Learning
The seminal work of Angluin [19] introduced the foundation on which the framework
of Section 1.4 is based. It also introduced the L∗ learning algorithm, which allows
the inference DFAs. DFAs are formalisms used to represent languages. As seen
in Figure 1.4, DFAs can also be used to model reactive systems, which display
input/output behavior on each transition. Yet they lack conciseness compared to more
advanced formalisms, requiring more states to model the same behavior.
This motivated later works [164,187,198] to advance Angluin’s algorithm to the setting
of Mealy machines. New algorithms for Mealy machines have since been developed
with the goal of reducing the number of tests required to infer models. These include
the Observation Pack [116] and TTT [122], the later appearing particularly promising.
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Testing algorithms for Mealy machines have also been developed [92, 191], some of
which provide measurable confidence in the learned models.
1.5.2 Learning with Mappers
Mealy machines provide a conciser way of describing the input/output behavior of real
systems, but as shown in Section 1.3, they require abstraction to model parameterized
software exhibiting data flow. Work in [10] formally encodes this abstraction in a
mapper component, which is placed between the SUL and the learner. The mapper
confers to the learner an abstract representation of the SUL. An abstract Mealy
machine can be inferred, like the one shown for Protocol B in Figure 1.3b. By applying
the mapper’s inverted form on the abstract model we can then generate a concrete
model (like an RA). This procedure is also known as concretization of the abstract
model.
Contribution In Chapters 2 and 3 we use this approach to infer models of real
TCP and SSH implementations. We obtain models for various implementations with
a measurable degree of confidence attained by applying the testing algorithm in [191].
We then use model checking to verify these models against properties we formalize
from the protocols’ specifications, and find several standard violations.
The TCP and SSH case studies provide applications of learning with abstraction to
widely used protocol implementations. This distinguishes the TCP case study from
the work in [10], where the implementation of a TCP simulator was inferred. The
two case studies are also among the first to use a combination of model learning and
model checking to verify real-world protocol implementations.
In the SSH case study we learn and check SSH server implementations for OpenSSH,
BitVise and DropBear. In the TCP case study we learn and check TCP client and
server implementations for Windows 8, Linux and FreeBSD. Having obtained models
for both clients and servers, we connect them using the model of a loss-less network
and check properties concerning their interaction.
1.5.3 Learning with Automatically Generated Mappers
By using mappers an important limitation is lifted, however there is a significant
cost incurred. Constructing mappers is an arduous task which often requires deep
knowledge of the SUL. Work by Aarts et al. [2] shows that it is possible to construct
mappers automatically for a specific class of RAs. The approach hinges on the notion
that at any time, only a couple of values (so called memorable values) are remembered
by the SUL, and are relevant in exploring its future behavior. Parameter abstractions
can thus be formed based on relations with these values. Abstractions are refined
over the course of learning starting from an initial set of coarse abstractions. As new
relations with past values are discovered in counterexamples, new abstractions are
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encoded into the mapper. This approach falls under the more general approach of
Counterexample Generated Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR).
The approach of Aarts et al. was built into Tomte [201], which supports learning
RAs with equalities. Tomte’s architecture is displayed in Figure 1.7. The Learner
implements any active learning algorithm for Mealy machines. The Abstractor encodes
the evolving mapper component, tasked with translating between abstract and concrete
messages. The Lookahead Oracle is the component responsible with finding memorable
values. It passes concrete inputs along to the SUL, while adjoining to each concrete
output the set of memorable values in the current run. These are used by the
Abstractor to form corresponding output abstractions. Tomte’s decoupled nature
allows it to easily incorporate and leverage more advanced Mealy machine learners
like TTT.
Learner Abstractor
Lookahead
Oracle
Determinizer SUL
Figure 1.7: Tomte’s architecture. The Determinizer is its latest addition
Contribution Chapter 4 extends the work of Aarts et al. to settings allowing fresh
values (e.g. randomly generated SUL values). The non-deterministic nature of fresh
value generation makes them a problem for learning techniques, which require systems
to be deterministic. We combat this by formalizing a Determinizer component and
incorporating it in Tomte. The Determinizer acts like a mapper, and provides the
learner a deterministic concrete view of the SUL, by constructing and applying a
1 to 1 mapping from regular SUL values to ’neat values’. Under the action of the
Determinizer, the first fresh value (regardless of its actual value) is mapped to -1, the
second fresh value to -2 and so on. We show that learning the behavior of a SUL can
be done solely by analyzing its ’neat view’.
The extension to systems with fresh values is essential for the analysis of certain
protocols, as explained in Section 1.3. Chapter 4 also introduces a series of optimizati-
ons to Tomte. Among the most notable are connecting Tomte to the TTT learning
algorithm, and improving and streamlining counterexample analysis. We show gains
obtained from these optimizations over an extensive series of benchmarks involving
prior configurations of Tomte and RALib.
It should be noted that our approach is not the first to tackle the problem of fresh
values. The algorithm introduced by Bollig et al. [37] can also learn models with fresh
values, but these models are severely restricted relative to those we can learn. For
example, these models cannot describe a language which only accepts sequences of
parameterized inputs whose last two values are equal.
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1.5.4 Learning Systems with Tree Queries
Cassel et al. [53, 58] presents a different approach for learning RAs which incorporates
the handling of parameterized behavior into the learning algorithm. Their algorithm,
SL∗, utilizes tree queries in place of simple tests. A tree query comprises a concrete
prefix and a symbolic suffix. The algorithm poses tree queries to a tree oracle, which
answers them by generating Symbolic Decision Trees (SDT) describing the SUL’s
behavior after the prefix for the suffix. An SDT is a data structure which compactly
encodes observations made by running a large number of tests on the SUL. Each SDT
obtained running a tree query is stored into a tabled structure similar to L∗’s, in
the cell corresponding to the query’s concrete prefix and symbolic suffix. Closedness
checks are done by comparing SDTs in rows for equivalence.
SL∗
Algorithm
Tree
Oracle
SUL
tree query tests
observationsSDTs
Figure 1.8: RALib’s architecture
Canonical implementations of a tree oracle permit the generation of more succinct
(i.e. compact) models. The framework of Cassel et al. supports learning RAs with
advanced relations by providing canonical tree oracles for these relations. In [58],
Cassel et. al. formalize tree oracles for equalities and inequalities (involving the
<,> and = relations). They also give an intuition on how various combinations of
relations are handled, including inequalities over sums with constants. They then use
a prototype implementation to learn simple models of these combinations. Cassel
et al. [54] introduce RALib2, an open-source implementation of this approach which
supports equality and inequality relations.
Before discussing contributions, we give an intuition on the structure of SDTs, and
on how a tree oracle can be implemented. Figure 1.9 shows SDTs a tree oracle may
construct on a tree query with the concrete prefix connect ack(10) and symbolic
suffix msg(p) ack(p). An SDT symbolically describes all the instantiations of a suffix
that when appended to a prefix, form valid traces of the SUL. These instantiations
lead to accepting states in the SDT, whereas those forming invalid traces lead to
rejecting states. In the case of Protocol B, the suffix forms valid traces if the parameters
of msg and ack are equal to the parameter of ack in the prefix and its successor,
respectively.
To answer a tree query, a tree oracle as presented in Chapter 5 first generates a
maximally refined tree which explores all possible parameter configurations for the
suffix given the relations. In our example, we consider equality and successor relations.
Consequently, we have to explore cases when a suffix parameter is equal, the successor
2https://bitbucket.org/learnlib/ralib
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Figure 1.9: SDTs for prefix connect ack(10) and suffix msg(p) ack(p).
r1 refers to the first parameter in the prefix
or different, relative to previous parameters. This requires execution of three tests,
which may result in the concrete traces:
connect() ack(10) msg(10) ack(11) (equal)
connect() ack(10) msg(11) nok() (successor)
connect() ack(10) msg(20) nok() (different)
Note, that only the first trace ends in ack, and thus matches our suffix. All others
don’t, hence the cases they encode lead to rejecting states in the tree. For the matching
trace, the output value of this ack is a successor of the value of the previous ack. This
automatically invalidates similar traces whose last ack contains a value that is not a
successor.
Once it has built a maximally refined tree, the oracle compresses it into an equivalent
maximally abstract tree by merging equivalent subtrees and their respective branches,
and returns this tree as answer. This compression step is needed to ensure that
learning converges, and also to produce compact models. Notice that the SDT shown
in Figure 1.9a is maximally refined only in terms of its input parameters and is already
maximally abstract in terms of its output parameters. This was done to ease exposition
and also because producing maximally abstract subtrees for output parameters is
greatly simplified by the determinism requirement. This requirement means that
at most one refined output branch can lead to an accepting state, while all others
necessarily lead to rejecting states, allowing for their simple merger.
Contribution In Chapter 5, we extend RALib and use it to generate and check TCP
client implementations for FreeBSD and Linux. This is the first practical case study
involving an RA learner. We frame the case study within the learning-based testing
framework introduced by Meinke [151] (where learning is used as means of building tests
more likely to uncover problems). The case study produced detailed concrete models
with data that also captured abnormal scenarios. It also lead to the discovery of two
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new violations. Conducting experiments lead to the uncovering of a bug, whereby while
closing a data connection, the Linux TCP client processed and acknowledged certain
invalid segments. Uncovering the bug was made possible by the exploratory tests
learning involves. The bug was acknowledged and subsequently fixed by developers.
Analyzing the models we discover a different violation to the RFC regarding the size
of the receive window in TCP, acknowledged by the developers.
Getting RALib to the point where it could learn TCP involved several steps, some
of which are detailed in the chapter. First we provide an implementation of the tree
oracle for a setting of equalities and inequalities over sums with constants (Protocol B
would fit in such a setting). We then adapt the Determinizer concept developed in
Chapter 4 to this setting, and connect it to the framework. We also implement suffix
optimizations for these relations to make the approach more scalable.
The concept of suffix optimization was introduced in [57] for a setting of equalities,
but never implemented for our specific setting. This optimization involves annotating
the symbolic suffixes obtained from counterexamples, with the relations they capture
within the counterexample. The tree oracle only considers these relations when
processing tree queries with this suffix, instead of all enabled relations, leading to a
reduction in the number of tests needed to answer the tree query. To give a concrete
example, in Figure 1.9 knowing that we only have to test the parameter of msg for
equality (instead of also for successor) would reduce the number of tests from 3 to 2.
The reduction becomes (much) more pronounced once we consider more relations, or
suffixes and prefixes with more parameters.
1.5.5 An SMT-based Learning Framework
The last two approaches can, in theory, provide automated ways of generating models
for many practical systems. However, adapting both approaches to a broader class
of systems or learning scenarios is far from trivial. Take for example adaptations for
learning systems without resets or learning systems only from a set of logs. Such
adaptations would likely mean reconstruction of these approaches from the ground
up.
Adding to that, both approaches require a significant number of tests which grows
rapidly with increasing system complexity. This was particularly evident in the TCP
case study involving RALib, where the high number of tests meant we had to use
small input alphabets and could not learn server implementations. Poor scalablity is
caused in part by inefficiencies in the classical learning framework which arise when
processing counterexamples. Counterexamples driving the learning process often con-
tain complicating information, such as unnecessary inputs or confusing data relations.
Unnecessary inputs make counterexamples longer than needed. Confusing data relati-
ons make it difficult to identify those which are relevant from a counterexample. To
give a concrete example, consider a login system with register and login methods both
carrying a user ID and password as parameters. Also consider two counterexample
traces exercising the same functionality on the login system: (c1) register(0,0)
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ok() login(0,0) ok() and (c2) register(0,1) ok() login(0,1) ok(). (c1) con-
tains confusing data relations binding user IDs also to passwords, when in fact, it is
irrelevant that they are equal. By contrast, (c2) contains only the relevant relations
and is not confusing.
The presence of either unnecessary inputs or confusing data relations in counterex-
amples can adversely impact the performance of active learning algorithms, causing
them to run many more tests (and inputs) than necessary. To give an intuition of
the impact, imagine if in the learning run of Section 1.4 we would have found the
counterexample connect msg msg connect connect msg. Without further proces-
sing of this counterexample, we might have very well used the suffix msg connect
connect msg as a distinguishing sequence. This suffix has twice as many inputs as
the compact msg msg we used in the learning run, and thus leads to longer tests. The
suffix is made longer by two unnecessary connect inputs. Confusing data relations
hide away the relevant relations. In the context of tree queries, we want to optimize
suffix execution only considering relations that are relevant and not those that are
irrelevant (such as a user ID being equal to a password).
State-of-the-art algorithms such as TTT effectively tackle the problem of unnecessary
inputs for DFAs and Mealy machines. Yet the problem still plagues learners for more
advanced formalisms such as RAs. Chapter 4 provides a way of dealing with confusing
data relations by a disambiguation step in which all relations are tested, but this
procedure is very costly in terms of the number of tests required.
Contribution Chapter 6 proposes a framework based on Satisfiability Modulo
Theories (SMT [33]) which intrinsically avoids problems arising with counterexamples.
The underlining idea is to separate concerns between the learner and the tester. The
learner is no longer able to run tests, its task is reduced to that of generating a
hypothesis consistent with a set of observations. The tester is the one performing
tests. Counterexamples found by the tester are incorporated by the learner into more
refined hypotheses. As it no longer needs to run tests, the learner can also operate in
a passive setting, where from a set of logged observations, it can build a hypothesis.
By using what is effectively a passive learner in an active setting, we aim to answer
a more general question, namely, how does such an approach perform in practical
benchmarks compared to the classical active setting using active learning algorithms?
As the chapter shows, it is at least competitive.
The proposed framework uses SMT to implement the learner. More specifically,
counterexamples found by the tester are encoded into SMT constraints over the
functions comprising the formalism definition. The constraints are then supplied
to an SMT solver. From the solution provided, the learner generates a hypothesis
model which it sends to the tester. This approach benefits from the capacity of SMT
solvers to handle advanced arithmetic, which opens the door to the rapid prototyping
of learning for advanced formalisms. To that end, we formalize encodings for both
conventional FSMs such as DFAs and Mealy machines, and for advanced formalisms
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such as RAs with equality and fresh values. Our framework is also highly adaptable,
as shown in the provided adaptations to learning systems without resets. Additionally,
by removing from the learner the ability to run tests, learning performance is no longer
affected by complicating information in counterexamples.
We have implemented this framework in the open-source learning tool Z3GI3, and
have shown its effectiveness over a series of experiments, where we compare it to other
learners following the classical learning framework. Our tool implements an all purpose
learner, in the sense that, it can infer models for many formalisms, including DFAs,
Mealy machines, accepting/rejecting RAs and regular input/output RAs (termed
IORA in this chapter). It implements learning both actively and passively and can
also learn Mealy machines that cannot be reset. Moreover, our tool’s decoupled
architecture allows encodings to be swapped while the rest of the framework stays the
same, facilitating the probing of new encodings.
A setting similar to ours was previously introduced in [213], where the authors
connect a passive learner to a model-based tester, though their realization is markedly
different, provides no guarantees on the minimality of the learned model and can
only learn one specific formalism, in the form of Partial Labeled Transition Systems
(PLTS). We additionally compare our approach to the classical one over a series of
experiments.
Passive learning using SMT solvers is also not new. Neider et al. [161,162] propose
an SMT-based passive learning approach for FSMs using encodings similar to ours.
The approach is shown to be effective even when compared to more involving SAT-
based approaches. We improve upon this work adapting the SMT-based approach to
richer classes of automata. Moreover, we assess the effectiveness of such an approach
when used in an active way, by drawing comparison with classical active learning
approaches.
1.6 Related Work
This section gives an overview of works closely related to our area of research. We
attempt to group these works, noting that there is a varying degree of interrelation
between works of different groups, as there is between active model learning, testing,
reverse engineering and other fields.
1.6.1 Applications of Model Learning to Software Analysis
The idea to use model learning as means of analyzing software originates from work
by Peled et al. [170], who proposed a conformance testing approach combining model
learning via L∗ and model checking under the name black box checking. The concept
was further advanced and applied in [99]. Meinke et al. introduce a similar methodology
3https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/rick/z3gi/tree/lata/z3gi
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in [149,150] under the name learning-based testing. The overriding idea is to use model
learning as means of generating better tests, that is, tests that more likely detect non-
conformance to supplied specifications. Meinke et al. instantiate the learning-based
testing framework, along with specific learning algorithms, for formalisms including
first-order functions [149,150] and Kripke structures [151]. Subsequent work introduces
the tool LBTest which implements this methodology for Kripke structures [152]. The
tool connects the IKL learning algorithm [151] to the NuSMV model checker [165].
Given formal specifications and a black-box system, the tool produces True/False
verdicts for compliance to each specification.
Hagerer et al. [101] are the first to frame model learning in a practical setting. They
improve the testing of a telecommunications system by leveraging models obtained
for its components. Margaria et al. [147] later adapt and apply model learning to
derive models of the switch within this system. Model learning has since seen many
applications in the area of testing. Raffelt et al. [177] provide a proof of concept for
using learning to infer a renown bug tracking system and router [177]. Later work by
Windmu¨ller et al. [220] leverages model learning in the regression testing of an editorial
system. In a similar case study, Schuts et al. [184] use model learning to improve a
new implementation of a Philips legacy control component. Khalili et al. [129] apply
model learning to the middleware of a robotic platform. The generated models are
then used for the verification of the platform’s control software.
Some applications involve security settings. Cho et al. [64] use model learning to
infer models of botnets. Analysis of these models uncovered a design flaw in the
MegaD botnet’s infrastructure. In subsequent work [63], they use the learning tool
MACE to analyze implementations of the SMB protocol and were able to find multiple
vulnerabilities. De Ruiter et al. [181] generate Mealy machines for different TLS
client and server implementation, and discover several implementation flaws which
prompted fixes by developers. Tappler at al. [200] infer models of five different broker
implementations of the MQTT protocol. They check the models by manually analyzing
traces (sequences of inputs/outputs) exposing differences between pairs of the learned
models, and find 18 bugs. Other applications of model learning include analysis of a
biometric passport [11], several EMV bank cards [3], hand-held readers [59], filter and
sanitizer programs [21,22,43], and web applications [24].
1.6.2 Algorithms for Learning Models with Data
Over the course of time, several active learning algorithms have been proposed for
inferring models with data. As the algorithms are varied, we describe them more in
terms of their restrictions and only occasionally expand upon their inner workings,
referring the reader to their corresponding references for details. We also discuss
passive learning approaches in closing.
Automata modeling data fit within the broader class of automata, namely, that of
automata with (possibly) infinite alphabets. Finite-memory automata [126] are among
the first formalisms developed within this class. They resemble a restricted class
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of acceptor RAs with equalities but no message names, which impose restrictions
on the way values are stored in registers, such as no two registers can store the
same values (we call this unique-valuedness). Finite-memory automata are also the
first automata with infinite alphabets for which an active learning algorithm was
developed. The algorithm of Sakamoto [182] ran iterations of L∗ with growing sets of
values until the set was large enough to capture the whole language. Each iteration
resulted in a DFA, which was subsequently translated to a corresponding finite-memory
automata. Scalability of the algorithm is worsened by it having to restart L∗ on each
counterexample processed. It is still, nevertheless, remarkable that learning for such
an expressive class of systems was formulated this early (the work dates back to 1997).
Unfortunately, as finite-memory automata were mainly meant as theoretical tools for
modeling and proving properties on languages with infinite alphabets, the algorithm
has seen limited use in practice.
The first learning algorithm for parameterized systems was introduced by Berg et
al. in [30] with the goal of learning protocol entities. The models learned were
parameterized, but did not have registers, parameters were restricted to boolean values
and only guards were allowed on transitions. Shahbaz and Li et al. [139, 186, 189]
remedied this through learning algorithms which supported parameterized systems
with unbounded parameter domains. The models inferred still did not have registers,
however, and had guards defined over state-local concrete values. Berg et al. in [31]
formalize the first algorithm capable of learning fully operational RAs with equalities.
Therein, a Mealy machine is first inferred using an alphabet flattened with a small
set of values. The machine is then condensed into an RA with equalities. While free
of any of the previous restrictions, the approach is hampered by the poor scalability
of learning with large alphabets. We can readily note similarities with prior work on
learning finite-memory automata.
Earlier attempts on using handcrafted abstractions for learning protocol simulations [9],
inspired works by Howar and Aarts et al. [7, 117] to formulate automated abstraction-
based algorithms for learning RAs with equalities and potentially unbounded parameter
domains. These algorithms automatically determine abstractions through iterations of
automated abstraction refinement. Isberner et al. [120] introduce the idea of state-local
abstractions, namely, that some abstractions are only relevant in certain states (for
example, logging in with a valid username is only relevant in states reached after
registering). The idea came in a context where previous approaches employed global
abstractions. A new learning algorithm is formulated based on this idea which produces
more succint models, while using fewer tests. Abstraction refinement also lies at the
core of the algorithm implemented in MACE [63], though that algorithm requires
manual specification of an output abstraction function.
Howar et al. [57,121] introduce an algorithm capable of inferring canonical and succint
acceptor RAs with equalities (or so called data languages). Canonicity provides a
unique form to all models expressing the same behavior, whereas succintness ensures the
capturing of behavior by a compact representation. The canonical form is formulated
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first in [55] for RAs with equalities, and later extended to RAs with binary relations [56].
The canonical form presented is succint, as it is free of restrictions normally imposed
on models with data, like unique-valuedness in the case of finite-memory automata.
Some restrictions remain however, notably right invariance, which is touched upon
in Chapter 4. As an aside, previous works defined similar canonical forms for finite-
memory automata in [26,27]. An extension of the RA learning algorithm [58] generalizes
it to other operations, while conditioning canonicity to provision of a canonical tree
oracle.
The problem of fresh values was first tackled by Bollig et al. [37], with an algorithm
capable of learning session automata. The algorithm builds on the idea that a
newly introduced value only has impact within a session. Once the session ends, the
value can be forgotten. Session automata are similar to RAs with equalities and
unbounded parameter domains, which can express fresh values. Nevertheless, their
expressive power is limited. They cannot express, for example, languages containing
only sequences of letters where every two consecutive letters are distinct. Fresh values
were also tackled in the learner SIMPA [24], which uses a tabled learning algorithm,
and data mining as means of inferring guards.
More recently, Moerman et al. [156] formulate algorithms based on L∗ [19] and
its extension to non-deterministic DFAs [36], for learning deterministic and non-
deterministic nominal automata [35] with equalities. In concise form, these resemble
acceptor RAs with equalities without methods, just values (i.e. letters). Their
algorithm is based on nominal set theory [172]. Prefixes and suffixes are arranged in an
observation table as in L∗, but are no longer encoded by single sequences. Instead they
are encoded by sets over the infinite alphabet. These sets, while infinite in the number
of elements, admit a finite representation which is achieved using orbits. For example,
supposing a and b are two distinct letters from the alphabet, the orbit of a is the set of
all 1 letter sequences, whereas the orbit of ab is the set of all 2 distinct letter sequences.
The data structures stored in the table are functions which compactly describe the
behavior of the automaton over the set obtained by extending each element of the
prefix with each element of the suffix. Their algorithm can be easily adapted to
nominal automata with inequalities by virtue of the swappable underlying structure it
builds on.
Other works such as [80, 146,153] develop algorithms for inferring acceptor symbolic
automata. These can be seen as acceptor RAs without registers. The algorithms
introduced by Botincˇan and Argyros et al. [22,43] can learn extended transducer forms
of these automata. For example, the algorithm in [43] infers models extended with the
notion of a lookback parameterized by n, which allows transitions to refer to any of the
n last introduced values. Giannakopoulou et al. and Howar et al. [95, 157] developed
a white-box algorithm to infer component interfaces of Java programs. The inferred
models resemble symbolic automata; transitions are labeled with method names and
guarded with constraints on the corresponding method parameters. The automata
capture the safety behavior (i.e. are exceptions generated?) a Java class exhibits by
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invoking sequences of its public methods.
In the context of passive learning, which entails extracting information from a set of
traces, data and control aspects have traditionally been analyzed separately. With
regards to data, we mention the tool Daikon, which implements various techniques for
invariant extraction from traces generated by execution of an instrumented program
[78,79, 81, 82]. Research on Daikon has spun the development of new techniques that
leverage symbolic execution in order to produce fewer and more useful invariants
[72, 226]. In the context of control, notable are the classical state machine extraction
techniques such as Gold’s algorithm, Regular Positive and Negative Inference (RPNI)
and Evidence-Driven State Merging (EDSM). These algorithms are used to extract a
DFA from a set of positive and negative traces (or samples). We refer the reader to [108]
for an overview of these algorithms. More advanced solutions for the same problem have
been developed like DFASAT [106], which encodes learning as a Satisfiability (SAT)
problem and solves it using a SAT solver. In a similar way, Neider et al. [161, 162]
encode learning as an SMT problem and solve it using an SMT solver. Neider’s
thesis [162] also provides a detailed comparison between the various passive learning
approaches.
Data and control are facets that only combined can give a complete description of
software behavior. It is only in recent works, that attempts have been made to extract
models capturing both aspects. Some approaches extract EFSMs from the specification
of a program in the context of automata-based programming. Ulyansev et al. [204] use
an adaptation of the DFASAT algorithm to infer EFSMs from test scenarios. Test
scenarios are sequences of elements, where each element comprises the triggering event
(can be seen as input), a condition (can be seen as a guard) and one or more outputs
generated. Later work [62] extracts automata from both test scenarios and a set of
supplied temporal specifications (LTLs). It encodes automata extraction from test
scenarios as a Constraint Satisfiability Problem (CSP), which it solves with a CSP
solver. Using CSP instead of SAT simplifies the encoding. The EFSM obtained is
verified against the supplied LTLs. In case it doesn’t conform to all, the model and
specification are inputted to an approach based on ant colony optimization [61].
Other approaches obtain EFSMs from program traces generated from program exe-
cution, comprising sequences of method calls joined by valuations over variables and
method parameters. These expose less information than test scenarios (guards are
hidden) and can be generated in an automated way. Lorenzoli et al. [144] define the
GK-tails algorithm which uses Daikon and the K-tails [34] state merging algorithm
to obtain EFSMs models from program traces. The EFSMs generated are similar to
the RAs presented here. Similar traces are joined together into a single trace. The
resulting traces are then decorated using Daikon with invariants over the variables and
method parameters. From the decorated traces, a model is generated using K-tails
(states whose next K sequences are similar are merged). The model’s guards comprise
the invariants Daikon derived. Krka et al. [133] adapt the GK-tails algorithm by only
allowing merging of states having the same program state. Their work evaluates four
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different strategies for model synthesis based on invariants or trace sequences. In
the context of fault analysis, a different approach [148] applies rewriting rules on the
traces, replacing concrete data values by abstract ones, and inputs the rewritten traces
to a passive FSM learner.
Walkinshaw et al. [215] remarked that while the EFSMs generated by GK-tails are
informative and reasonably concise, they are generally non-deterministic (a consequence
of transitions being analyzed individually) which reduces their practicality. Moreover,
model expressivity is tied to Daikon’s invariants, making the approach less flexible.
Walkinshaw et al. formulate a different EDSM algorithm which uses data classifiers
(such as if-then-else clauses or binary decision trees) to determine which states can
be merged, and to implement the transition guards. Data classifiers are generated by
applying data classifier inference techniques over the set of traces. They implement
this approach in the tool MINT, which they connect to the WEKA [102] classifier
framework, providing access to around 100 classifier inference techniques. Approaches
so far generate EFSMs that are partial, as they specify only specify guards and not how
variables are updated. In a later work, Walkinshaw et al. [214] address this problem by
augmenting the EFSMs with update functions inferred by Genetic Programming [132],
resulting in fully computational models.
1.6.3 Optimizations to the Active Learning Framework
Recent optimizations of the learning setting have involved reducing learning algorithm
overhead, ensuring quality of subsequent hypothesis during learning and better testing.
We refer to [119] for a thorough overview of earlier advancements.
Our experience in Chapters 4 and 6 has shown that in terms of the number of tests
needed to learn a model, the best performing algorithms are those which require the
fewest tests to incorporate counterexamples into their structure and produce new
hypotheses. In other words, learners with the least overhead are the most efficient.
Recent advancements have tackled this overhead by shorter counterexamples and
optimized data structures.
Aarts et al. [2] noted that shorter counterexamples reduce the overall number of
tests required, as they result in shorter suffixes. Consequently, they incorporated
into their RA learning algorithm, techniques introduced by Koopman et al. [131] for
counterexample shrinking. These techniques involve eliminating from counterexamples
single transitions or sequences which form loops in the last hypothesis. The effectiveness
of applying these techniques was evidenced in [8], which compared existing RA
learning approaches. Therein, loop elimination was shown to have a marked effect in
shortening counterexamples, and consequently in reducing the number of tests needed
for learning.
Reduction in test numbers can also be attained by using optimized data structures.
Observation tables provide an intuitive, yet costly way of encoding observations. The
cost lies not so much in the memory footprint, as it does in the number of tests
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needed to close a table and build a new hypothesis. Some of these tests might be
meaningless with regards to incorporating the essence of the last counterexample,
yet are needed as a side-effect of the structure used and of the redundancies often
present in counterexamples. Kearns and Vazirani [127] introduced discrimination trees
(they call ’classification trees’) as an alternative to observation tables. More advanced
algorithms such as the Observation Pack [116] and TTT [122] incorporate similar
structures. The work in [122] benchmarks different learning algorithms and shows
the effectiveness of TTT, and more generally, of algorithms based on discrimination
trees
A different line of work follows the quality of hypotheses generated in learning. The
aim is to ensure that every new hypothesis is at least just as good qualitatively as
the last. Comparing hypothesis is done on the basis of a distance metric. Smetsers
et al. [197] formalize a metric based on the minimal-length counterexample which
distinguishes a hypothesis from the SUL. A hypothesis is better if the minimal-length
counterexample is longer. This metric follows the remark of Alfaro et al. [75] that a
potential bug in the far-away future is less troubling than a potential bug today.
Smetsers et al. integrate the metric into L∗ by adding an additional check performed
on each newly generated hypothesis, comparing it to the previous. This comparison
results either in a quality guarantee or in a new counterexample for the learner. Later
work by Van den Bos et al. [207] enhances Angluin’s framework by adding a general
Comparator component to perform the comparison based on a given metric. They
also introduce a new metric centered on the distance of a hypothesis to a set of logs.
While ensuring a notion of quality was the main goal, both works note a decrease in
the number of tests as a (desirable) side-effect of enforcing these metrics.
Finally, learning correct models cannot be done without effective testers. Our case
studies have used the model-based algorithm introduced in [191]. The novelty of
the algorithm lies in forming a test by post-pending to a sequence of inputs leading
to a state, an adaptive distinguishing sequence which distinguishes this state. By
comparison, other model-based algorithms (W-method [65] and Wp-method [92])
post-pend other forms of separating sequences. The conception of this algorithm was
prompted by failure of the W and Wp-method algorithms to find counterexamples
to an invalid hypothesis in an industrial case study [190]. On the note of separating
sequences for states in the model, Smetsers et al. [195] propose a more efficient
algorithm for computing them, which can be used to enhance the performance of
classical test algorithms like the W-method.
A different approach used in [16] adapts model-based mutation testing (shown to be
effective in [14,15]) for learning Mealy machines. The resulting algorithm compares
favorably to that in [191] on the TCP and MQTT models inferred in [88,200]. Yoo
et al. [225] propose a different test approach whereby testing is done using a com-
bination of the W-method and random sampling. Effectiveness is shown through
learning experiments on the DNP3 protocol. Alternatively, in a context where several
implementations are learned simultaneously, counterexamples can be derived from
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differences between the hypotheses generated, as done so in [21].
Testing approaches presented so far have been mainly guided by models (model-based).
In the context of conformance testing however, it is specifications which we want to
check. So it is natural to design tests on the basis of these specifications. To that end,
works proposing integration of model checking with model learning [149–152,170] use
counterexamples supplied by the model checker to drive the learning process.
Moving away from black-box settings, white-box methods can also prove effective.
For example, the learning algorithms in [63] and [157] use symbolic or concolic
execution [130] to instantiate tests exploring paths in programs. The effectiveness
of symbolic execution compared to black-box approaches was shown in case studies
involving the concolic execution tool JDart [94, 145]. Smetsers et al. [196] propose
an alternative approach whereby testing is done by fuzzing. Their combined model
learning and fuzzing approach scored very well in the RERS 2016 challenge [180], a
competition which aims at comparing verification techniques and tools. For fuzzing,
they used the tool American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [13], which helped uncover behaviors
that weren’t found using an adapted Wp-method.
1.6.4 Tools for Reverse Engineering
Our last section covers tools for reverse engineering. Model learning itself can be
viewed as a reverse engineering technique. That said, model learning relies on kno-
wing the SUL’s interface. Such knowledge cannot always be guaranteed, especially
when considering botnets, whose protocols are purposefully hidden. Consequently,
interface inference becomes a key problem. Interfaces comprise the message formats
an application uses.
Among tools supporting interface inference, Discoverer [73], Biprominer [216], Veritas
[218] and ProDecoder [217] generate message formats solely from network traces.
To shed insight into how inference can be done, we give a rough description of the
mode of operation followed by Veritas and ProDecoder. Raw packets obtained in
an observation step are decomposed into sequences of n contiguous bytes (so called
n-grams). Keywords are identified from these sequences (for example GET for HTTP),
distinguished by the high frequency with which they appear, and then used in machine
learning to group messages of the same type into clusters. From each cluster a message
format is derived (a way to do this is via sequence alignment techniques such as those
in [160] and [83]).
Other tools use the application’s binary in dynamic taint analysis. This technique
involves monitoring how the application processes inputs in order the extract their
formats. Polyglot [52], AutoFormat [141], Tupni [74] and Dispatcher [51] fit in this
category. We can also include Autogram [111], a tool developed for Java programs
(thus uses application bytecode) to learn context free grammars.
Having obtained the interface, we can then perform model inference. Tools relying on
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provision of the interface include all active learning tools, of which we mention Tomte4
and RALib5 [54] for learning RAs, LearnLib [123]6, AIDE7 [17] and libalf8 [140] for
learning variations of FSMs. From passive learning tools we mention dfasat9 [106],
StateChum10 [212] and MINT11 [215], the latter designed for EFSM synthesis. Other
tools integrate interface inference with model inference, Netzob12 [40,42] being a prime
example. Once it has obtained packet formats from traces (using techniques described
in [41]), Netzob uses an adaptation of Angluin’s active learning algorithm to infer
transition graphs which can then be used in protocol analysis.
Work in [24] introduces a model-based toolchain for security testing of web applications.
Therein, two approaches are described for inferring models of web applications. One
relies on a Web crawler to extract an interface and active learning to infer a model using
this interface [112], the other uses static analysis to generate a model [155].
4http://tomte.cs.ru.nl/
5https://bitbucket.org/learnlib/ralib/
6https://learnlib.de/
7http://aide.codeplex.com/
8http://libalf.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/
9https://bitbucket.org/chrshmmmr/dfasat/
10http://statechum.sourceforge.net/
11https://bitbucket.org/nwalkinshaw/efsminferencetool/
12https://github.com/netzob/netzob/
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1.7 Thesis Contents and Personal Contribution
We end the introduction by recapping the contents of the thesis while noting the
author’s personal contribution. The thesis gathers works from four peer-reviewed
articles published at workshops or conferences and one unpublished journal entry
which extends a separate article that was also peer-reviewed. Each work is included
in a separate chapter. The author has made a significant contribution to each work,
nevertheless, it is important to stress out that all works resulted from collaborative
efforts.
Chapter 2 describes a case study involving model learning with mappers and model
checking TCP implementations. Chapter 2 is based on the following publication:
P. Fitera˘u-Bros¸tean, R. Janssen, and F. Vaandrager. Combining Model Learning
and Model Checking to Analyze TCP Implementations. In CAV 2016, volume
9780 of LNCS, pages 454–471. Springer, 2016 [88]
This publication largely supersedes the following article:
P. Fitera˘u-Bros¸tean, R. Janssen, and F. Vaandrager. Learning Fragments of the
TCP Network Protocol. In FMICS 2014, volume 8718 of LNCS, pages 78–93.
Springer, 2014 [87]
All data relevant to Chapter 2 has been deposited and is available at:
P. Fitera˘u-Bros¸tean, R. Janssen, and F. Vaandrager. Source code and data
relevant for the paper ’Combining Model Learning and Model Checking to
Analyze TCP Implementations’. 2017. doi: 10.17026/dans-xhw-8tyc [86]
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Chapter 2
Model Learning and Model Checking of
TCP Implementations
We combine model learning and model checking in a challenging case study
involving Linux, Windows and FreeBSD implementations of TCP. We use model
learning to infer models of different software components and then apply model
checking to fully explore what may happen when these components (e.g. a Linux
client and a Windows server) interact. Our analysis reveals several instances in
which TCP implementations do not conform to their RFC specifications.
2.1 Introduction
Our society has become completely dependent on network and security protocols such
as TCP/IP, SSH, TLS, Bluetooth, and EMV. Protocol specification or implementation
errors may lead to security breaches or even complete network failures, and hence
many studies have applied model checking to these protocols in order to find such
errors. Since exhaustive model checking of protocol implementations is usually not
feasible [124], two alternative approaches have been pursued in the literature. This
chapter proposes a third approach.
A first approach, followed in many studies, is to use model checking for analysis of
models that have been handcrafted starting from protocol standards. Through this
approach many bugs have been detected, see e.g. [28, 48,109,135,142,199]. However,
as observed in [46], the relationships between a handcrafted model of a protocol and
the corresponding standard are typically obscure, undermining the reliability and
relevance of the obtained verification results. In addition, implementations of protocols
frequently do not conform to their specification. Bugs specific to an implementation
can never be captured using this way of model checking. In [87], for instance, we showed
that both the Windows 8 and Ubuntu 13.10 implementations of TCP violate the
standard. In [181], new security flaws were found in three of the TLS implementations
that were analyzed, all due to violations of the standard. In [59] and [208] it was shown
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that implementations of a protocol for Internet banking and of SSH, respectively,
violate their specification.
A second approach has been pioneered by Musuvathi and Engler [158]. Using the CMC
model checker [159], they model checked the “hardest thing [they] could think of”, the
Linux kernel’s implementation of TCP. Their idea was to run the entire Linux kernel
as a CMC process. Transitions in the model checker correspond to events like calls
from the upper layer, and sending and receiving packets. Each state of the resulting
CMC model is around 250 kilobytes. Since CMC cannot exhaustively explore the
state space, it focuses on exploring states that are the most different from previously
explored states using various heuristics and by exploiting symmetries. Through their
analysis, Musuvathi and Engler found four bugs in the Linux TCP implementation.
One could argue that, according to textbook definitions of model checking [23, 68],
what Musuvathi and Engler do is not model checking but rather a smart form of
testing.
The approach we explore in this chapter uses model learning. Model learning, or active
automata learning [2, 19, 198], is emerging as a highly effective technique to obtain
models of protocol implementations. In fact, all the standard violations reported
in [59, 87, 181, 208] have been discovered (or reconfirmed) with the help of model
learning. The goal of model learning is to obtain a state model of a black-box system
by providing inputs to and observing outputs. This approach makes it possible to
obtain models that fully correspond to the observed behavior of the implementation.
Since the models are derived from a finite number of observations, we can (without
additional assumptions) never be sure that they are correct: even when a model is
consistent with all the observations up until today, we cannot exclude the possibility
that there will be a discrepancy tomorrow. Nevertheless, through application of
conformance testing algorithms [137], we may increase confidence in the correctness of
the learned models. In many recent studies, state-of-the-art tools such as LearnLib [198]
routinely succeeded to learn correct models efficiently. In the absence of a tractable
white-box model of a protocol implementation, a learned model is often an excellent
alternative that may be obtained at relatively low cost.
The main contribution of this chapter is the combined application of model checking,
model learning and abstraction techniques in a challenging case study involving Linux,
Windows and FreeBSD implementations of TCP. Using model learning and abstraction
we infer models of different software components and then apply model checking to
explore what may happen when these components (e.g. a Linux client and a Windows
server) interact.
The idea to combine model checking and model learning was pioneered in [170], under
the name of black box checking. In [151], a similar methodology was introduced to
use learning and model checking to obtain a strong model-based testing approach.
Following [151,170], model checkers are commonly used to analyze models obtained via
automata learning. However, most of these applications only consider specifications
of a single system component, and do not analyze networks of learned models. An
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exception is the work of Shahbaz and Groz [188] on integration testing, in which
learned component models are composed and then analyzed using reachability analysis
in order to find integration faults. Our results considerably extend our previous work
on learning fragments of TCP [87] since we have (1) added inputs corresponding to
calls from the upper layer, (2) added transmission of data, (3) inferred models of
TCP clients in addition to servers, and (4) learned models for FreeBSD in addition to
Windows and Linux. Abstraction is the key for scaling existing automata learning
methods to realistic applications. In order to obtain tractable models we use the
theory of abstractions from [10], which in turn is inspired by earlier work on predicate
abstraction [67,143]. Our use of abstractions is similar to that of Cho et al [64], who
used abstractions to infer models of realistic botnet command and control protocols.
Whereas in our previous studies on model learning the abstractions were implemented
by ad-hoc Java programs, we now define them in a more systematic manner. We
provide a language for defining abstractions, and from this definition we automatically
generate mapper components for learning and model checking.
Our method may be viewed as a smart black-box testing approach that combines the
strengths of model learning and model checking. The main advantage of our method
compared to approaches in which models are handcrafted based on specifications is
that we analyze the “real thing” and may find “bugs” in implementations. In fact, our
analysis revealed several instances in which TCP implementations do not conform to
the standard. Compared to the white-box approach of Musuvathi and Engler [158], our
black-box method has several advantages. First of all, we obtain explicit component
models that can be fully explored using model checking. Also, our method appears to
be easier to apply and is more flexible. For instance, once we had learned a model
of the Linux implementation it took just two days to learn a model of the Windows
implementation. In the approach of [158], one first would need to get access to the
proprietary code from Microsoft, and then start more or less from scratch from an
entirely different code base. In contrast, using our approach it is possible to learn a
model of any TCP implementation within a few days. Besides these practical benefits,
there is also an important philosophical advantage. If one constructs a model of some
real-world phenomenon or system and makes claims based on this model then, in
line with Popper [175], we think this model ought to be falsifiable. Our model of
the Windows 8 TCP client is included in the chapter in Figure 2.2, and all Mealy
machine and nuSMV models are available at 1. Our notion of state is clear and based
on the Nerode congruence [163]: two traces lead to the same state unless there is a
distinguishing suffix. Any researcher can study our models and point out mistakes. In
contrast, the model of Musuvathi is specified implicitly through heuristics (when have
we seen a state before?) that are programmed on top of the Linux implementation.
As a result, falsification of their model is virtually impossible.
1http://www.sws.cs.ru.nl/publications/papers/fvaan/FJV2016/
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2.2 Background on Model Learning
Mealy machines
During model learning, we represent protocol entities as Mealy machines. A Mealy
machine is a tuple M = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉, where I, O, and Q are finite sets of input
actions, output actions, and states, respectively, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and
→⊆ Q× I ×O×Q is the transition relation. We write q i/o−−→ q′ if (q, i, o, q′) ∈→. We
assume M to be input enabled (or completely specified) in the sense that, for each
state q and input i, there is a transition q
i/o−−→ q′, for some o and q′. We call M
deterministic if for each state q and input i there is exactly one output o and one state
q′ such that q
i/o−−→ q′. We call M weakly deterministic if for each state q, input i and
output o there is exactly one state q′ with q
i/o−−→ q′.
Let σ = i1 · · · in ∈ I∗ and ρ = o1 · · · on ∈ O∗. Then ρ is an observation triggered
by σ in M, notation ρ ∈ AM(σ), if there are q0 · · · qn ∈ Q∗ such that q0 = q0 and
qj−1
ij/oj−−−→ qj , for all j with 0 ≤ j < n. If M and M′ are Mealy machines with
the same inputs I and outputs O, then we write M ≤ M′ if, for each σ ∈ I∗,
AM(σ) ⊆ AM′(σ). We say that M and M′ are (behaviorally) equivalent, notation
M≈M′, if both M≤M′ and M′ ≤M.
If M is deterministic, then AM(σ) is a singleton set for each input sequence σ. In
this case, M can equivalently be represented as a structure 〈I,O,Q, q0, δ, λ〉, with
δ : Q× I → Q, λ : Q× I → O, and q i/o−−→ q′ ⇒ δ(q, i) = q′ ∧ λ(q, i) = o.
MAT framework
The most efficient algorithms for model learning all follow the pattern of a minimally
adequate teacher (MAT) as proposed by Angluin [19]. In the MAT framework, learning
is viewed as a game in which a learner has to infer an unknown automaton by asking
queries to a teacher. The teacher knows the automaton, which in our setting is
a deterministic Mealy machine M. Initially, the learner only knows the inputs I
and outputs O of M. The task of the learner is to learn M through two types of
queries:
• With a membership query, the learner asks what the response is to an input
sequence σ ∈ I∗. The teacher answers with the output sequence in AM(σ).
• With an equivalence query, the learner asks whether a hypothesized Mealy
machine H is correct, that is, whether H ≈ M. The teacher answers yes if
this is the case. Otherwise it answers no and supplies a counterexample, which
is a sequence σ ∈ I∗ that triggers a different output sequence for both Mealy
machines, that is, AH(σ) 6= AM(σ).
Starting from Angluin’s seminal L∗ algorithm [19], many algorithms have been proposed
for learning finite, deterministic Mealy machines via a finite number of queries. We
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refer to [119] for recent overview. In applications in which one wants to learn a model of
a black-box reactive system, the teacher typically consists of a System Under Learning
(sul) that answers the membership queries, and a conformance testing tool [137]
that approximates the equivalence queries using a set of test queries. A test query
consists of asking to the sul for the response to an input sequence σ ∈ I∗, similar to
a membership query.
Abstraction
We recall relevant parts of the theory of abstractions from [10]. Existing model learning
algorithms are only effective when applied to Mealy machines with small sets of inputs,
e.g. fewer than 100 elements. Practical systems like TCP, however, typically have
huge alphabets, since inputs and outputs carry parameters of type integer or string.
In order to learn an over-approximation of a “large” Mealy machine M, we place a
transducer in between the teacher and the learner, which translates concrete inputs in
I to abstract inputs in X, concrete outputs in O to abstract outputs in Y , and vice
versa. This allows us to abstract a Mealy machine with concrete symbols in I and
O to a Mealy machine with abstract symbols in X and Y , reducing the task of the
learner to inferring a “small” abstract Mealy machine.
Formally, a mapper for inputs I and outputs O is a deterministic Mealy machine
A = 〈I ∪O,X ∪ Y,R, r0, δ, λ〉, where I and O are disjoint sets of concrete input and
output symbols, X and Y are disjoint sets of abstract input and output symbols, and
λ : R× (I ∪O)→ (X ∪Y ), the abstraction function, respects inputs and outputs, that
is, for all a ∈ I ∪O and r ∈ R, a ∈ I ⇔ λ(r, a) ∈ X.
Basically, the abstraction of Mealy machineM via mapper A is the Cartesian product
of the underlying transition systems. Let M = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→M〉 be a Mealy machine
and let A = 〈I ∪O,X ∪ Y,R, r0, δA, λA〉 be a mapper. Then αA(M), the abstraction
of M via A, is the Mealy machine 〈X,Y ∪ {⊥}, Q×R, (q0, r0),→α〉, where ⊥6∈ Y is a
fresh output and →α is given by the rules
q
i/o−−→M q′, r i/x−−→A r′ o/y−−→A r′′
(q, r)
x/y−−→α (q′, r′′)
6 ∃i ∈ I : r i/x−−→A
(q, r)
x/⊥−−−→α (q, r)
To understand how the mapper is utilized during learning, we follow the execution of
a single input of a query. The learner produces an abstract input x, which it sends
to the mapper. By inversely following abstraction function λA, the mapper converts
this to a concrete input i and updates its state via transition r
i/x−−→A r′. The concrete
input i is passed on to the teacher, which responds with a concrete output o according
to q
i/o−−→M q′. This triggers the transition r′ o/y−−→A r′′ in which the mapper generates
the corresponding abstract output y and updates its state again. The abstract output
is then returned to the learner.
We notice that the abstraction function is utilized invertedly when translating inputs.
More precisely, the abstract input that the learner provides is an output for the mapper.
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The translation from abstract to concrete involves picking an arbitrary concrete value
that corresponds to the given abstract value. It can be that multiple concrete values
can be picked, in which case all values should lead to the same abstract behavior, thus
ensuring that the resulting abstract model is deterministic. It can also be that no
values correspond to the input abstraction, in which case, by the second rule, ⊥ is
returned to the learner, without consulting the teacher. We define the abstraction
component implementing αA as the transducer which follows from the mapper A, but
inverts the abstraction of inputs.
From the perspective of a learner, a teacher for M and abstraction component
implementing αA together behave exactly like a teacher for αA(M). If αA(M) is
deterministic, then the learner will eventually succeed in learning a deterministic
machine H satisfying αA(M) ≈ H. In [10], also a concretization operator γA is
defined. This operator is the adjoint of the abstraction operator: it turns any abstract
machine H with symbols in X and Y into a concrete machine with symbols in I and
O. If H is deterministic then γA(H) is weakly deterministic.
As shown in [10], αA(M) ≤ H implies M≤ γA(H). This tells us that when we apply
mapper A during learning of some “large” Mealy machineM, even though we may not
be able to learn the behavior of M exactly, the concretization γA(H) of the learned
abstract model H is an over-approximation of M, that is, M≤ γA(H). Similarly to
the abstraction component, a concretization component for mapper A implements γA.
This component is again fully defined by a mapper, but handles abstraction of outputs
invertedly. During model checking, the composition of the abstract model H and the
concretization component for A provides us with an over-approximation of M.
Framework for mapper definition
In order to apply our abstraction approach, we need an abstraction and a concre-
tization component for a given mapper A. We could implement these components
separately in an arbitrary programming language, but then they would have to remain
consistent with A. Moreover, ensuring that translation in one component inverts
the corresponding translation in the other is non-trivial, and difficult to maintain, as
changes in one would have to be applied invertedly in the other.
We used an alternative approach, in which we first define a mapper and then derive
the abstraction and concretization components automatically. To this end, we built a
language for defining a mapper in terms of (finite) registers, and functions to encode
transitions and outputs. Our language supports case distinctions with programming-
style if-else-statements, and requires that every branch leads to exactly one output
and updates registers exactly once, such that the translations are complete. Except for
the restrictions of finiteness and determinism, our language has the expressiveness of
a simple programming language and should thus be usable to abstract (and concretize
reversely) a wide range of systems and protocols. Listing 2.1 shows the example of
a mapper for a simple login system. The mapper stores the first password received,
and compares subsequent passwords to it. The abstract passwords used by the learner
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are {true, false}, denoting a correct or incorrect password, respectively. At the first
attempt, true invertedly maps to any concrete password, and false maps to ⊥. Later
on true invertedly maps to the value picked the first time, while false maps to any
other value. For TCP, we define multiple abstraction functions for inputs and outputs,
in terms of multiple parameters per input or output.
Listing 2.1 A simple example mapper for a login system, in a simplified syntax
integer stored := −1;
map enter(integer password→ boolean correct)
if (stored = −1 ∧ password ≥ 0) ∨ stored = password then
correct := true
else
correct := false
update
if stored = −1 ∧ password ≥ 0 then
stored := password
else
stored := stored . Every path explicitly assigns a value
To derive the components, we need to implement the inverse of the abstraction function,
for both inputs and outputs. This can be achieved using a constraint solver or by
randomly picking concrete values until we find one that is translated to the abstract
value we want to concretize, where translation is done with the mapper in the forward
direction. The latter approach may be hard, as the concrete domain is usually very
large, while there may be only a few concrete values matching the abstract value,
meaning we would have to test many concrete values before we find a fitting one. To
that end, heuristics can help reduce the pool of selectable concrete values. Where
the latter approach improves on the former is in testing the abstraction function. We
want to ensure that different concrete values translating to the same abstract value
lead to the same abstract behavior, as the learner cannot handle non-determinism.
A constraint solver usually picks values in a very structured and deterministic way,
which does not test the abstraction function well. Picking concrete values randomly
and checking the corresponding abstract value allows more control over obtaining a
good test coverage, but is in general less scalable.
2.3 Learning Setup
2.3.1 TCP as a System under Learning
In TCP there are two interacting entities, the server and the client , which communicate
over a network through packets, comprising a header and application data. On both
sides there is an application, initiating and using the connection through socket calls.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the learning setup.
Each entity is learned separately and is a sul in the learning context. This sul thus
takes packets or socket calls as inputs. It can output packets or timeout , in case the
system does not respond with any packet. RFC 793 [176] and its extensions, most
notably [44,168], specify the protocol.
Packets are defined as tuples, comprising sequence and acknowledgement numbers,
a payload and flags. By means of abstraction, we reduce the size of sequence and
acknowledgement number spaces. Each socket call also defines an abstract and concrete
input. Whereas packet configurations are the same for both client and server, socket
calls differ. The server can listen for connections and accept them, whereas the client
can actively connect. Both parties can send and receive data, or close an established
connection (specifically, a half-duplex close [44, p. 88]). The server can additionally
close its listening socket. Values returned by socket calls are not in the output alphabet
to reduce setup complexity.
Figure 2.1 displays the learning setup used. The learner generates abstract inputs,
representing packets or socket calls. The abstraction component concretizes each
input by translating abstract parameters to concrete, and then updates its state. The
concrete inputs are then passed on to the network adapter , which in turn transforms
each input into a packet, sending it directly to the sul, or into a socket call, which it
issues to the sul adapter . The sul adapter runs on the same environment as the sul
and its sole role is to perform socket calls on the sul. Each reponse packet generated
by the sul is received by the network adapter, which retrieves the concrete output
from the packet or produces a timeout output, in case no packet was received within a
predefined time interval. The output is then sent to the abstraction component, which
computes the abstract output, updates its state again, and sends the abstract output
to the learner.
The learner is based on LearnLib [178], a Java library implementing L∗ based algorithms
for learning Mealy machines. The abstraction component is also written in Java, and
interprets and inverts a mapper. The network adapter is a Python program based
on Scapy [183], Pcapy [169], and Impacket [118]. It uses Scapy to craft TCP packets,
and Scapy together with a Pcapy and Impacket based sniffer to intercept responses.
The network adapter is connected to the sul adapter via a standard TCP connection.
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This connection is used for communicating socket calls to be made on the sul. Finally,
the sul adapter is a program which performs socket calls on command, written in C
to have low level access to socket options. The sul adapter was designed so that it
does not block. To that end, it handles blocking calls such as accept-call by launching
new threads to make these calls. For reasons we explain later, the number of active
blocking calls is kept to a maximum of one.
2.3.2 Viewing the SUL as a Mealy Machine
TCP implementations cannot be fully captured by Mealy machines. To learn a
model, we therefore need to apply some restrictions. As mentioned, the number of
possible values for the sequence and acknowledgement numbers is reduced by means
of abstractions. Furthermore, payload is limited to either 0 or 1 byte. Consequently, 1
byte of data is sent upon a send -call. Flags are limited to only the most interesting
combinations, and we also abstract away from all other fields from the TCP layer or
lower layers, allowing Scapy to pick default values.
TCP is also time-dependent. The sul may, for instance, retransmit packets if they
are not acknowledged within a specified time. The sul may also reset if it does not
receive the acknowledgement after a number of such retransmissions, or if it remains
in certain states for too long. The former we handled by having the network adapter
ignore all retransmissions. For the latter, we verified that the learning queries were
short enough so as not to cause these resets.
TCP is inherently concurrent, as a server can simultaneously handle multiple connecti-
ons. This property is difficult to capture in Mealy machines. To overcome this, the
sul adapter ensures that at most one connection is accepted at any time by using
a set of variables for locking and unlocking the accept and connect-calls. Moreover,
at most one active blocking call is allowed at any time, whereas non-blocking socket
calls can always be called. The sul adapter ignores blocking calls when one is already
pending, resulting in timeout responses.
Furthermore, the backlog size parameter defines the number of connections to be
queued up for an eventual accept-call by the server sul. The model grows linearly
with this parameter, while only exposing repetitive behavior. For this reason we set
the backlog to the value 1.
2.3.3 Technical Challenges
We overcame several technical challenges in order to learn models. Resetting the sul
and setting a proper timeout value are solved similarly to [87].
Our tooling for sniffing packets sometimes missed packets generated by the sul,
reporting erroneous timeout outputs. This induced non-deterministic behavior, as a
packet may or may not be caught, depending on timing. Each observation is therefore
repeated three times to ensure consistency. Consistent outputs are cached to speed
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up learning, and to check consistency with new observations. It also allows to restart
learning with reuse of previous observations.
In order to remove time-dependent behavior we use several TCP settings. Most
notably, we disable slow acknowledgements and enable quick acknowledgements where
possible (on Linux and FreeBSD). The intuition is that we want the sul to send
acknowledgements whenever they can be issued, instead of delaying them. We also
had to disable syn cookies in FreeBSD, as this option caused generation of the initial
sequence number in a seemingly time dependent way, instead of using fresh values.
For Linux, packets generated by a send -call were occasionaly merged with previous
unacknowledged packets, so we could only learn a model by omitting send -call, although
data packets could still be sent from the learner to the sul.
2.3.4 Mapper Definition
The mapper is based on the work of Aarts et al. [2], and on the RFCs. Socket calls
contain no parameters and do not need abstraction, so they are mapped simply with the
identity relation. TCP packets are mapped by mapping their parameters individually.
Flags are again retained by an identity relation. The sequence and acknowledgement
numbers are mapped differently for inputs and outputs; input numbers are mapped
to {valid, invalid}, and outputs are mapped to {current,next, zero, fresh}. After a
connection is set up, the mapper keeps track of the sequence number which should be
sent by the sul and learner. Valid inputs are picked according to this, whereas current
and next represent repeated or incremented numbers, respectively. The abstract
output zero denotes the concrete number zero, whereas fresh is used for all other
numbers. If no connection is established, any sequence number is valid (as the RFCs
then allow a fresh value), and the only valid acknowledgement number is zero.
Recall that concrete inputs with the same abstract value should lead to an equivalent
abstract behavior, otherwise, the behavior exposed to the learner is non-deterministic.
As valid behavior is well specified by the RFC’s, we were able to define valid inputs
based largely on the RFC’s.
Invalid inputs, by contrast to their valid counterparts, trigger behaviors that are largely
undefined by RFCs. To learn the how the sul reacts to these inputs, abstractions
should be defined precisely according to these behaviors, which is unfeasible to do by
hand. As a result, we have excluded invalid inputs from the learning alphabet.
To translate valid inputs, we first used a constraint solver which finds solutions for the
transition relation. This is done by taking the disjunction of all path constraints, similar
to symbolic execution techniques [130]. However, this did not test the abstraction well,
as the constraint solver always picks zero if possible, for example. Hence, we instead
randomly picked concrete values until we found one matching the right abstract value.
Concrete values were picked with a higher probability if they or their predecessors
had been picked or observed previously during the same run. This approach sufficed
to translate all values for our experiments.
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The concrete mappers developed are available at 2. They were implemented in the
language described in Section 2.2. Note that a mapper is available for every operating
system tested, with minor differences between mappers. These differences are the
result of adaptations made to fit the the actual implementations. These adaptations
concern cases when the sul is reset by learner inputs. The mapper should be able to
detect whenever such a reset occurs and reset its state. Most conditions encoded in
the mapper for reset detection are the same among all operating systems. There are
however a few conditions specific to certain operating systems. To give an example,
receipt of a packet containing the rst flag always indicated reset of the sul for
Linux. By contrast, for FreeBSD and Windows, depending on the flags in the packet
which prompted the reset, receipt of a rst might mean that the sul state remained
unaffected. Conditions for detecting sul reset were refined during experiments. This
was possible, since insufficient conditions lead to occurrences of non-determinism,
causing learning to fail. We refined the conditions based on these occurrences.
2.3.5 Detailed TCP Mapper Description
Having described the mapper at a high level, we present in detail the actual mapper
used for learning Linux TCP stacks. The mappers used for the other operating systems
are similar, with the few differences noted earlier.
The mapper features two components, one for processing responses generated by the
sul, the other for processing requests generated by the learner. Responses generated
by the sul are either packets or timeouts. We treat them separately. Requests made
by the learner are either socket calls or abstract packet inputs. Socket calls are not
processed, as they don’t have any parameters nor do they require the mapper to change
state. Note that both components as described here perform the transformation from
concrete to abstract. However, both can be executed invertedly: during learning the
request component is used invertedly for concretizing abstract inputs.
The mapper uses variables to keep track of the sequence numbers of the two interacting
sides (during learning, these sides are the sul and the learner). The variables form the
mapper’s state and are needed to implement the abstractions. τ is a special value used
to initialize/reset variables. It is a small negative value, lying outside of the sequence
number domain, hence its use is strictly internal to the mapper. In constructing the
mapper, we tried to limit the number of variables, so as to keep its formulation simple.
With that being said, our mapper uses the following variables:
• learnerSeq - tracks the learner sequence number
• sulSeq - tracks the sul sequence number
• learnerSeqProposed - stores the sequence number sent by the learner whenever
no sequence number is active at the learner side (learnerSeq is τ). We call
such a sequence number fresh, as it may be used to establish a new connection.
learnerSeqProposed is reset upon processing each response.
2https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/pfiteraubrostean/tcp-learner/tree/cav-aec/input/mappers
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Listing 2.2 Linux mapper: processing incoming packet responses
1: map response(flags flagsIn, int concSeq, int concAck, int concData→
flags absFlagsIn, absIn absSeq, absIn absAck)
2: absFlagsIn := flagsIn
3: if concSeq = sulSeq + 1 then
4: absSeq := next
5: else
6: if concSeq = sulSeq then
7: absSeq := current
8: else
9: if concSeq = 0 then
10: absSeq := zero
11: else
12: absSeq := fresh
13: if concAck = learnerSeq + 1 ∨ concAck = learnerSeqProposed + 1 then
14: absAck := next
15: else
16: if concAck = learnerSeq then
17: absAck := current
18: else
19: if concAck = 0 then
20: absAck := zero
21: else
22: absAck := fresh
23: update
24: if rst ∈ flagsIn ∨ (learnerSeqProposed 6= τ ∧ concAck 6= learnerSeqProposed + 1) then
25: sulSeq := τ
26: learnerSeq := τ
27: else
28: if learnerSeqProposed 6= τ ∨ concSeq = sulSeq + 1 then
29: if syn ∈ flagsIn ∨ fin ∈ flagsIn then
30: sulSeq := concSeq
31: else
32: if psh ∈ flagsIn then
33: sulSeq := sulSeq + concData
34: else
35: sulSeq := sulSeq
36: learnerSeq := concAck
37: else
38: if syn ∈ flagsIn then
39: sulSeq := concSeq
40: if concAck = zero then
41: learnerSeq := learnerSeq
42: else
43: learnerSeq := concAck
44: else
45: sulSeq := sulSeq
46: learnerSeq := learnerSeq
47: learnerSeqProposed := τ
Listing 2.2 shows the code used to process packet responses. Note that concData
stands for the payload size in a response. In lines 2-21 we compare sequence and
acknowledgement numbers to mapper variables, resulting in corresponding abstract
values. The variables are then updated using these numbers. At a high level, sulSeq and
learnerSeq are preserved unless certain situations occur which result in their change.
The code checks specifically for these situations. Lines 23-25 check if connection was
reset or could not be set up, in which case sulSeq and learnerSeq are reset. Lines 27-35
handle the general case when the packet sent by the sul was not resetting. Therein,
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sulSeq is updated in the presence of countable flags (syn and fin) or payload (suggested
by psh). learnerSeq always takes the value of the response’s acknowledgement number
(concAck), since through this number, the sul indicates the sequence number that it
next expects from the learner. Lines 37-42 handle the special case when the response
contains a syn flag yet no sequence number was proposed by the learner (this may
happen when the sul actively connects). The response sequence number is stored in
sulSeq since by including a syn flag, the sul announced that it will use this number
to establish a connection. The acknowledgment number is only stored in learnerSeq
if its value is not 0, as 0 indicates that the sul has no log of the learner’s sequence
number. In all other cases, sulSeq and learnerSeq stay the same.
Listing 2.3 Linux mapper: processing outgoing packet requests
1: map request( flags flagsOut, int concSeq, int concAck, int concData→
flags absFlagsOut, absOut absSeq, absOut absAck, int absData )
2: absData := concData, absFlagsOut := flagsOut
3: if learnerSeq = τ ∨ learnerSeq = concSeq then
4: absSeq := valid
5: else
6: absSeq := inv
7: if (sulSeq = τ ∧ concAck = 0) ∨ (sulSeq 6= τ ∧ concAck = sulSeq + 1) ∨ ack /∈ flagsOut then
8: absAck := valid
9: else
10: absAck := inv
11: update
12: if rst ∈ flagsOut ∧ absSeq = valid ∧ absAck = valid then
13: learnerSeqProposed := τ
14: sulSeq := τ
15: learnerSeq := τ
16: else
17: if learnerSeq = τ then
18: learnerSeqProposed := concSeq
19: else
20: learnerSeqProposed := τ
21: sulSeq := sulSeq
22: learnerSeq := learnerSeq
The code for processing timeout responses (not included) simply resets learnerSeqPro-
posed while preserving all other variables. Processing packet requests from the learner
(see Listing 2.3) is done in a similar way to responses, only now our abstractions are
valid/invalid. A sequence number is valid if either the learner sequence number is
not set, in which case any number is valid, or if it is equal to the learner sequence
number. All acknowledgement numbers are valid if ack is not contained in the packet
flags as the specification only requires validating acknowledgement numbers if ack is
present. If ack is contained, then valid numbers are 0 if the sul sequence number
is not set (as there is nothing to acknowledge), or the successor of sulSeq otherwise.
In the update section, we take care that we update learnerSeqProposed accordingly
and that we reset the variables whenever valid reset packets are issued. The request
component also computes abstraction for the payload size via absData. This allows
the learner to specify payload size in abstract inputs. We only used payload sizes of 0
or 1.
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2.4 Model Learning Results
Figure 2.2: Learned model for Windows 8 TCP Client. To reduce the size of the
diagram, we eliminate all self loops with timeout outputs. We replace flags and
abstractions by their capitalized initial letter and hence use s for syn, a for ack etc.
and n for next, c for current, z for zero and f for fresh. We omit input parameter
abstractions, since they are the same for all packets, namely valid for both sequence
and acknoweldgement numbers. Finally, we group inputs that trigger a transition to
the same state with the same output. Timeouts are denoted by ‘-’.
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Using the abstractions defined in Section 2.2, we learned models of the TCP client
and server for Windows 8, Ubuntu 14.04 and FreeBSD 10.2. For testing we used the
conformance testing algorithm described in [191] to generate efficient test suites which
are parameterized by a middle section of length k . Generated exhaustively, these
ensure learned model correctness, unless the respective implementation corresponds to
a model with at least k more states. For each model, we first executed a random test
suite with k of 4, up to 40000 tests for servers, and 20000 tests for clients. We then
ran an exhaustive test suite with k of 2 for servers, respectively 3 for clients.
Table 2.1 describes the setting of each of these experiments together with statistics on
learning and testing: (1) the number of states in the final model, (2) the number of
hypotheses found, (3) the total number of membership queries, (4) the total number
of unique test queries run on the sul before the last hypothesis, (5) the number of
unique test queries run to validate the last hypothesis. The models learned and other
experimental data such as input configurations used, hypothesis models generated
during learning and statistics, are available at 3.
SUL States Hyp. Mem. Q. Tests to l. Hyp. Tests on l. Hyp.
Client Windows 8 13 2 1576 1322 50243
Server Windows 8 38 10 11428 9549 65040
Client Ubuntu 14.04 15 2 1974 15268 56174
Server Ubuntu 14.04 57 14 17879 15681 66523
Client FreeBSD 10.2 12 2 1456 1964 47387
Server FreeBSD 10.2 55 18 22287 12084 75894
Table 2.1: Statistics for learning experiments
Figure 2.2 shows the model learned for the Windows 8 client. This model covers
standard client behavior, namely connection setup, sending and receiving data and
connection termination. Based on predefined access sequences, we identify each state
with its analogous state in the RFC state diagram [176, p. 23], if such a state exists.
Transitions taken during simulated communication between a Windows client and a
server are colored green. These transitions were identified during model checking, on
which we expand in Section 2.5. Models for Linux and FreeBSD clients can be found
in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
Table 2.1 shows that the models for the Linux and FreeBSD servers have more states
than for Windows, and all models have more states than described in the specification.
We attribute this to several factors. We have already mentioned that model sizes grow
linearly with the value of the backlog-parameter. While we set it to 1, the setting
is overridden by operating system imposed minimum value of 2 for FreeBSD and
Linux. Moreover, sul behavior depends on blocking system calls and on whether the
receive buffer is empty or not. Although specified, this is not modeled explicitly in
the specification state diagram. As an example, the established and close wait
states from the standard each have multiple corresponding states in the model in
Figure 2.2.
3https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/pfiteraubrostean/tcp-learner/tree/cav-aec/models
46 2. Model Learning and Model Checking of TCP Implementations
Non-conformance of implementations
Inspection of learned models revealed several cases of non-conformance to RFC’s in
the corresponding implementations.
A first non-conformance involves terminating an established connection with a close.
The resulting output should contain a fin if the closing side has read via rcv all data
received from the other side. Note that data is first received in a side’s buffer, from
which it is read and removed by rcv calls. If there is received data not yet read by
the closing side, the output should contain a rst, which would signal to the other side
an aborted termination [44, p. 88]. Windows does not conform to this, as a close
can generate a rst instead of a fin even in cases where there is no data to be read
(the data buffer is empty), namely, in states where a rcv call is pending. Figure 2.2
marks this behavior in red. FreeBSD implementations are also non-compliant, as they
always generate fin packets on a close, regardless if all data has been read. This
would arguably fall under the list of common bugs [168], namely “Failure to send
a RST after Half Duplex Close”. The learned Linux models fully comply to these
specifications.
A second non-conformance has to do with the processing of syn packets. On receiving
a syn packet in a synchronized state, if the sequence number is in “the window”
(as it always is, in our case), the connection should be reset (via a corresponding
rst packet) [176, p.71]. Linux implementations conform for syn packets but not for
syn+ack packets, to which they respond by generating an acknowledgement with no
change of state. Both Windows and FreeBSD respect this specification.
We note a final non-conformance in Windows implementations. In case the connection
does not exist (closed), a reset should be sent in response to any incoming packet
except for another reset [176, p. 36], but Windows 8 sends nothing. FreeBSD can be
configured to respond in a similar way to Windows, by changing the blackhole setting.4
This behavior is claimed to provide “some degree of protection against stealth scans”,
and is thus intentional.
2.5 Model Checking Results
2.5.1 Model Checking the Learned Behavior
We analyzed the learned models of TCP implementations using the model checker
NuSMV [66]. We composed pairs of learned client and server models with a hand-made
model of a non-lossy network, which simply delivers output from one entity as input
for the other entity. Since the abstract input and output domains are different, the
abstract models cannot communicate directly, and so we had to encode the concretized
models within NuSMV code. We wrote a script that translated the abstract Mealy
machine models from LearnLib to NuSMV modules, and another script that translated
4https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=blackhole
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Figure 2.3: Schematic overview of NuSMV-model. Only half of the setup is shown in
detail, as the model is symmetric and another TCP-entity model is connected to the
network.
the corresponding mappers to NuSMV modules. TCP entities produce abstract
outputs, which are translated to concrete. The network module then passes along
such concrete messages. Before being delivered to the other entity, these messages are
again transformed into abstract inputs. By encoding mapper functions as relations,
NuSMV is able to compute both the abstraction function and its inverse, i.e., act
as a concretization component. The global structure of the model is displayed in
Figure 2.3.
In Mealy machines, transitions are labeled by an input/output pair. In NuSMV
transitions carry no labels, and we also had to split the Mealy machine transitions into
a separate input and output part in order to enable synchronization with the network.
Thus, a single transition q
i/o−−→ q′ from a (concrete) Mealy machine is translated to a
pair of transitions in NuSMV:
(loc = q, in = .., out = ..)→(loc = q, in = i, out = ..)→(loc = q′, in = i, out = o).
Sequence and acknowledgement numbers in the implementations are 32-bit numbers,
but were restricted to 3-bit numbers to reduce the state space. Whereas concrete
messages are exchanged from one entity to the other, socket call inputs from the
application are simulated by allowing system-calls to occur non-deterministically. A
simplification we make is that we do not allow parallel actions: an action and all
resulting packets have to be fully processed until another action can be generated.
Consequently, there can be at most one packet in the composite model at any time.
For example, once a three way handshake is initiated between a client and a listening
server via a connect-call, no more system-calls can be performed until the handshake
is finalized.
2.5.2 Checking Specifications
After a model is composed, the interaction between TCP entities can be analyzed using
the NuSMV model checker. However, it is important to realize that, since we used
abstractions, the learned models of TCP servers and clients are over-approximations
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of the actual behaviors of these components. If Mealy machine M models the actual
behavior of a component, A is the mapper used, and H is the abstract model that we
learned then, as explained in Section 2.2, correctness of H implies M≤ γA(H). Since
γA(H) is weakly deterministic, in this case there exists a forward simulation relation
fromM to γA(H). This forward simulation is preserved by the translation from Mealy
machines to NuSMV. Results from Grumberg and Long [100] then imply that, for
any ∀CTL∗-formula (which includes all LTL-formulas) we can transfer model checking
results for γA(H) to the (unknown) model M. Since simulations are preserved by
composition, this result even holds when γA(H) is used as a component in a larger
model.
Another essential point is that only a subset of the abstract inputs is used for learning.
Hence invalid inputs (i.e. inputs with invalid parameters) are not included in our
models. Traces with these inputs can therefore not be checked. Hence, the first
property that we must check is a global invariant that asserts that invalid inputs will
never occur. In case they do, NuSMV will provide a counterexample, which is used
to find the cause of invalidity. During our initial experiments, NuSMV found several
counterexamples showing that invalid inputs may occur. Based on analysis of these
counterexamples we either refined/corrected the definition of one of the mappers, or
we discovered a counterexample for the correctness of one of the abstract models.
After a number of these iterations, we obtained a model in which invalid inputs can
no longer occur. As mapper construction is done manually, these iterations are also
not yet automated.
With only valid inputs, the composite model may be checked for arbitrary ∀CTL∗
formulas. Within these formulas, we may refer to input and output packets and their
constituents (sequence numbers, acknowledgements, flags,..). This yields a powerful
language for stating properties, illustrated by a few examples below. These formulas
are directly based on the RFC’s.
Many properties that are stated informally in the RFC’s refer to control states of the
protocol. These control states, however, cannot be directly observed in our black-box
setting. Nevertheless, we can identify states, e.g. based on inputs and outputs leading
to and from it. For example, we base the proposition established on RFC 793, which
states that: “The connection becomes ‘established’ when sequence numbers have been
synchronized in both directions” [176, p. 11], and that only a close or abort socket
call or incoming packets with a rst or fin can make an entity leave the established
state [176, section 3.9].
We first show a simple safety formula checking desynchonization: if one entity is in
the established state, the other cannot be in syn sent and time wait:
G¬(tcp1-state = established ∧ (tcp2-state = syn sent ∨ tcp2-state = time wait))
The next specification considers terminating an established connection with a close-
input. The output should contain a fin, except if there is unread data (in which case
it should contain a rst). This corresponds to the first non-conformance case explained
in Section 2.4. The specification is captured by the following formula, in which T is
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the triggered-operator as defined in NuSMV.
G(state = established→ ((input = rcv T input 6= packet with data) ∧ input = close)→
(F output = packet with fin)))
We have formalized and checked, in a similar way, specifications for all other non-
conforming cases as well as many other specifications.
We have also checked which transitions in the abstract models are reachable in the
composed system. For every transition, we take its input and starting state, and check
whether they can occur together. In this way we can find the reachable parts of model.
This proves useful when analyzing models, as the reachable parts likely harbor bugs
with the most impact. Similarly, comparing reachable parts helps reveal the most
relevant differences between implementations. The first and third non-conformances
in Section 2.4 occur in the reachable parts of the respective models. Figure 2.2 marks
these parts in green.
2.6 Conclusions and Future Work
We combined model learning, model checking and abstraction techniques to obtain
and analyze models of Windows, Linux and FreeBSD TCP server and client imple-
mentations. Composing these models together with the model of a network allowed us
to perform model checking over the composite setup and verify that any valid number
generated by one TCP entity is seen as valid number by the other TCP entity. We
have also identified breaches of the RFC’s in all operating systems, and confirmed
them by formulating temporal specification and checking them. Work in this chapter
suggests several directions for future work.
Based on our understanding of TCP, we manually defined abstractions (mappers)
that made it possible to learn models of TCP implementations. Getting the mapper
definitions right turned out to be tricky. In fact, we had to restrict our learning
experiments to valid abstractions of the sequence and acknowledgement numbers. This
proved limiting when searching for interesting rules to model check, like for example
those that would expose known implementation bugs. Such rules often concern invalid
parameters, which do not appear in the models we learned. Additionaly, we had
to manually refine our mapper due to counterexamples found by the model checker.
Learning algorithms that construct the abstractions automatically could potentially
solve this problem. We hope that extensions of the learning algorithms for register
automata as implemented in the Tomte [5] and RALib [53] tools will be able to
construct abstractions for TCP fully automatically.
Work in this chapter was severely restricted by the lack of expressivity of Mealy
machines. In order to squeeze the TCP implementation into a Mealy machine, we
had to eliminate timing based behavior as well as re-transmissions. Other frameworks
for modeling state machines might facilitate modeling these aspects. Obviously,
we would also need learning algorithms capable of generating such state machines.
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There has been some preliminary work on extending learning algorithms to timed
automata [98, 209], and to I/O transition systems [12, 210], with the additional benifit
of approximate learning. Approximate learning learns an upper and lower boundary
to the behavior of the system, instead of an exact model. This may allow to abstract
away the corner-cases in the model and the mapper, if they are not relevant for the
specifications. Extensions of this work could eliminate some of the restrictions that
we encountered.
2.A Model of Linux TCP Client
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Figure 2.4: Learned model for Linux TCP Client. We use all the pruning strategies
that we used for Window 8 apart from merging transitions with the same output.
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2.B Model of FreeBSD TCP Client
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Figure 2.5: Learned model for FreeBSD TCP Client. We use all the pruning strategies
that we used for Window 8 apart from merging transitions with the same output.

Chapter 3
Model Learning and Model Checking of
SSH Implementations
We apply model learning on three SSH implementations to infer state machine
models, and then use model checking to verify that these models satisfy basic
security properties and conform to the RFCs. Our analysis showed that all
tested SSH server models satisfy the stated security properties, but uncovered
several violations of the standard.
3.1 Introduction
SSH is a security protocol that is widely used to interact securely with remote machines.
The Transport layer of SSH has been subjected to security analysis [219], incl. analyses
that revealed cryptographic shortcomings [18,25,167].
Whereas these analyses consider the abstract cryptographic protocol, this chapter
looks at actual implementations of SSH, and investigates flaws in the program logic
of these implementations, rather than cryptographic flaws. Such logical flaws have
occurred in implementations of other security protocols, notably TLS, with Apple’s
’goto fail’ bug and the FREAK attack [32]. For this we use model learning (a.k.a. active
automata learning) [19,170,205] to infer state machines of three SSH implementations,
which we then analyze by model checking for conformance to both functional and
security properties.
The properties we verify for the inferred state machines are based on the RFCs that
specify SSH [221–224]. These properties are formalized in LTL and verified using
NuSMV [66]. We use a model checker since the models are too complex for manual
inspection (they are trivial for NuSMV). Moreover, by formalizing the properties
we can better assess and overcome vagueness or under-specification in the RFC
standards.
This chapter is born out of two recent theses [138, 208], and is to our knowledge
the first combined application of model learning and model checking in verifying
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SSH implementations, or more generally, implementations of any network security
protocol.
Related work Chen et al. [60] use the MOPS software model checking tool to detect
security vulnerabilities in the OpenSSH C implementation due to violation of folk
rules for the construction of secure programs such as “Do not open a file in writing
mode to stdout or stderr”. Udrea et al. [203] also investigated SSH implementations
for logical flaws. They used a static analysis tool to check two C implementations of
SSH against an extensive set of rules. These rules not only express properties of the
SSH protocol logic, but also of message formats and support for earlier versions and
various options. Our analysis only considers the protocol logic. However, their rules
were tied to routines in the code, so had to be slightly adapted to fit the different
implementations. In contrast, our properties are defined at an abstract level so do
not need such tailoring. Moreover, our black-box approach means we can analyze any
implementation of SSH, not just open-source C implementations.
Formal models of SSH in the form of state machines have been used before, namely
for a manual code review of OpenSSH [174], formal program verification of a Java
implementation of SSH [173], and for model based testing of SSH implementations [39].
All this research only considered the SSH Transport layer, and not the other SSH
protocol layers.
Model learning has previously been used to infer state machines of EMV bank cards [3],
electronic passports [11], hand-held readers for online banking [59], and implementati-
ons of TCP [88] and TLS [181]. Some of these studies relied on manual analysis of
learned models [3, 11,181], but some also used model checkers [59,88].
Instead of using active learning as we do, it is also possible to use passive learning to
obtain protocol state machines [218]. Here network traffic is observed, and not actively
generated. This can then provide a probabilistic characterization of normal network
traffic, but it cannot uncover implementation flaws that occur in strange message
flows, which is our goal.
3.2 Model Learning
3.2.1 Mealy Machines
A Mealy machine is a tuple M = (I,O,Q, q0, δ, λ), where I is a finite set of inputs,
O is a finite set of outputs, Q is a finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state,
δ : Q × I → Q is a transition function, and λ : Q × I → O is an output function.
Output function λ is extended to sequences of inputs by defining, for all q ∈ Q, i ∈ I
and σ ∈ I∗, λ(q, ) =  and λ(q, iσ) = λ(q, i)λ(δ(q, i), σ). The behavior of Mealy
machine M is defined by function AM : I∗ → O∗ with AM(σ) = λ(q0, σ), for σ ∈ I∗.
Mealy machines M1 and M2 are equivalent, denoted M1 ≈ M2, iff AM1 = AM2 .
Sequence σ ∈ I∗ distinguishes M1 and M2 if and only if AM1(σ) 6= AM2(σ).
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3.2.2 MAT Framework
The most efficient algorithms for model learning (see [119] for a recent overview) all
follow the pattern of a minimally adequate teacher (MAT) as proposed by Angluin [19].
Here learning is viewed as a game in which a learner has to infer an unknown automaton
by asking queries to a teacher. The teacher knows the automaton, which in our setting
is a Mealy machine M, also called the System Under Learning (sul). Initially, the
learner only knows the input alphabet I and output alphabet O of M. The task of
the learner is to learn M via two types of queries:
• With a membership query, the learner asks what the response is to an input
sequence σ ∈ I∗. The teacher answers with the output sequence in AM(σ).
• With an equivalence query, the learner asks whether a hypothesized Mealy machine
H is correct, that is, whether H ≈ M. The teacher answers yes if this is the
case. Otherwise it answers no and supplies a counterexample, which is a sequence
σ ∈ I∗ that triggers a different output sequence for both Mealy machines, that is,
AH(σ) 6= AM(σ).
The MAT framework can be used to learn black-box models of software. If the behavior
of a software system, or System Under Learning (sul), can be described by some
unknown Mealy machineM, then a membership query can be implemented by sending
inputs to the sul and observing resulting outputs. An equivalence query can be
approximated using a conformance testing tool [137] via a finite number of test queries.
A test query consists of asking the sul for the response to an input sequence σ ∈ I∗,
similar to a membership query. Note that this cannot rule out that there is more
behavior that has not been discovered.
3.2.3 Abstraction
Most current learning algorithms are only applicable to Mealy machines with small
alphabets comprising abstract messages. Practical systems typically have parameteri-
zed input/output alphabets, whose application triggers updates on the system’s state
variables. To learn these systems we place a mapper between the learner and the sul.
The mapper is a transducer which translates concrete inputs to abstract inputs and
concrete outputs to abstract outputs. For a thorough discussion of mappers, we refer
to [10].
3.3 The Secure Shell Protocol
The Secure Shell Protocol (or SSH) is a protocol used for secure remote login and
other secure network services over an insecure network. It runs as an application layer
protocol on top of TCP, which provides reliable data transfer, but does not provide
any form of connection security. The initial version of SSH was superseded by a second
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Figure 3.1: SSH protocol layers
version (SSHv2), after the former was found to contain design flaws which could not be
fixed without losing backwards compatibility [93]. This work focuses on SSHv2.
SSHv2 follows a client-server paradigm. The protocol consists of three layers (Fi-
gure 3.1):
1. The transport layer protocol (RFC 4253 [224]) forms the basis for any communica-
tion between a client and a server. It provides confidentiality, integrity and server
authentication as well as optional compression.
2. The authentication protocol (RFC 4252 [221]) is used to authenticate the client to
the server.
3. The connection protocol (RFC 4254 [222]) allows the encrypted channel to be
multiplexed in different channels. These channels enable a user to run multi-
ple applications, such as terminal emulation or file transfer, over a single SSH
connection.
Each layer has its own specific messages. The SSH protocol is interesting in that
outer layers do not encapsulate inner layers, and different layers can interact. For this
reason, we opt to analyze SSH as a whole, instead of analyzing its constituent layers
independently. Below we discuss each layer, outlining the relevant messages which
are later used in learning, and characterizing the so-called happy flow that a normal
protocol run follows.
At a high level, a typical SSH protocol run uses the three constituent protocols in
the order given above: after the client establishes a TCP connection with the server,
(1) the two sides use the Transport layer protocol to negotiate key exchange and
encryption algorithms, and use these to establish session keys, which are then used
to secure further communication; (2) the client uses the user authentication protocol
to authenticate to the server; (3) the client uses the connection protocol to access
services on the server, for example the terminal service.
3.3.1 Transport Layer
SSH runs over TCP, and provides end-to-end confidentiality and integrity using session
keys. Once a TCP connection has been established with the server, these session
keys are securely negotiated using a key exchange algorithm, the first step of the
protocol. The key exchange begins by the two sides exchanging their preferences for
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the key exchange algorithm to be used, as well as encryption, compression and hashing
algorithms. Preferences are sent with a kexinit message. Subsequently, key exchange
using the negotiated algorithm takes place. Following this algorithm, one-time session
keys for encryption and hashing are generated by each side, together with an identifier
for the session. The main key exchange algorithm is Diffie-Hellman, which is also
the only one required by the RFC. For the Diffie-Hellman scheme, kex30 and kex31
are exchanged to establish fresh session keys. These keys are used from the moment
the newkeys command has been issued by both parties. A subsequent sr auth
requests the authentication service. The happy flow thus consists of the succession of
the three steps comprising key exchange, followed up by a successful authentication
service request. The sequence is shown in Figure 3.2.
pre-kex kexed
KEX30/
    KEX31 pre-authinit
KEXINIT/
    KEXINIT keyed
NEWKEYS/
    NEWKEYS
SR_AUTH/
    SR_ACCEPT
Figure 3.2: The happy flow for the Transport layer.
Key re-exchange [224, p. 23], or rekeying, is an almost identical process, the difference
being that instead of taking place at the beginning, it takes place once session keys
are already in place. The purpose is to renew session keys so as to foil potential
replay attacks [223, p. 17]. It follows the same steps as key exchange. A fundamental
property of rekeying is that it should preserve the state; that is, after the rekeying
procedure is completed, the protocol should be in the same state as it was before the
rekeying started. The only thing that changes is that the new keys negotiated through
rekeying are now used, instead of the old ones.
3.3.2 Authentication Layer
Once a secure tunnel has been established, the client can authenticate. For this, four
authentication methods are defined in RFC 4252 [221]: password, public-key, host-
based and none. The authentication request includes a user name, service name and
authentication data, which consists of both the authentication method as well as the
data needed to perform the actual authentication, such as the password or public key.
The happy flow for this layer, as shown in Figure 3.3, is simply a single protocol step
that results in a successful authentication. The messages ua pw ok and ua pk ok
achieve this for respectively password and public key authentication.
pre-auth auth
UA_PK_OK/UA_SUCCESS
   UA_PW_OK/UA_SUCCESS
Figure 3.3: The happy flow for the user Authentication layer.
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3.3.3 Connection Layer
Successful authentication makes services of the Connection layer available. The
Connection layer enables the user to open and close channels of various types, with
each type providing access to specific services. Of the various services available, we
focus on the remote terminal over a session channel, a classical use of SSH. The
happy flow consists of opening a session channel, ch open, requesting a “pseudo
terminal” ch request pty, optionally sending and managing data via the messages
ch send data, ch window adjust, ch send eof, and eventually closing the
channel via ch close, as depicted in Figure 3.4.
auth
chanCH_OPEN/    CH_OPEN_SUCCESS
pty
CH_REQUEST_PTY/
    CH_SUCCESS
CH_CLOSE/
    CH_CLOSE_SUCCESS
CH_SEND_DATA...
Figure 3.4: The happy flow for the Connection layer.
3.4 The Learning Setup
The learning setup consists of three components: the learner, the mapper and the
sul. The learner generates abstract inputs, representing SSH messages. The mapper
transforms these messages into well-formed SSH packets and sends them to the sul.
The sul sends response packets back to the mapper, which in turn, translates these
packets to abstract outputs. The mapper then sends the abstract outputs back to
the learner.
The learner uses LearnLib [178], a Java library implementing L∗ based algorithms
for learning Mealy machines. The mapper is based on Paramiko, an open-source
SSH implementation written in Python1. We opted for Paramiko because its code is
relatively well structured and documented. The sul can be any existing implementation
of an SSH server. The three components communicate over sockets, as shown in
Figure 3.5.
SSH is a complex client-server protocol. Work in this chapter is therefore concentrated
on learning models of the implementation of the server, and not of the client. We
1Paramiko is available at http://www.paramiko.org/
  Learner    Mapper  
               "KEX30"             
               "KEX31"              
    SUT    
    (seq=16, len=358, payload=...)    
    (seq=17, len=214, payload=...)    
Figure 3.5: The SSH learning setup.
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further restrict learning to only exploring the terminal service of the Connection layer,
as we consider it to be the most interesting from a security perspective. Algorithms for
encryption, compression and hashing are left to default settings and are not purposefully
explored. Also, the starting state of the sul is one where a TCP connection has
already been established and where SSH versions have been exchanged, which are
prerequisites for starting the Transport layer protocol.
3.4.1 The Learning Alphabet
The alphabet we use consists of inputs, which correspond to messages sent to the
server, and outputs, which correspond to messages received from the server. We split
the input alphabet into three parts, one for each of the protocol layers.
Learning does not scale with a growing input alphabet, and since we are only learning
models of servers, we remove those inputs that are not intended to ever be sent to the
server2. Furthermore, from the Connection layer we only use messages for channel
management and the terminal functionality. Finally, because we will only explore
protocol behavior after SSH versions have been exchanged, we exclude the messages
for exchanging version numbers.
The resulting lists of inputs for the three protocol layers are given in Tables 3.1-3.3.
In some experiments, we used only a subset of the most essential inputs, to further
speed up experiments. This restricted alphabet significantly decreases the number of
queries needed for learning models while only marginally limiting explored behavior.
We discuss this again in Section 3.5. Inputs included in the restricted alphabet are
marked by ’*’ in the tables below.
Table 3.1 lists the Transport layer inputs. We include a version of the kexinit message
with first kex packet follows disabled. This means no guess [224, p. 17] is
attempted on the sul’s parameter preferences. Consequently, the sul will have to send
its own kexinit in order to convey its own parameter preferences before key exchange
can proceed. Also included are inputs for establishing new keys (kex30, newkeys),
disconnecting (disconnect), as well as the special inputs ignore, unimpl and debug.
The latter are not interesting, as they are normally ignored by implementations. Hence
they are excluded from our restricted alphabet. disconnect could take a long time
to execute, so was also excluded.
The Authentication layer defines a single client message type for the authentication
requests [221, p. 4]. Its parameters contain all information needed for authentication.
Four authentication methods exist: none, password, public key and host-based. Our
mapper supports all methods except host-based authentication because some SUTs
don’t support this feature. Both the public key and password methods have ok
and nok variants, which provide respectively correct and incorrect credentials. Our
2This means we exclude the messages service accept, ua accept, ua failure, ua banner,
ua pk ok, ua pw changereq, ch success and ch failure from our alphabet.
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Table 3.1: Transport layer inputs
Message Description
disconnect Terminates the current connection [224, p. 23]
ignore Has no intended effect [224, p. 24]
unimpl Intended response to unrecognized messages [224, p. 25]
debug Provides other party with debug information [224, p. 25]
kexinit* Sends parameter preferences [224, p. 17]
kex30* Initializes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [224, p. 21]
newkeys* Requests to take new keys into use [224, p. 21]
sr auth* Requests the authentication protocol [224, p. 23]
sr conn* Requests the connection protocol [224, p. 23]
restricted alphabet supports only public key authentication, as the implementations
processed this faster than the other authentication methods.
Table 3.2: Authentication layer inputs
Message Description
ua none Authenticates with the “none” method [221, p. 7]
ua pk ok* Provides a valid name/key pair [221, p. 8]
ua pk nok* Provides an invalid name/key pair [221, p. 8]
ua pw ok Provides a valid name/password pair [221, p. 10]
ua pw nok Provides an invalid name/password pair [221, p. 10]
The Connection layer allows clients to manage channels and request services over them.
In accordance with our learning goal, our mapper only supports inputs for requesting
terminal emulation, plus inputs for channel management as shown in Table 3.3. The
restricted alphabet only supports the most general channel management inputs, and
excludes those not expected to produce state change.
Table 3.3: Connection layer inputs
Message Description
ch open* Opens a new channel [222, p. 5]
ch close* Closes a channel [222, p. 9]
ch eof* Indicates that no more data will be sent [222, p. 9]
ch data* Sends data over the channel [222, p. 7]
ch edata Sends typed data over the channel [222, p. 8]
ch window adjust Adjusts the window size [222, p. 7]
ch request pty* Requests terminal emulation [222, p. 11]
The output alphabet includes all messages an SSH server generates, which may include,
with identical meaning, any of the messages defined as inputs. This also includes respon-
ses to various requests: kex31 [224, p. 21] as reply to kex30, sr succes in response
to service requests (sr auth and sr conn), ua success and ua failure [221, p.
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5,6] in response to authentication requests, and
ch open success [222, p. 6] and ch success [222, p. 10] , in positive response to
ch open and ch request pty respectively. To these outputs, we add no resp
for when the sul generates no output, and the special outputs ch none, ch max
and no conn, and buffered, which we discuss in the next subsections.
3.4.2 The Mapper
The mapper must provide a translation between abstract messages and well-formed
SSH messages: it has to translate abstract inputs listed in Tables 3.1-3.3 to actual SSH
packets, and translate the SSH packets received in answer to our abstract outputs.
If no answer is received on an input, the mapper must return an output indicating
timeout, which in our case is the no resp message.
The sheer complexity of the mapper meant that it was easier to adapt an existing
SSH implementation, rather than construct the mapper from scratch. After all, in
many ways the mapper acts similar to an SSH client. Paramiko already provides
mechanisms for encryption/decryption, as well as routines for constructing and sending
the different types of packets, and for receiving them. These routines are called by
control logic dictated by Paramiko’s own state machine. The mapper was constructed
by replacing this control logic with one dictated by messages received from the learner.
The technical nature of the mapper and the fact that it was adapted from an existing
codebase makes it difficult to formalize accurately. We hence only give an informal
description of its behavior.
The mapper maintains a set of state variables to record parameters of the ongoing
session, including the server’s preferences for key exchange and encryption algorithm,
parameters of these protocols, and, once it has been established, the session key.
These parameters are updated when receiving messages from the server and used to
concretize inputs to actual SSH messages to the server.
For example, upon receiving a kexinit from the sul, the mapper saves the sul’s
preferences for key exchange, hashing and encryption algorithms. Initially these
parameters are all set to the defaults that any server should support, as required by
the RFC. On receiving kex31 in response to the kex30 input, the mapper saves the
hash, as well as the new keys. Finally, a newkeys response prompts the mapper to
use the new keys negotiated earlier in place of the older ones, if such existed.
The mapper also contains a buffer for storing opened channels, which is initially
empty. On a ch open from the learner, the mapper adds a channel to the buffer
with a randomly generated channel identifier; on a ch close, it removes the channel
(if there was any). The buffer size, or the maximum number of opened channels, is
limited to one. Initially the buffer is empty. The mapper also stores the sequence
number of the last received message from the sul. This number is then used when
constructing unimpl inputs.
In the following cases, inputs are answered by the mapper directly instead of being
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sent to the sul to find out its response: (1) on receiving a ch open input if the
buffer has reached the size limit, the mapper directly responds with ch max; (2) on
receiving any input operating on a channel (all Connection layer inputs other than
ch open) when the buffer is empty, the mapper directly responds with ch none;
(3) if connection with the sul was terminated, the mapper responds with a no conn
message, as sending further messages to the sul is pointless in that case.
3.4.3 Practical Complications
SSH implementations even behind the mapper abstraction may not behave like
deterministic Mealy machines, a prerequisite for the learning algorithm to succeed.
Sources of non-determinism are:
1. Underspecification in the SSH specification (for example, by not specifying the
order of certain messages) allows some non-deterministic behavior. Even if client
and server do implement a fixed order for messages they sent, the asynchronous
nature of communication means that the interleaving of sent and received messages
may vary. Moreover, client and server are free to intersperse debug and ignore
messages at any given time3
2. Timing is another source of non-deterministic behavior. For example, the mapper
might time-out before the sul had sent its response. Some suls also behave
unexpectedly when a new input is received too shortly after the previous one.
Hence in our experiments we adjusted time-out periods accordingly so that neither
of these events occur, and the sul behaves deterministically all the time.
To detect non-determinism, the mapper caches all observations in an SQLite database
and verifies if new observations are consistent with previous ones. If not, it raises a
warning, which then needs to be manually investigated. We analyzed each warning
until we found a setting under which behavior was deterministic.
The cache also acts as a cheap source of responses for already answered queries.
Finally, by re-loading the cache from a previous experiment, we were able to start
from where this experiment left off. This proved useful, as experiments could take
several days.
Another practical problem besides non-determinism is that an SSH server may produce
a sequence of outputs in response to a single input. This means it is not behaving as
a Mealy machines, which allows for only one output. To deal with this, the mapper
concatenates all outputs into one, producing a single output which it delivers to the
learner. The sequence in which the concatenated outputs are received is preserved in
the produced output.
A final challenge is presented by forms of ‘buffering’, which we encountered in two
situations. Firstly, some implementations buffer incoming requests during rekey; only
once rekeying is complete are all these messages processed. This leads to a newkeys
3The ignore messages are aimed to thwart traffic analysis.
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response (indicating rekeying has completed), directly followed by all the responses to
the buffered requests. This would lead to non-termination of the learning algorithm,
as for every sequence of buffered messages the response differs. To prevent this, we
treat the sequence of queued responses as the single output buffered.
A different form of buffering occurs when opening and closing channels, since a sul can
close only as many channels as have previously been opened. Learning this behavior
would lead to an infinite state machine, as we would need a state ‘there are n channels
open’ for every number n. For this reason, we restrict the number of simultaneously
open channels to one. The mapper returns a custom response ch max to a ch open
message whenever this limit is reached.
3.5 Learning Results
We use the setup described in Section 3.4 to learn models for OpenSSH, Bitvise and
DropBear SSH server implementations. OpenSSH represents the focal point, as it
is the most popular implementation of SSH (with over 80 percent of market share
in 2008 [18]) and the default server for many UNIX-based systems. DropBear is an
alternative to OpenSSH designed for low resource systems. Bitvise is a well-known
proprietary Windows-only SSH implementation.
In our experimental setup, learner and mapper ran inside a Linux Virtual Machine.
OpenSSH and DropBear were learned over a localhost connection, whereas Bitvise was
learned over a virtual connection with the Windows host machine. We have adapted
the setting of timing parameters to each implementation.
OpenSSH was learned using a full alphabet, whereas DropBear and Bitvise were
learned using a restricted alphabet (as defined in Subsection 3.4.1). The reason
for using a restricted alphabet was to reduce learning times. Based on the model
learned for OpenSSH (the first implementation analyzed) and the specification, we
excluded inputs that seemed unlikely to produce state change (such as debug or
unimpl). We also excluded inputs that could take a long time to process (such as
disconnect) but were not were not needed to visit all states in the happy flow. We
excluded, for example, the user/password based authentication inputs (ua pw ok
and ua pw nok) as they would take the system 2-3 seconds to respond to. By
contrast, public key authentication resulted in quick responses. We explain the more
intricate case for disconnect when we discuss the learned models.
For generating test queries we used random and exhaustive variants of the testing
algorithm described in [191], which generate efficient test suites. Tests generated
comprise an access sequence, a middle section of length k and a distinguishing sequence.
The exhaustive variant generates tests for all possible middle sections of length k and
all states. Passing all tests then provides some notion of confidence, namely, that
the learned model is correct unless the (unknown) model of the implementation has
at least k more states than the learned hypothesis. The random variant produces
tests with randomly generated middle sections. No formal confidence is provided, but
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past experience shows this to be more effective at finding counterexamples since k
can be set to higher values. We executed a random test suite with k of 4 comprising
40000 tests for OpenSSH, and 20000 tests for Bitvise and DropBear. We then ran an
exhaustive test suite with k of 2 for all implementations.
Extending our test suite are test queries derived manually from counterexamples
generated by model checking the learned model. These counterexamples have to
be checked on the sul to see whether the sul is indeed non-compliant with the
corresponding property or the learned model is wrong. As the properties we formalized
were safety properties, all resulting counterexamples were of finite length. We hence
were able to manually derive tests from them, and add these tests to the test suite. In
the case of DropBear, one of the counterexamples found by the model checker was
an actual counterexample for the learner (it invalidated the learned model). This
counterexample could not be found by our exhaustive test algorithm using a k of 2.
Indeed, the hypothesis the learner produced after processing this counterexample had
two additional states, indicating that a k of 3 would have been necessary. Such a test
setting would have required the costly execution of 122836 tests on the invalidated
learned model and 209911 on the final model. This shows the limitation of exhaustive
test algorithms in finding counterexamples. It also provides a compelling argument
for integrating a model checker into the testing loop for each hypothesis, rather than
only for the learned model.
Table 3.4 describes the exact versions of the systems analyzed together with statistics
on learning and testing: (1) the number of states in the learned model, (2) the number
of hypotheses built during the learning process and (3) the total number of learning and
test queries run. For test queries, we only consider those run on the last hypothesis. All
learned models are available at 4. Statistics give a glimpse into the issue of scalability.
Assuming each input took 0.5 seconds to process, and an average query length of 10,
to perform 40000 queries would have taken roughly 55 hours. This is consistent with
the time experiments took, which span several days. The long duration compelled us
to resort to restricted alphabets, which lead to reduction in the number of queries
needed. Our work could have benefited from parallel execution.
Table 3.4: Statistics for learning experiments
SUT States Hypotheses Mem. Q. Test Q.
OpenSSH 6.9p1-2 31 4 19836 76418
Bitvise 7.23 65 15 24996 58423
DropBear v2014.65 29 8 8357 64478
The large number of states is down to several reasons. First of all, some systems
exhibited buffering behavior. In particular, Bitvise would queue responses for higher
layer inputs sent during rekey, and would deliver them all at once after rekeying was
done. Interestingly, the size of the queue affected how Bitvise reacted to disconnect
4https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/pfiteraubrostean/Learning-SSH-Paper/tree/master/models
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during rekey, a lower layer input. The longer the queue, the more time it took for
BitVise to process and thus, terminate the connection. This forced us to exclude
disconnect from the restricted alphabet, as its processing time could grow to several
seconds. Rekeying was another major contributor to the number of states. For each
state where rekeying is possible, the sequence of transitions constituting the complete
rekeying process should lead back to that state. This leads to two additional rekeying
states for every state allowing rekey. Many states were also added due to the mapper
generated outputs ch none or ch max, outputs which signal that no channel is
open or that the maximum number of channels have been opened.
Figure 3.6 shows the model obtained for OpenSSH, with some edits to improve
readability. The figure collects the states into 3 clusters, indicated by the rectangles,
where each cluster corresponds to one of the protocol layers. We eliminate redundant
states and information induced by the mapper, as well as states present in successful
rekeying sequences. Wherever rekeying was permitted, we replace the rekeying states
and transitions by a single REKEY SEQUENCE transition. We also factor out edges
common to states within a cluster. We replace common disconnecting edges, by one
edge from the cluster to the disconnect state. Common self loop edges are colored, and
the actual i/o information only appears on one edge. Transitions with similar start
and end states are joined together on the same edge. Transition labels are kept short
by regular expressions(UA * stands for inputs starting with UA ) or by factoring
out common start strings. Green edges highlight the happy flow. ’+’ concatenates
multiple outputs.
On analyzing Figure 3.6, we notice that the happy flow, colored in green, is fully
explored and mostly matches our earlier description of it5. Also explored is what
happens when a rekeying sequence is attempted. We notice that rekeying is only
allowed in states of the Connection layer. Strangely, for these states, rekeying is
not state preserving, as the generated output on receiving a sr auth, sr conn or
kex30 changes from unimpl to no resp. This leads to two sub-clusters of states,
one before the first rekey, the other afterward. In all other states, the first step of a
rekeying (kexinit) yields (unimpl), while the last step (newkeys) causes the system
to disconnect.
We also note the intricate authentication behavior: after an unsuccessful authentication
attempt the only authentication method still allowed is password authentication.
Finally, only Bitvise allowed multiple terminals to be requested over the same channel.
As depicted in the model, OpenSSH abruptly terminates on requesting a second
terminal. DropBear exhibits a similar behavior.
We warn the reader of an inaccuracy in the learned models caused by the mapper. The
inaccuracy was detected after experiments were done and is still present. Analyzing
the initial state, we remark how kexinit appears as response to most inputs from that
5The only exception is in the Transport layer, where unlike in our happy flow definition, the server
is the first to send the newkeys message. This is also accepted behavior, as the protocol does not
specify which side should send newkeys first.
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state. This behavior is odd, since we expected kexinit responses to be given only to
kexinit messages. Upon closer inspection, we found that a kexinit message was sent
by the server just after SSH versions had been exchanged, before the server received
any input from the learner. Our mapper buffered this kexinit message and falsely
considered it as a response to the first input sent by the learner. Consequently, kexinit
appears as response to all inputs in the initial state, though it was actually generated
before any input was sent. Furthermore, when parsing this kexinit response, the
mapper could silently send kexinit to the server effectively completing preference
exchange. This happened if the input was not kexinit and did not cause the connection
to terminate. Later processing of kexinit messages is done normally (such as during
rekey). Readers should keep this inaccuracy in mind when interpreting the model
of Figure 3.6. The inaccuracy affects solely transitions from the start state. In the
future, we hope to address this inaccuracy, reduce mapper-induced redundant states
and update 4 with improved models
3.6 Security Specifications
A NuSMV model is specified by a set of finite variables together with a transition-
function that describes changes on these variables. Specifications in temporal logic,
such as CTL and LTL, can be checked for truth on specified models. NuSMV provides
a counterexample if a given specification is not true. We generate NuSMV models
automatically from the learned models. Generation proceeds by first defining a NuSMV
file with three variables, corresponding to inputs, outputs and states. The transition-
function is then extracted from the learned model and appended to this file. This
function updates the output and state variables for a given valuation of the input
variable and the current state. Figure 3.7 gives an example of a Mealy machine and its
associated NuSMV model. The NuSMV models derived from the learned SSH models,
and the formalized properties are available at 4.
The remainder of this section defines the properties we formalized and verified. We
group these properties into four categories:
1. basic characterizing properties, properties which characterize the mapper and sul
assembly at a basic level. These hold for all implementations.
2. security properties, these are properties fundamental to achieving the main security
goal of the respective layer.
3. key re-exchange properties, or properties regarding the rekey operation (after the
initial key exchange was done).
4. functional properties, which are extracted from the SHOULD’s and the MUST’s
of the RFC specifications. They may have a security impact.
A key point to note is that properties are checked not on the actual concrete model
of the sul, but on an abstraction of the sul that is induced by the mapper. This
is unlike in [88], where properties were checked on a concretization of the learned
68 3. Model Learning and Model Checking of SSH Implementations
q0start
q1
BEGIN/OK
MSG/NOK
BEGIN/OK
MSG/ACK
MODULE main
VAR s t a t e : {q0 , q1 } ;
inp : {BEGIN, MSG} ;
out : {OK, NOK, ACK} ;
ASSIGN
i n i t ( s t a t e ) := q0 ;
next ( s t a t e ) := case
s t a t e = q0 & inp = BEGIN: q1 ;
s t a t e = q0 & inp = MSG: q0 ;
s t a t e = q1 & inp = BEGIN: q1 ;
s t a t e = q1 & inp = MSG: q1 ;
e sac ;
out := case
s t a t e = q0 & inp = BEGIN: OK;
s t a t e = q0 & inp = MSG: NOK;
s t a t e = q1 & inp = BEGIN: OK;
s t a t e = q1 & inp = MSG: ACK;
esac ;
Figure 3.7: Mealy machine + associated NuSMV code
model obtained by application of a reverse mapping. Building a reverse mapper is
far from trivial given the mapper’s complexity. Thus we need to be careful when
we interpret model checking results for the learned model. Also, we must be aware
that when some property does not hold for the abstract model, and the model checker
provides a counterexample, we still need to check whether this counterexample is an
actual run of the abstraction of the sul induced by the mapper. If this is not the
case then the counterexample demonstrates that the learned model is incorrect. In
the previous section we noted an inconsistency between learned models and how the
systems behave due to mapper-induced behavior. The inconsistency has minimal
impact on the properties we analyze as it impacts only transitions from the initial
state, and its effects are clear and can be accounted for.
Before introducing the properties, we mention some basic predicates and conventions
we use in their definition. The happy flow in SSH consists in a series of steps: the
user (1) exchanges keys, (2) requests for the authentication service, (3) supplies valid
credentials to authenticate and finally (4) opens a channel. Whereas step (1) is
complex, the subsequent steps can be captured by the simple predicates hasReqAuth,
validAuthReq and hasOpenedChannel respectively. The predicates are defined in
terms of the output generated at a given moment, with certain values of this output
indicating that the step was performed successfully. For example, ch open success
indicates that a channel has been opened successfully. Sometimes we also need the
input that generated the output, so as to distinguish this step from other steps. In
particular, requesting the authentication service is distinguished from requesting the
connection service by sr auth. To these predicates, we add predicates for valid,
invalid and all authentication methods, a predicate for the receipt of newkeys from
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the server, and receipt of kexinit, which can also be seen as initiation of key (re-)
exchange. These last predicates have to be tweaked in accordance with the input
alphabet used and with the output the sul generated (kexinit could be sent in
different packaging, either alone, or joined by a different message). Their formulations
below are for the OpenSSH server. Finally, connLost indicates that connection was
lost, and endCondition is the condition after which higher layer properties no longer
have to hold.
hasReqAuth := inp=SR AUTH ∧ out=SR ACCEPT;
validAuthReq := out=UA PK OK ∨ out=UA PW OK;
hasOpenedChannel := out=CH OPEN SUCCESS;
validAuthReq := inp=UA PK OK ∨ inp=UA PW OK;
invAuthReq := inp=UA PK NOK ∨ inp=UA PW NOK ∨ inp=UA NONE;
authReq := validAuthReq ∨ invalidAuthReq ;
receivedNewKeys := out=NEWKEYS ∨ out=KEX31 NEWKEYS;
kexStarted := out=KEXINIT ;
connLost := out=NO CONN ∨ out=DISCONNECT;
endCondition := kexStarted ∨ connLost ;
Our formulation uses NuSMV syntax. We also use the weak until operator W, which
is not supported by NuSMV, but can be easily defined in terms of the until operator U
and globally operator G that are supported: pW q = pU q |Gp. Many of the higher
layer properties we formulate should hold only until a disconnect or a key (re-)exchange
happens, hence the definition of the endCondition predicate. This is because the
RFCs don’t specify what should happen when no connection exists. Moreover, higher
layer properties in the RFCs only apply outside of rekey sequences, as inside a rekey
sequence the RFCs advise implementations to reject all higher layer inputs, regardless
of the state before the rekey.
3.6.1 Basic Characterizing Properties
In our setting, a single TCP connection is made and once this connection is lost (e.g.
because the system disconnects) it cannot be re-established. The moment a connection
is lost is marked by generation of the no conn output. From this moment onwards,
the only outputs encountered are the no conn output (the mapper tried but failed
to communicate with the sul), or outputs generated by the mapper directly, without
querying the system. The latter are ch max (channel buffer is full) and ch none
(channel buffer is empty). With these outputs we define Property 3.1 which describes
the “one connection” property of our setup.
Property 3.1. G ( out=NO CONN →
G ( out=NO CONN ∨ out=CH MAX ∨ out=CH NONE) )
Outputs ch max and ch none are still generated because of a characteristic we
touched on in Subsection 3.4.2. The mapper maintains a buffer of open channels and
limits its size to 1. From the perspective of the mapper, a channel is open, and thus
added to the buffer, whenever ch open is received from the learner, regardless if
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a channel was actually opened on the sul. In particular, if after opening a channel
via ch open an additional attempt to open a channel is made, the mapper itself
responds by ch max without querying the sul. This continues until the learner
closes the channel by ch close, prompting removal of the channel and the sending
of an actual CLOSE message to the sul (hence out!=ch none). A converse property
can be formulated in a similar way for when the buffer is empty after a ch close, in
which case subsequent ch close messages prompt the mapper generated ch none,
until a channel is opened via ch open and an actual OPEN message is sent to the
sul. Conjunction of these two behaviors forms Property 3.2.
Property 3.2. (G ( inp=CH OPEN) →
X ( ( inp=CH OPEN → out=CH MAX)
W ( inp=CH CLOSE ∧ out !=CH NONE) ) ) ∧
(G ( inp=CH CLOSE) →
X ( ( inp=CH CLOSE → out=CH NONE)
W ( inp=CH OPEN ∧ out !=CH MAX) ) )
3.6.2 Security Properties
In SSH, upper layer services rely on security guarantees ensured by lower layers. So
these services should not be available before the lower layers have completed. For
example, the authentication service should only become available after a successful
key exchange and the setting up of a secure tunnel by the Transport layer, otherwise
the service would be running over an unencrypted channel. Requests for this service
should therefore not succeed unless key exchange was performed successfully.
Key exchange involves three steps that have to be performed in order but may be
interleaved by other actions. Successful authentication necessarily implies successful
execution of the key exchange steps. We can tell each key exchange step was successful
from the values of the input and output variables. Successful authentication request is
indicated by the predicate defined earlier, hasReqAuth. Following these principles, we
define the LTL specification in Property 3.3, where O is the once operator. Formula
Op is true at time t if p held in at least one of the previous time steps t′ ≤ t.
Property 3.3. G ( hasReqAuth →
O ( ( inp=NEWKEYS ∧ out=NO RESP) ∧
O ( ( inp=KEX30 ∧ out=KEX31 NEWKEYS) ∧
O ( out=KEXINIT) ) ) )
Apart from a secure connection, Connection layer services also assume that the client
behind the connection was authenticated. This is ensured by the Authentication
layer by means of an authentication mechanism, which only succeeds, and thus
authenticates the client, if valid credentials are provided. For the implementation
to be secure, there should be no path from an unauthenticated to an authenticated
state without the provision of valid credentials. We consider an authenticated state
as a state where a channel has been opened successfully, described by the predicate
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hasOpenedChannel. Provision of valid/invalid credentials is indicated by the outputs
ua success and ua failure respectively. Along these lines, we formulate this
specification by Property 3.4, where S stands for the since operator. Formula pSq
is true at time t if q held at some time t′ ≤ t and p held in all times t′′ such that
t′ < t′′ ≤ t.
Property 3.4. G ( hasOpenedChannel →
out !=UA FAILURE S out=UA SUCCESS )
3.6.3 Key Re-exchange Properties
According to the RFC [222, p. 24], re-exchanging keys (or rekeying) (1) is preferably
allowed in all states of the protocol, and (2) its successful execution does not affect ope-
ration of the higher layers. We consider two general protocol states, pre-authenticated
(after a successful authentication request, before authentication) and authenticated.
These may map to multiple states in the learned models. We formalized requirement
(1) by two properties, one for each general state. In the case of the pre-authenticated
state, we know we have reached this state following a successful authentication service
request, indicated by the predicate hasReqAuth. Once here, performing the inputs for
rekey in succession should imply success until one of two things happen, the connection
is lost(connLost) or we have authenticated. This is asserted in Property 3.5. A similar
property is defined for the authenticated state.
Property 3.5. G ( hasReqAuth →
X ( inp=KEXINIT → out=KEXINIT ∧
X ( inp=KEX30 → out=KEX31 NEWKEYS ∧
X ( inp=NEWKEYS → out=NO RESP) ) ) W
( connLost ∨ hasAuth ) )
Requirement (2) cannot be expressed in LTL, since in LTL we cannot specify that
two states are equivalent. We therefore checked this requirement directly, by writing a
simple script which, for each state q that allows rekeying, checks if the state q′ reached
after a successful rekey is equivalent to q in the subautomaton that only contains the
higher layer inputs.
3.6.4 Functional Properties
We formalized and checked several other properties drawn from the RFCs. We found
parts of the specification unclear, which sometimes meant that we had to give our own
interpretation. A first general property can be defined for the disconnect output.
The RFC specifies that after sending this message, a party MUST not send or receive
any data [224, p. 24]. While we cannot tell what the server actually receives, we can
check that the server does not generate any output after sending disconnect. After
a disconnect message, subsequent outputs should be solely derived by the mapper.
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Knowing the mapper induced outputs are no conn, ch max and ch none, we
formulate by Property 3.6 to describe expected outputs after a disconnect.
Property 3.6. G ( out=DISCONNECT →
X G ( out=CH NONE ∨ out=CH MAX ∨ out=NO CONN) )
The RFC states in [222, p. 24] that after sending a kexinit message, a party MUST
not send another kexinit, or a sr accept message, until it has sent a newkeys
message(receivedNewKeys). This is translated to Property 3.7.
Property 3.7. G ( out=KEXINIT →
X ( ( out !=SR ACCEPT ∧ out !=KEXINIT) W receivedNewKeys ) )
The RFC also states [222, p. 24] that if the server rejects the service request, “it
SHOULD send an appropriate SSH MSG DISCONNECT message and MUST discon-
nect”. Moreover, in case it supports the service request, it MUST send a sr accept
message. Unfortunately, it is not evident from the specification if rejection and support
are the only allowed outcomes. We assume that is the case, and formalize an LTL
formula accordingly by Property 3.8. For a service request (sr auth), in case we are
not in the initial state, the response will be either an accept (sr accept), disconnect
(disconnect), or no conn, output generated by the mapper after the connection is
lost. We adjusted the property for the initial state in which models responded with
kexinit which would easily break the property. As explained in Section 3.5, systems
actually generate this kexinit message before any input is sent, whereas models falsely
encode it as a response to initial inputs.
Property 3.8. G ( ( inp=SR AUTH ∧ s t a t e != s0 ) →
( out=SR ACCEPT ∨ out=DISCONNECT ∨ out=NO CONN ) ) )
The RFC for the Authentication layer states in [221, p. 6] that if the server rejects
the authentication request, it MUST respond with a ua failure message. Rejected
requests are suggested by the predicate invAuthReq. In case of requests with valid
credentials (validAuthReq), a ua success MUST be sent only once. While not
explicitly stated, we assume this to be in a context where the authentication service
had been successfully requested, hence we use the hasReqAuth predicate. We define
two properties, Property 3.9 for behavior before an ua success, Property 3.10
for behavior afterward. For the first property, note that (hasReqAuth) may hold
even after successful authentication, but we are only interested in behavior between
the first time (hasReqAuth) holds and the first time authentication is successful
(out=ua success), hence the use of the O operator. As is the case with most higher
layer properties, the first property only has to hold until the end condition holds
(endCondition), that is the connection is lost (connLost) or rekey was started by the
sul (kexStarted).
Property 3.9. G ( ( hasReqAuth ∧ !O out=UA SUCCESS) →
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( inva l i dAuthReq → out=UA FAILURE)
W ( out=UA SUCCESS ∨ endCondi t ion ) )
Property 3.10. G ( out=UA SUCCESS → X G out !=UA SUCCESS)
In the same paragraph, it is stated that authentication requests received after a
ua success SHOULD be ignored. This is a weaker statement, and it requires that all
authentication messages (suggested by authReq) after a ua success output should
prompt no response from the system(no resp) until the end condition is true. The
formulation of this statement shown in Property 3.11.
Property 3.11. G ( out=UA SUCCESS →
X ( ( authReq→ out=NO RESP ) W endCondi t ion ) )
The Connection layer RFC states in [222, p. 9] that on receiving a ch close message,
a party MUST send back a ch close, unless it had already sent this message for the
channel. The channel must have been opened beforehand (hasOpenedChannel) and
the property only has to hold until the end condition holds or the channel was closed
(out=CH CLOSE ). We formulate Property 3.12 accordingly.
Property 3.12. G ( hasOpenedChannel →
( ( inp=CH CLOSE) → ( out=CH CLOSE) )
W ( endCondi t ion ∨ out=CH CLOSE) )
3.6.5 Model Checking Results
Table 3.5 presents model checking results. Crucially, the security properties hold
for all three implementations. We had to slightly adapt our properties for Bitvise
as it buffered all responses during rekey (incl. UA SUCCESS). In particular, we
used validAuthReq instead of out=UA SUCCESS as sign of successful authentica-
tion.
Properties marked with ’*’ did not hold because implementations chose to send unimpl,
instead of the output suggested by the RFC. As an example, after successful authenti-
cation, both Bitvise and OpenSSH respond with unimpl to further authentication
requests, instead of being silent, violating Property 3.11. Whether the alternative
behavior adapted is acceptable is up for debate. Certainly the RFC does not suggest
it, though it does leave room for interpretation.
DropBear is the only implementation that allows rekeying in both general states of the
protocol. DropBear also satisfies all Transport and Authentication layer specifications,
however, problematically, it violates the property of the Connection layer. Upon
receiving ch close, it responds by ch eof instead of ch close, not respecting
Property 3.12.
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Table 3.5: Model checking results
Property Key word OpenSSH Bitvise DropBear
Security Trans. X X X
Auth. X X X
Rekey Pre-auth. X X X
Auth. X X X
Functional Prop. 3.6 MUST X X X
Prop. 3.7 MUST X X X
Prop. 3.8 MUST X* X X
Prop. 3.9 MUST X X X
Prop. 3.10 MUST X X X
Prop. 3.11 SHOULD X* X* X
Prop. 3.12 MUST X X X
3.7 Conclusions
We have combined model learning with abstraction techniques to infer models of the
OpenSSH, Bitvise and DropBear SSH server implementations. We have also formalized
several security and functional properties drawn from the SSH RFC specifications. We
have verified these properties on the learned models using model checking and have
uncovered several minor standard violations. The security-critical properties were met
by all implementations.
Abstraction was provided by a mapper component placed between the learner and the
sul. The mapper was constructed from an existing SSH implementation. The input
alphabet of the mapper explored key exchange, setting up a secure connection, several
authentication methods, and opening and closing channels over which the terminal
service could be requested. We used two input alphabets, a full version for OpenSSH,
and a restricted version for Bitvise and DropBear. The restricted alphabet was still
sufficient to explore most aforementioned behavior.
We encountered several challenges. Firstly, building a mapper presented a considerable
technical challenge, as it required re-structuring of an actual SSH implementation.
Secondly, because we used classical learning algorithms, we had to ensure that the
abstracted implementation behaved like a (deterministic) Mealy machine. Here time-
induced non-determinism was difficult to eliminate. Buffering also presented problems,
leading to a considerable increase in the number of states. Moreover, the systems
analyzed were relatively slow, which meant learning took several days. This was
compounded by the size of the learning alphabet, and it forced us into using a reduced
alphabet for two of the implementations.
Limitations of work in this chapter, hence possibilities for future work, are several.
First of all, the mapper was not formalized, unlike in [88], thus we did not produce a
concretization of the abstract models. Consequently, model checking results cannot
be fully transferred to the actual implementations. Formal definition of the mapper
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and concretization of the learned models (as defined in [10]) would tackle this. The
mapper also caused considerable redundancy in the learned models; tweaking the
abstractions used, in particular those for managing channels, could alleviate this
problem while also improving learning times. This in turn would facilitate learning
using expanded alphabets instead of resorting to restricted alphabets. Furthermore,
the mapper abstraction could be refined, to give more insight into the implementations.
In particular, parameters such as the session identifier could be extracted from the
mapper and potentially handled by existing Register Automata learners [5,54]. These
learners can infer systems with parameterized alphabets, state variables and simple
operations on data. Finally, we suppressed all timing-related behavior, as it could not
be handled by the classical learners used; there is preliminary work on learning timed
automata [98] which could use timing behavior.
Despite these limitations, work in this chapter provides a compelling application of
learning and model checking in a security setting, on a widely used protocol. We
hope this lays some more groundwork for further case studies, as well as advances in
learning techniques.

Chapter 4
Learning Register Automata with Fresh
Value Generation
We present a new algorithm for active learning of register automata. Our
algorithm uses counterexample-guided abstraction refinement to automatically
construct a component which maps (in a history dependent manner) the large
set of actions of an implementation into a small set of actions that can be
handled by a Mealy machine learner.
The class of register automata that is handled by our algorithm extends previous
definitions since it allows for the generation of fresh output values. This feature
is crucial in many real-world systems (e.g. servers that generate identifiers,
passwords or sequence numbers). We have implemented our new algorithm in a
tool called Tomte.
4.1 Introduction
Model checking and model learning are two core techniques in model-driven engineering.
In model checking [68] one explores the state space of a given state transition model,
whereas in model learning [19,108,198,205] the goal is to obtain such a model through
interaction with a system by providing inputs and observing outputs. Both techniques
face a combinatorial blow up of the state-space, commonly known as the state explosion
problem. In order to find new techniques to combat this problem, it makes sense
to follow a cyclic research methodology in which tools are applied to challenging
applications, the experience gained during this work is used to generate new theory
and algorithms, which in turn are used to further improve the tools. After consistent
application of this methodology for 25 years model checking is now applied routinely to
industrial problems [1]. Work on the use of model learning in model-driven engineering
started later [170] and has not yet reached the same maturity level, but in recent years
there has been spectacular progress.
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We have seen, for instance, several convincing applications of model learning in the
area of security and network protocols. Cho et al. [64] successfully used model learning
to infer models of communication protocols used by botnets. Model learning was used
for fingerprinting of EMV banking cards [3]. It also revealed a security vulnerability
in a smartcard reader for internet banking that was previously discovered by manual
analysis, and confirmed the absence of this flaw in an updated version of this device [59].
Fiterau et al. [87] used model learning to demonstrate that both Linux and Windows
implementations violate the TCP protocol standard. Using a similar approach, Fiterau
et al. [89] showed that three implementations of the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol
violate the standard. In [177], model learning is used to infer properties of a network
router, and for testing the security of a web-application (the Mantis bug-tracker).
Model learning has proven to be an extremely effective technique for spotting bugs,
complementary to existing methods for software analysis.
A major theoretical challenge is to lift learning algorithms for finite state systems
to richer classes of models involving data. A breakthrough has been the definition
of a Nerode congruence for a class of register automata [55, 56] and the resulting
generalization of learning algorithms to this class [114,115]. Register automata [55,126]
are a type of extended finite state machines in which one can test for equality of data
parameters, but no operations on data are allowed. Recently, the results on register
automata have been generalized to even larger classes of models in which guards
may contain arithmetic constraints and inequalities [54,58]. A different approach for
extending learning algorithms to classes of models involving data has been proposed
in [10]. Here the idea is to place an intermediate mapper component in between
the implementation and the learner. This mapper abstracts (in a history dependent
manner) the large set of (parametrized) actions of the implementation into a small set
of abstract actions that can now be handled by automata learning algorithms for finite
state systems. In [7], we described an algorithm that uses counterexample-guided
abstraction refinement to automatically construct an appropriate mapper for a subclass
of register automata that may only store the first and the last occurrence of a parameter
value. Moerman et al. [156] present a learning algorithm for nominal automata, which
are acceptors of languages over infinite (structured) alphabets. Nominal automata are a
direct reformulation of the classical notion of finite automaton where one replaces finite
sets with orbit-finite sets and functions (or relations) with equivariant ones [35,172].
The algorithm of Moerman et al. [156] is almost a verbatim copy of the classical
algorithm of Angluin [19]. Deterministic nominal automata are equally expressive as
register automata but, due to the fact that they are unique-valued, exponentially less
succinct (see [56]).
The approaches of [7, 54–56, 58, 114, 115, 156] do not allow to learn models with of
fresh output values. Fresh outputs are technically challenging,1 but crucial in many
1In register automata frameworks with accepting states, like [56], fresh outputs can be modeled
but membership queries cannot be implemented, whereas in transducer based frameworks that
generate outputs in response to inputs, like [7,114], the outcome of membership queries would become
nondeterministic.
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real-world systems, e.g. servers that generate fresh identifiers, passwords or sequence
numbers. Bollig et al. [37] provide a learning algorithm for session automata, a
class of register automata that supports fresh data values. This algorithm is elegant,
but the expressivity of session automata is limited since no guards are allowed in
transitions.
The main contributions of this chapter are (a) an extension of the learning algorithm
of [7] to the full class of register automate with fresh outputs, (b) a description of the
implementation of our new algorithm in the 0.41 release of the Tomte tool2, and (c) an
experimental evaluation of our implementation on a series of benchmarks, including a
comparison with the RALib [54] tool. Tomte’s source code and experimental results
are available at3.
Figure 4.1 presents the overall architecture of our learning approach. At the right we
see the teacher or system under learning (SUL), an implementation whose behavior
can be described by an (unknown) input enabled and input deterministic register
automaton. At the left we see the learner, which is a tool for learning finite deter-
ministic Mealy machines. In our current implementation we use LearnLib [154,178],
but there are also other libraries like libalf [38] that implement active learning algo-
rithms. In between the learner and the SUL we place three auxiliary components:
the determinizer, the lookahead oracle, and the abstractor. First the determinizer
eliminates the nondeterminism of the SUL that is induced by fresh outputs. Then
the lookahead oracle annotates events with information about the data values that
need to be remembered because they play a role in the future behavior of the SUL.
Finally, the abstractor maps the large set of concrete values of the SUL to a small set
of symbolic values that can be handled by the learner.
Learner Abstractor
Lookahead
Oracle
Determinizer
Teacher
(SUL)
Figure 4.1: Architecture of Tomte
The idea to use an abstractor for learning register automata originates from [7] (based
on work of [10]). Using abstractors one can only learn restricted types of deterministic
register automata. Therefore, [2,8] introduced the concept of a lookahead oracle, which
makes it possible to learn any deterministic register automaton. In this chapter, we
extend the algorithm of [2, 8] with the notion of a determinizer, allowing us to also
learn register automata with fresh outputs.
2http://tomte.cs.ru.nl/
3https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/harcok/tomte/tree/release-0.41
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4.2 Register Automata
In this section, we define register automata and their operational semantics in terms
of Mealy machines. In addition, we discuss technical concepts that provide insight
into the behavior of register automata, concepts which play a key role in the technical
development of this chapter: right invariance and symmetry. For reasons of exposition,
the notion of register automaton that we define here is a simplified version of what
we have implemented in our tool: Tomte also supports constants and actions with
multiple parameters. Our definition is similar to that of a scalarset Mealy machine
from [7] and of a register Mealy machine from [114], except that the value of the
output parameter is not necessarily determined by the values of the registers and the
input parameter.
4.2.1 Definition
We postulate a countably infinite set V of variables, which contains two special variables
in and out. An atomic formula is a boolean expression of the form true, false, x = y or
x 6= y, with x, y ∈ V . A formula ϕ is a conjunction of atomic formulas. Let X ⊆ V be
a set of variables. We write Φ(X) for the set of formulas with variables taken from X.
A valuation for X is a function ξ : X → Z. We write Val(X) for the set of valuations
for X. If ϕ is a formula with variables from X and ξ is a valuation for X, then we
write ξ |= ϕ to denote that ξ satisfies ϕ. We use symbol ≡ to denote syntactic equality
of formulas. We represent (partial) functions as sets of pairs, and write X 9 Y for
the set of partial functions from X to Y .
Definition 4.1 (Register automaton). A register automaton (RA) is a tuple R =
〈I,O, L, l0, V,Γ〉 with
• I and O finite, disjoint sets of input and output symbols, respectively,
• L a finite set of locations and l0 ∈ L the initial location,
• V is a function that assigns to each location l a finite set V (l) ⊆ V \ {in, out} of
registers, with V (l0) = ∅.
• Γ ⊆ L×I×Φ(V)× (V 9 V)×O×L a finite set of transitions. For each transition
〈l, i, g, %, o, l′〉 ∈ Γ, we refer to l as the source, i as the input symbol, g as the
guard, % as the update, o as the output symbol, and l′ as the target. We require
that g ∈ Φ(V (l) ∪ {in, out}) and % : V (l′)→ V (l) ∪ {in, out}. We write l i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′
if 〈l, i, g, %, o, l′〉 ∈ Γ.
Example 4.1. As a first running example of a register automaton we use a FIFO-set
with capacity two, similar to the one presented in [114]. A FIFO-set is a queue in which
only different values can be stored, see Figure 4.2. In this automaton, I = {Push,Pop},
O = {OK,NOK,Return}, L = {l0, l1, l2}, V (l0) = ∅, V (l1) = {v}, and V (l2) = {v, w}.
Input Push tries to add the value of parameter in to the queue, and input Pop tries
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l0start l1 l2
Push(in)/OK
v:=in
Pop/NOK
in 6= v
Push(in)/OK
w:=in
in = v
Push(in)/NOK
out = v
Pop/Return(out)
out = v
Pop/Return(out)
v:=w
Push/NOK
Figure 4.2: FIFO-set with a capacity of 2 modeled as a register automaton
to retrieve a value from the queue. The output in response to a Push is OK if the
input value can be added successfully, or NOK if the input value is already in the
queue or if the queue is full. The output in response to a Pop is Return(out), with as
parameter the oldest value from the queue, or NOK if the queue is empty. Each input
has parameter in and each output has parameter out. However, we omit parameters
that do not matter and for instance write Pop instead of Pop(in) since parameter in
does not occur in the guard and is not touched by the update. Usually, we also do not
list the sets of variables of locations explicitly, as they can be inferred from the context.
4.2.2 Semantics
The operational semantics of register automata is defined in terms of (infinite state)
Mealy machines.
Definition 4.2 (Mealy machine). A Mealy machine is defined to be a tuple M =
〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉, where I and O are disjoint sets of input and output actions, respecti-
vely, Q is a set of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and → ⊆ Q× I ×O ×Q is the
transition relation. We write q
i/o−−→ q′ if (q, i, o, q′) ∈ →, and q i/o−−→ if there exists a
state q′ such that q
i/o−−→ q′. A Mealy machine is input enabled if, for each state q and
input i, there exists an output o such that q
i/o−−→. We say that a Mealy machine is
finite if the sets Q, I and O are finite.
A partial run of M is a finite sequence α = q0 i0 o0 q1 i1 o1 q2 · · · in−1 on−1 qn,
beginning and ending with a state, such that for all j < n, qj
ij/oj−−−→ qj+1. A run of
M is a partial run that starts with q0. The trace of α, denoted trace(α), is the finite
sequence β = i0 o0 i1 o1 · · · in−1 on−1 that is obtained by erasing all the states from
α. We say that β is a trace of state q ∈ Q iff β is the trace of some partial run that
starts in q, and we say that β is a trace of M iff β is a trace of q0. We call two states
q, q′ ∈ Q equivalent, notation q ≈ q′, iff they have the same traces. Let M1 and M2
be Mealy machines with the same sets of input actions. We say that M1 and M2
are equivalent, notation M1 ≈ M2, if they have the same traces. We say that M1
implements M2, notation M1 ≤M2, if all traces of M1 are also traces of M2.
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The operational semantics of a register automaton is a Mealy machine in which the
states are pairs of a location l and a valuation ξ of the state variables. A transition
may fire for given input and output values if its guard evaluates to true. In this
case, a new valuation of the state variables is computed using the update part of the
transition.
Definition 4.3 (Semantics register automata). Let R = 〈I,O, L, l0, V,Γ〉 be a RA. The
operational semantics of R, denoted [[R]], is the Mealy machine 〈I×Z, O×Z, Q, q0,→〉,
where Q = {(l, ξ) | l ∈ L ∧ ξ ∈ Val(V (l)))}, q0 = (l0, ∅), and relation → is defined
inductively by the rule
l
i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′
ι = ξ ∪ {(in, d), (out, e)} ι |= g ξ′ = ι ◦ %
(l, ξ)
i(d)/o(e)−−−−−→ (l′, ξ′)
(4.1)
If transition (l, ξ)
i(d)/o(e)−−−−−→ (l′, ξ′) can be inferred using rule (4.1) then we say that it
is supported by transition l
i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′ of R, and that transition l i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′ fires.
We call R input enabled if its operational semantics [[R]] is input enabled. A run or
trace of R is just a run or trace of [[R]], respectively. Two register automata R1 and
R2 are equivalent if [[R1]] and [[R2]] are equivalent. We call R input deterministic if
for each reachable state (l, ξ) and input action i(d) at most one transition may fire.
An input deterministic register automaton R has the property that for any trace β of
R there exists a unique run α such that trace(α) = β.
Example 4.2. The register automaton of Figure 4.2 is input deterministic. The
following sequence constitutes a run of this automaton:
(l0, ∅) Pop/NOK−−−−−−→ (l0, ∅) Push(22)/OK−−−−−−−−→ (l1, {(v, 22)}) Push(7)/OK−−−−−−−→ (l1, {(v, 22), (w, 7)})
By erasing the states from this sequence we obtain the trace
Pop NOK Push(22) OK Push(7) OK
Note that we again omit the parameters of actions Pop, NOK and OK.
The main contribution of this chapter is an algorithm for learning input enabled
and input deterministic register automata. Our algorithm solves this problem by
reducing it to the problem of learning finite deterministic Mealy machines, for which
efficient algorithms exist. We recall the definition of a deterministic Mealy machine.
We call a register automaton deterministic if its semantics is a deterministic Mealy
machine.
Definition 4.4 (Deterministic Mealy machine). A Mealy machineM = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→
〉 is deterministic if for each state q and input action i there is exactly one output action
o and exactly one state q′ such that q
i/o−−→ q′. A deterministic Mealy machine M can
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equivalently be represented as a structure 〈I,O,Q, q0, δ, λ〉, where δ : Q× I → Q and
λ : Q× I → O are defined by: q i/o−−→ q′ ⇔ δ(q, i) = q′ ∧ λ(q, i) = o. Update function
δ is extended to a function from Q × I∗ → Q by the following classical recurrence
relations:
δ(q, ) = q,
δ(q, i u) = δ(δ(q, i), u).
Similarly, output function λ is extended to a function from Q× I∗ → O∗ by
λ(q, ) = ,
λ(q, i u) = λ(q, i) λ(δ(q, i), u).
Example 4.3. The register automaton of Figure 4.2 is not deterministic. Recall that
in every transition of a register automaton the input symbol carries a parameter in
and the output symbol carries a parameter out, but that we omit these parameters in
diagrams when they do not occur in the guard and are not touched by the update. As
there are no constraints on the value of out for transitions with output symbol OK, an
input Push(1) may induce both an OK(1) and an OK(2) output (in fact, parameter out
can take any value). We can easily make the automaton of Figure 4.2 deterministic,
for instance by strengthening the guards with out = in for transitions where the output
value does not matter.
Example 4.4. Our second running example is a register automaton, displayed in
Figure 4.3, that describes a simple login procedure. If a user performs a Register-input
l0start l1 l2
Register/OK(out)
pwd:=out
in = pwd
Login(in)/OK
in 6= pwd
Login(in)/NOK
Logout/OK
ChangePassword(in)/OK
pwd:=in
Figure 4.3: A simple login procedure modeled as a register automaton
then the automaton produces output symbol OK together with a password. The user
may then proceed by performing a Login-input together with the password that she has
just received. After login the user may either change the password or logout. We
can easily make the automaton input enabled by adding self loops i/NOK in each
location, for each input symbol i that is not enabled. It is not possible to model the
login procedure as a deterministic register automaton: the very essence of the protocol
is that the system nondeterministically picks a password and gives it to the user.
84 4. Learning Register Automata with Fresh Value Generation
4.2.3 Symmetry
A key characteristic of register automata is that they exhibit strong symmetries.
Because no operations on data values are allowed and we can only test for equality,
bijective renaming of data values preserves behavior. The symmetries can be formally
expressed through the notion of an automorphism. In the remainder of this section,
we present the definition of an automorphism and explore some basic properties that
will play a key role later on in this chapter. Slight variations of these properties have
been proven elsewhere, see for instance [77]. The symmetry of register automata under
data automorphisms plays a central role in [35], and in fact serves as a definition of
the equivalent notion of a nominal automaton.
Definition 4.5. An automorphism is a bijection h : Z→ Z.
Let X be a set of variables. Then we lift an automorphism h to valuations ξ for X
by pointwise extension, that is, h(ξ) = h ◦ ξ. Since formulas in Φ(X) only assert that
variables from X are equal or not, satisfaction of these formulas is not affected when
we apply an automorphism to a valuation.
Lemma 4.1. Let h be an automorphism, X be a set of variables, ξ ∈ Val(X) and
ϕ ∈ Φ(X). Then ξ |= ϕ iff h(ξ) |= ϕ.
Proof. By structural induction on ϕ.
We also lift automorphisms to the states, actions and transitions of a register au-
tomaton R by pointwise extension. The transition relation of R is preserved by
automorphisms.
Lemma 4.2. Let h be an automorphism and let R be a register automaton. Then
(l, ξ)
i(d)/o(e)−−−−−→ (l′, ξ′) is a transition of R iff (l, h(ξ)) i(h(d))/o(h(e))−−−−−−−−−→ (l′, h(ξ′)) is a
transition of R.
Proof. Use Lemma 4.1.
Next, we lift automorphisms to runs by pointwise extension.
Lemma 4.3. Let h be an automorphism and let R be a register automaton. Then α
is a (partial) run of R iff h(α) is a (partial) run of R.
Proof. Use Lemma 4.2 and the fact that h trivially preserves the initial state.
Finally, we lift automorphisms to traces by pointwise extension.
Lemma 4.4. Let h be an automorphism, let R be a register automaton and let α be
a partial run of R. Then trace(h(α)) = h(trace(α)).
Proof. Use Lemma 4.3.
Corollary 4.1. Let h be an automorphism and let R be a register automaton. Then
β is a trace of R iff h(β) is a trace of R.
4.2. Register Automata 85
We call two states, actions, transitions, runs or traces equivalent if there exists an
automorphism that maps one to the other.
4.2.4 Constants and Multiple Parameters
Tomte also supports constants and actions with multiple parameters. These features
are convenient for modelling applications, but do not add any expressivity to the basic
model of register automata.
Suppose R is a register automaton in which we would like to refer to distinct constants
c1 and c2. Then we may extend R with the sequence of two transitions illustrated
in Figure 4.4, starting from location l′0 which is the initial location of the extended
automaton. The first transition initializes c1, which becomes a variable in our encoding,
l′0start l
′
1 l0
Initialize(in)/OK
c1:=in
in 6= c1
Initialize(in)/OK
c2:=in
Figure 4.4: Encoding of constants
and similarly the second transition initializes c2. After performing the initializations
we enter the initial state l0 of R. Constants c1 and c2 are added as variables to all
the locations of R, and they may be tested in transitions. The encoding introduces
an auxiliary input symbol Initialize and output symbol OK. If desired, the register
automaton can be made input enabled by adding a trivial Initialize-loop to each location
of R, and an Initialize-loops with guard in = c1 to l′1. Note that in an actual run of the
automaton, c1 and c2 may be assigned arbitrary (distinct) values, different from the
specific values for these constants that we had in mind originally. However, because of
the symmetries of register automata this does not matter, and we may always rename
constants to their intended values via an appropriate automorphism.
Tomte also supports multiple parameters for input and output actions, like in the
simple login model shown in Figure 4.5. This model describes a system in which a
user can register by providing a user id and a password, and then login using the
credentials that were used for registering. What we can do here is to split a transition
l0start l1 l2
Register(in1, in2)/OK
usr:=in1
pwd:=in2
in1 = usr
in2 = pwd
Login(in1, in2)/OK
in1 6= usr ∨ in2 6= pwd
Login(in1, in2)/NOK
Register/NOK
Login/NOK
Register/NOK
Figure 4.5: A simple login system with inputs that carry two parameters
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with multiple input parameters into a squence of transitions with a single parameter.
The transition from l0 to l1, for instance, can be translated to the pattern shown in
Figure 4.6.
l0start l
′
0 l1
Register(in)/OK
usr:=in
Register(in)/OK
pwd:=in
Figure 4.6: Encoding of multiple parameters
The implementation in Tomte involves several optimizations and does not use the
above encodings. Nevertheless, these encodings show how constants and multiple
parameters can be handled conceptually.
4.3 Restricted Types of Register Automata
Cassel et al [54] introduce the concept of a right invariant register automaton and
provide a canonical automaton presentation of any language recognizable by a deter-
ministic right invariant register automaton. The notion of right invariance plays an
important role in our work as well. In this section, we discuss the formal definition of
right invariance and prove some key results.
Definition 4.6. Let R = 〈I,O, L, l0, V,Γ〉 be a register automaton. Then R is right
invariant if, for each transition l
i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′ in Γ, g is satisfiable and
1. for distinct x, y ∈ V (l), neither g ⇒ x = y nor g ⇒ x 6= y is valid, and
2. the combined effect of guard g and assignment % does not imply x = y for distinct
x, y ∈ V (l′) (note that inequalities may be implied).4
Right invariance says that in guards we may compare input and output values with
registers, but we are not allowed to test for (in)equality of distinct registers. Also,
assignments may not copy the value of a single register in the source state to two
distinct registers in the target state.
Example 4.5. The FIFO-set model of Figure 4.2 and the login model of Figure 4.3
are right invariant. Figure 4.7 shows an example of a register automaton that is not
right invariant. This automaton models a simple slot machine. By pressing a button a
user may stop a spinning reel to reveal a value. If two consecutive values are equal
then the user wins, otherwise he loses. The automaton is not right invariant, since in
location l2 we test for equality the registers v and w.
The next lemma provides an equivalent characterization of right invariance.
4We can formalize this second condition by introducing a primed version x′ of each variable x: for
all pairs of distinct variables x, y ∈ V (l′) we require that the implication g ∧ (∧z∈V (l′) z′ = ρ(z))⇒
x′ = y′ is not valid.
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l0start l1 l2
button/reel(out)
v:=out
button/reel(out)
w:=out
v 6= w
button/lose
v = w
button/win
Figure 4.7: A simple slot machine modeled as a register automaton
Lemma 4.5. R is right invariant iff for all transitions l i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′, % is injective and
guard g is equivalent to a formula of the form gin ∧ gout such that
1. gin ≡ in = x, with x ∈ V (l), or gin ≡
∧
x∈W in 6= x, with W ⊆ V (l) (by convention
the conjunction over the empty index set is true),
2. gout ≡ out = x, with x ∈ V (l) ∪ {in}, or gout ≡
∧
x∈W out 6= x, with W ⊆
V (l) ∪ {in},
3. if gin ≡ in = x, with x ∈ V (l), then there are no y, z ∈ V (l′) with %(y) = in and
%(z) = x,
4. if gout ≡ out = x, with x ∈ V (l) ∪ {in}, then there are no y, z ∈ V (l′) with
%(y) = out and %(z) = x, and
5. there is no x ∈ V (l) with gin ≡ in = x and gout ≡ out = x.
Proof. “⇒” Suppose l i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′ is a transition of R. Assume that x, y ∈ V (l′) are
distinct variables and %(x) = %(y). Then g ∧ (∧z∈V (l′) z′ = ρ(z))⇒ x′ = y′ is valid,
which is a contradiction. Thus % is injective. Since g is satisfiable, it can be written
as a conjunction of atomic formula x = y or x 6= y with x, y distinct variables from
V (l) ∪ {in, out}. W.l.o.g. we assume that each atomic formula occurs at most once
in g. Observe that g does not contain an atomic formula x = y with x, y distinct
variables from V (l), because then g ⇒ x = y would be valid. Similarly, g does not
contain an atomic formula x 6= y with x, y distinct variables from V (l), because then
g ⇒ x 6= y would be valid. Thus each atomic formula in g either contains variable in
or variable out (or both). W.l.o.g. we assume that if an atomic formulas contain out,
variable out occurs on the left, and otherwise variable in occurs on the left. Moreover,
we assume w.l.o.g. that g does not contain atomic formulas in = x and out = x, for
some x ∈ V (l) (in such a case we may replace out = x by out = in). Let gout be
the conjunction of all atomic formulas from g that contain out, and let gin be the
conjunction of all remaining atomic formulas from g. Then g = gin ∧ gout. Observe
that gin does not contain subformulas in = x and in = y, for distinct x, y ∈ V (l),
because then g ⇒ x = y would be valid. Similarly, gin does not contain subformulas
in = x and in 6= y, for distinct x, y ∈ V (l), because then g ⇒ x 6= y would be valid.
Finally, observe that gin does not contain subformulas in = x and in 6= x, for x ∈ V (l),
because this would contradict satisfiability of g. Condition (1) from the lemma now
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follows. Using a similar argument, we may prove condition (2). Condition (3) follows
by contradiction. Suppose that gin ≡ in = x, %(y) = in and %(z) = x, for y, z ∈ V (l′).
Then g ∧ (∧u∈V (l′) u′ = ρ(u))⇒ y′ = z′ is valid, which is a contradiction. Conditions
(4) follows via a similar argument. Condition (5) follows from our assumption that g
does not contain atomic formulas in = x and out = x, for x ∈ V (l).
“⇐” Suppose l i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′ is a transition of R. Let ζ : V → Z be an injective function.
Valuation ξ for V (l) ∪ {in, out} assigns distinct values to all variables, except when
equality is required by g:
ξ(z) =

ζ(x) if z ≡ out ∧ gout ≡ out = x
ζ(in) if gin ≡ in = z
ζ(z) otherwise
It is routine to check that ξ |= g, which means that g is satisfiable. Now suppose
that x and y are distinct variables in V (l). Then ξ 6|= g ⇒ x = y, which implies that
g ⇒ x = y is not valid. Let n ∈ Z be a value with n 6= ζ(in) and n 6= ζ(out). Valuation
ξ for V (l) ∪ {in, out} assigns the same value n to all variables, except when inequality
is required by g:
ξ(z) =

ζ(in) if z ≡ in ∧ gin contains an inequality
ζ(out) if z ≡ out ∧ gout contains an inequality
n otherwise
It is again routine to check that ξ |= g. Suppose that x and y are distinct variables in
V (l). Then ξ 6|= g ⇒ x 6= y, which implies that g ⇒ x = y is not valid.
In order to prove condition (2), suppose x, y are distinct variables from V (l′). Let, for
z ∈ V (l′), ξ′(z′) = ξ(%(z)). Then ξ ∪ ξ′ |= g ∧ (∧z∈V (l′) z′ = ρ(z)). By construction ξ
is injective, except that ξ(in) = ξ(z) in case gin ≡ in = z, and ξ(out) = ξ(z) in case
gout ≡ out = z. This observation, in combination with the fact that % is injective and
conditions (3) and (4) from the statement of the lemma, gives us that ξ′ is injective.
Therefore ξ ∪ ξ′ does not satisfy g ∧ (∧z∈V (l′) z′ = ρ(z))⇒ x′ = y′, which implies that
this formula is not valid.
Lemma 4.5 implies that each outgoing transition from a location l of R may fire in
each state (l, ξ) of [[R]], provided we choose the right input and output values. This
has as an important consequence that a location l is reachable in R iff a state (l, ξ) is
reachable in [[R]], for some ξ.
Corollary 4.2. Let R be a right invariant RA with a transition l i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′. Let
ξ ∈ Val(V (l)). Then [[R]] has a transition (l, ξ) i(d)/o(e)−−−−−→ (l′, ξ′) that is supported by
l
i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′.
Proof. We may assume that g is of the form gin ∧ gout described in Lemma 4.5. If
gin of the form in = x, for some x ∈ V (l), then choose d = ξ(x). Otherwise, let d be
equal to some arbitrary fresh value outside the range of ξ. Similarly, pick a value for
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e. Then with ι = ξ ∪ {(in, d), (out, e)} we have ι |= g by construction, and thus (l, ξ)
enables a transition that is supported by l
i,g,%,o−−−−→ l′.
Another restriction on register automata that plays an important role in our work is
unique-valuedness. Intuitively, this means that registers are required to always store
unique values.
Definition 4.7. Let R = 〈I,O, L, l0, V,Γ〉 be a register automaton. Then R is unique-
valued if, for each reachable state (l, ξ) of [[R]], valuation ξ is injective, that is, two
registers can never store identical values.
Example 4.6. The FIFO-set model of Figure 4.2 and the login model of Figure 4.3
are both unique-valued. The slot machine model of Figure 4.7 is not unique-valued,
since in location l2 registers v and w may contain the same value. Figure 4.8 presents
a variation of the FIFO-set model that is right invariant but not unique-valued. This
register automaton, which represents a FIFO-buffer of capacity 2, is not unique-valued
since in location l2 registers v and w may contain the same value.
l0start l1 l2
Push(in)/OK
v:=in
Pop/NOK Push(in)/OK
w:=in
out = v
Pop/Return(out)
out = v
Pop/Return(out)
v:=w
Push/NOK
Figure 4.8: FIFO-buffer with a capacity of 2 modeled as a register automaton
Even though right invariance and unique-valuedness are strong restrictions it is possible
to construct, for each register automaton, an equivalent register automaton that is
both right invariant and unique valued. Figure 4.9, for example, shows a right invariant
and unique-valued register automaton that is equivalent to the register automaton of
Figure 4.7.
Theorem 4.1. For each register automaton R there exists a right invariant and
unique-valued register automaton R such that R and R are equivalent.
Proof. See the extended version of this chapter available at 5.
Cassel et al [54] established that right invariant register automata can be exponentially
more succinct than unique-valued register automata. The second main result of this
section is that (arbitrary) register automata in turn can be exponentially more succinct
than right invariant register automata.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a sequence of register automata R1, R2,.. such that the
5http://www.sws.cs.ru.nl/publications/papers/fvaan/TomteFresh/
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l0start l1 l2
l3
button/reel(out)
v:=out
out = v
button/reel(out)
out 6= v
button/reel(out)
button/lose
button/win
Figure 4.9: Slot machine modeled as a right invariant register automaton
number of locations of Rn is O(n), but the minimal number of locations of a right
invariant register automaton that is equivalent to Rn is Ω(2n).
Proof. The idea is to let Rn encode a binary counter with n bits. The register
automaton Rn has input symbols Init and Tick, output symbols OK and Overflow,
n+ 2 locations l0, l1, c1, . . . , cn, and n+ 2 registers zero, one, xn, . . . , x1. Figure 4.10
shows the transitions of Rn. We view Tick as the default input symbol, OK as the
default output symbol, and do not display these default symbols in the diagram.
l0start
l1
c1 c2 c3 cn
Init(in)
zero, xn, . . . , x1 := in
in 6= zero
Init(in)
one := in
x1 = one
x1 := zerox1 = zero
x1 := one
x2 = one
x2 := zero
x2 = zero
x2 := one x3 = zero
x3 := one
xn = one
xn := zero
Overflow
xn = zero
xn := one
Figure 4.10: Encoding a binary counter as a register automaton
Mealy machine [[Rn]] has runs in which repeatedly location c1 is visited. The first
time all the variables xn, . . . , x1 equal zero, which encodes a binary counter with value
0, with x1 representing the least significant bit. Then, for each subsequent visit to
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c1, the value of the counter is incremented by one. When the counter overflows all
the bits become zero again and an output Overflow is generated. Since each cycle
from c1 to itself takes at least one transition, it takes at least 2
n transitions before an
output Overflow occurs. By Theorem 4.1, we know that there exists a right invariant
register automaton that is equivalent to Rn. Let R′n be such a right invariant register
automaton with a minimal number of locations. Then R′n has a transition with output
symbol Overflow, starting from a location l that is reachable with a cycle free path of
transitions in R′n. Due to Corollary 4.2, the number of transitions in this path is at
least 2n (otherwise [[R′n]] would be able to produce an Overflow prematurely). Hence
R′n contains at least 2n locations.
In this chapter, we will present an algorithm for learning input enabled, input de-
terministic, register automata. The models produced by our learning algorithm will
be a right invariant register automaton. By the results of this section, such a right
invariant register automaton will always exist, although it may be exponentially less
succinct than the original register automaton of the teacher.
4.4 Model Learning
Algorithms for active learning of automata have originally been developed for inferring
finite state acceptors for unknown regular languages [19]. Since then these algorithms
have become popular with the testing and verification communities for inferring models
of black box systems in an automated fashion. While the details change for concrete
classes of systems, all of these algorithms follow basically the same pattern. They
model the learning process as a game between a learner and a teacher. The learner
has to infer an unknown automaton with the help of the teacher. The learner can ask
three types of queries to the teacher:
Output Queries ask for the expected output for a concrete sequence of inputs. In
practice, output queries can be realized as simple tests.
Reset Queries prompt the teacher to return to its initial state and are typically
asked after each output query.
Equivalence Queries check whether a conjectured automaton produced by the
learner is correct. In case the automaton is not correct, the teacher provides a
counterexample, a trace exposing a difference between the conjecture and the
expected behavior of the system to be learned. Equivalence queries can be
approximated through (model-based) testing in black-box scenarios.
A learning algorithm will use these three kinds of queries and produce a sequence of
automata converging towards the correct one in a finite number of steps. We refer the
reader to [121,198,205] for introductions to active automata learning.
92 4. Learning Register Automata with Fresh Value Generation
4.4.1 The Nerode Congruence
Most of the learning algorithms that have been proposed in the literature aim to
construct an approximation of the Nerode congruence based on a finite number of
queries. The famous Myhill-Nerode theorem [163] for Deterministic Finite Automata
(DFA) provides a basis for describing (a) how prefixes traverse states (equivalence
classes), and (b) how states can be distinguished (by suffixes). Below we present a
straightforward reformulation of the Myhill-Nerode theorem for deterministic Mealy
machines, adapted from [198].
Definition 4.8. An observation over a set of inputs I and a set of outputs O is a
finite alternating sequence i0o0 · · · in−1on−1 of inputs and outputs that is either empty,
or begins with an input and ends with an output. Let S be a set of observations over I
and O. Then S is
• prefix closed if β i o ∈ S =⇒ β ∈ S,
• behavior deterministic if β i o ∈ S ∧ β i o′ ∈ S =⇒ o = o′, and
• input complete if β ∈ S ∧ i ∈ I =⇒ ∃o ∈ O : β i o ∈ S.
Two observations β, β′ ∈ S are equivalent for S, notation β ≡S β′, iff for all obser-
vations γ over I and O, βγ ∈ S ⇔ β′γ ∈ S. We write [β] to denote the equivalence
class of β with respect to ≡S.
Theorem 4.3 (Myhill-Nerode). Let S be a set of observations over finite sets of
inputs I and outputs O. Then S is the set of traces of some finite, deterministic Mealy
machine M iff S is nonempty, prefix closed, behavior deterministic, input complete,
and ≡S has finitely many equivalence classes (finite index).
Proof. “⇒”. Let M be a finite, deterministic Mealy machine and let S be its set
of traces. Then it is immediate from the definitions that S is a nonempty set of
observations that is prefix closed and input complete. Since each trace of M leads
to a unique state and M is deterministic, it follows that S is behavior deterministic.
Since all observations that lead to the same state are obviously equivalent and since
M is finite, equivalence relation ≡S has finite index.
“⇐”. Suppose S is nonempty, prefix closed, behavior deterministic, input complete,
and ≡S has finite index. We define the finite, deterministic Mealy machine M =
〈I,O,Q, q0, δ, λ〉 as follows:
• Q is the set of classes of ≡S .
• q0 is given by [].
• Let β ∈ S and i ∈ I. Then, since S is both input complete and behavior
deterministic, there exists a unique o ∈ O such that β i o ∈ S. We define
δ([β], i) = [β i o] and λ([β], i) = o.
It is straightforward to verify that M is a well-defined finite, deterministic Mealy
machine whose set of traces equals S.
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The equivalence relation ≡S induced by the set of traces S of a register automaton
does not have a finite index. However, as observed by [35,54,55], by using the inherent
symmetry of register automata we may define a slightly different equivalence relation
≡autS that does have a finite index and that may serve as a basis for a Myhill-Nerode
theorem for register automata. The equivalence relation ≡autS on S is defined by
β ≡autS β′ ⇔ ∃ automorphism h ∀γ : (βγ ∈ S ⇔ β′h(γ) ∈ S)
Proposition 4.1. Let R be an input deterministic register automataton and let S be
its set of traces. Then ≡autS has a finite index.
Proof. Since R is input deterministic, there exists for each trace of R a unique
corresponding run. Let β and β′ be traces of R and let (l, ξ) and (l′, ξ′) be the final
states of the corresponding runs. Assume that l = l′ and Part(ξ) = Part(ξ′). (Here
we write Part(f) for the partition induced by function f in which two elements from
the domain of f are placed in the same block iff f maps them to the same value.)
Then there exists an automorphism h from ξ to ξ′. By Lemma 4.3, α is a partial run
starting in (l, ξ) iff h(α) is a partial run starting in (l′, ξ′). Moreover, by Lemma 4.4,
trace(h(α)) = h(trace(α)). Hence, β ≡autS β′. Since R has a finite number of locations,
since each location has a finite set of registers, and since there are only finitely many
partitions of a finite set, this implies that ≡autS has a finite index.
Whereas [114,115] presents a learning algorithm for register automata that is based on a
variant of the Myhill-Nerode theorem for ≡autS (i.e., the “converse” of Proposition 4.1),
the idea of our approach is to learn register automata by constructing an abstraction
of the set of traces that has a finite index according to the original definition of
≡S .
4.4.2 Mappers
Below we recall relevant parts of the theory of mappers from [10]. In order to learn
an over-approximation of a “large” Mealy machine M, we may place a transducer
in between the teacher and the learner, which translates concrete inputs to abstract
inputs, concrete outputs to abstract outputs, and vice versa. This allows us to reduce
the task of the learner to inferring a “small” Mealy machine with an abstract alphabet.
As we will see, the determinizer and the abstractor of Figure 4.1 are examples of such
transducers.
The behavior of a transducer is fully specified by a mapper, a deterministic Mealy
machine in which concrete actions are inputs and abstract actions are outputs.
Definition 4.9 (Mapper). A mapper is a deterministic Mealy machine A = 〈I ∪
O,X ∪ Y,R, r0, δ, λ〉, where
• I and O are disjoint sets of concrete input and output actions,
• X and Y are disjoint sets of abstract input and output actions, and
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• λ : R× (I ∪O)→ (X ∪ Y ), referred to as the abstraction function, respects inputs
and outputs, that is, for all a ∈ I ∪O and r ∈ R, a ∈ I ⇔ λ(r, a) ∈ X.
A mapper A translates any sequence β ∈ (I ∪O)∗ of concrete actions into a correspon-
ding sequence of abstract actions given by
αA(β) = λ(r0, β).
A mapper also allows us to abstract a Mealy machine with concrete actions in I and O
into a Mealy machine with abstract actions in X and Y . Basically, the abstraction of
Mealy machineM via mapper A is the Cartesian product of the underlying transition
systems, in which the abstraction function is used to convert concrete actions into
abstract ones.
Definition 4.10 (Abstraction). Let M = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉 be a Mealy machine and
let A = 〈I ∪O,X ∪ Y,R, r0, δ, λ〉 be a mapper. Then αA(M), the abstraction of M
via A, is the Mealy machine 〈X,Y ∪ {⊥}, Q×R, (q0, r0),→〉, where ⊥6∈ Y is a fresh
output action and → is given inductively by the rules
q
i/o−−→ q′, r i/x−−→ r′ o/y−−→ r′′
(q, r)
x/y−−→ (q′, r′′)
6 ∃i ∈ I : r i/x−−→
(q, r)
x/⊥−−−→ (q, r)
The first rule says that a state (q, r) of the abstraction has an outgoing x-transition for
each transition q
i/o−−→ q′ of M with λ(r, i) = x. In this case, there exist unique r′, r′′
and y such that r
i/x−−→ r′ and r′ o/y−−→ r′′. An x-transition in state (q, r) then leads to
state (q′, r′′) and produces output y. The second rule in the definition ensures that the
abstraction αA(M) is input enabled. Given a state (q, r) of the mapper, it may occur
that for some abstract input x there does not exist a corresponding concrete input
i with λ(r, i) = x. In this case, an input x triggers the special “undefined” output
action ⊥ and leaves the state unchanged.
Lemma 4.6. Let A be a mapper and let M be a Mealy machine with the same
concrete input and output actions I and O. If β is a trace of M then αA(β) is a trace
of αA(M).
Proof. Straightforward, see also Lemma 4 of [10].
A mapper describes the behavior of a transducer component that we can place in
between a Learner and a Teacher. Consider a mapper A = 〈I ∪O,X ∪ Y,R, r0, δ, λ〉.
The transducer component that is induced by A records the current state, which
initially is set to r0, and behaves as follows:
• Whenever the transducer is in a state r and receives an abstract input x ∈ X
from the learner, it nondeterministically picks a concrete input i ∈ I such that
λ(r, i) = x, forwards i to the teacher, and jumps to state δ(r, i). If there exists no
such input i, then the component returns output ⊥ to the learner.
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• Whenever the transducer is in a state r and receives a concrete answer o from the
teacher, it forwards λ(r, o) to the learner and jumps to state δ(r, o).
• Whenever the transducer receives a reset query from the learner, it changes its
current state to r0, and forwards a reset query to the teacher.
From the perspective of a learner, a teacher for M and a transducer for A together
behave exactly like a teacher for αA(M). (We refer to [10] for a formalization of
this claim.) In [10], also a concretization operator γA is defined. Let H be a Mealy
machine with “abstract” actions in X and Y . The concretization operator γA is the
adjoint of the abstraction operator: it turns H into a concrete Mealy machine γA(H)
with actions in I and O. As shown in [10], αA(M) ≤ H implies M≤ γA(H).
4.5 The Determinizer
The login example of Figure 4.3 shows that input deterministic register automata may
exhibit nondeterministic behavior: in each run the automaton may generate different
output values (passwords). This is a useful feature since it allows us to model the
actual behavior of real-world systems, but it is also problematic since learning tools
such as LearnLib can only handle deterministic systems. In this section, we show
how this type of nondeterminism can be eliminated by exploiting symmetries that are
present in register automata.
As a first step, we show that each trace is equivalent to a ‘neat’ trace in which fresh
values are selected according to some fixed rules. The concept of ‘neat’ traces is similar
to the encoding with ‘representative’ traces that was used in [55] in a setting without
fresh values.
Definition 4.11 (Fresh and neat). Consider a trace β of register automaton R:
β = i0(d0) o0(e0) i1(d1) o1(e1) · · · in−1(dn−1) on−1(en−1) (4.2)
Let Sj be the set of values that occur in β before input ij , and let Tj be the set of values
that occur before output oj, that is, S0 = ∅, Tj = Sj ∪ {dj} and Sj+1 = Tj ∪ {ej}.
An input value dj is fresh if it has not occurred before in the trace, that is, dj 6∈ Sj.
Similarly, an output value ej is fresh if it has not occurred before, that is, ej 6∈ Tj . We
say that β has neat inputs if each fresh input value dj is equal to the largest preceding
value (including 0) plus one, that is, dj ∈ Sj ∪ {max(Sj ∪ {0}) + 1}. Similarly, β
has neat outputs if each fresh output value is equal to the smallest preceding value
(including 0) minus one, that is, for all j, ej ∈ Tj ∪ {min(Tj ∪ {0})− 1}. A trace is
neat if it has neat inputs and neat outputs, and a run is neat if its trace is neat.
Observe that in a neat trace the n-th fresh input value is n, and the n-th fresh output
value is −n.
Example 4.7. Trace i(1) o(3) i(7) o(7) i(3) o(2) is not neat, for instance because the
first fresh output value 3 is not equal to −1. Also, the second input value 7 is fresh
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but different from 4, the largest preceding value plus 1. An example of a neat trace is
i(1) o(−1) i(2) o(2) i(−1) o(−2).
The next proposition implies that in order to learn the behavior of a register automaton
it suffices to study its neat traces, since any other trace is equivalent to a neat trace.
In order to prove this result, we need the following technical definition, which extends
any finite one-to-one relation to an automorphism.
Definition 4.12. For each finite set S ⊆ Z, let EnumCompl(S) be a function that
enumerates the elements in the complement of S, that is, EnumCompl(S) : N→ (Z \S)
is a bijection. Then, for any finite one-to-one relation r ⊆ Z×Z, rˆ is the automorphism
given by:
rˆ = r ∪ {(EnumCompl(dom(r))(k),EnumCompl(ran(r))(k)) | k ∈ N}.
Here dom(r) denotes the domain of r and ran(r) denotes the range of r.
Proposition 4.2. For every trace β there exists a zero respecting automorphism h
such that h(β) is neat.
Proof. Let β, Sj and Tj (j = 0, . . . , n − 1) be as in Definition 4.11. Inductively, we
define relations sj , tj ⊆ Z× Z (for j = 0, . . . , n− 1) as follows
s0 = ∅
tj =
{
sj ∪ {(dj ,max(ran(sj) ∪ {0}) + 1)} if dj is fresh
sj otherwise
sj+1 =
{
tj ∪ {(ej ,min(ran(tj) ∪ {0})− 1)} if ej is fresh
tj otherwise
By induction, we can prove the following assertions, for all j: (1) dom(sj) = Sj and
dom(tj) = Tj , (2) sj and tj are injective. By construction, tn−1(β) is neat. Then
h = tˆn−1 is an automorphism such that h(β) is neat.
Example 4.8. Consider the trace i(1) o(3) i(7) o(7) i(3) o(2) from Example 4.7.
This non neat trace can be mapped to the neat trace i(1) o(−1) i(2) o(2) i(−1) o(−2)
by the automorphism h that acts as the identity function except that it permutes some
values: h(3) = −1, h(−1) = 7, h(7) = 2, h(2) = −2, and h(−2) = 3.
Corollary 4.3. For every run α of R there exists an automorphism h such that h(α)
is neat.
Proof. Let α be a run of R. Then β = trace(α) is a trace of R. Therefore, by
Proposition 4.2, there exists an automorphism h such that h(β) is neat. By Lemma 4.3,
h(α) is a run of R and by Lemma 4.4, trace(h(α)) = h(β). Since h(β) is neat and a
run is neat if its trace is neat, h(α) is neat as well.
Whereas the learner may choose to only provide neat inputs, we usually have no
control over the outputs generated by the SUL, so in general these will not be neat.
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In order to handle this, we place a component, called the determinizer, in between the
SUL and the learner. The determinizer renames the outputs generated by the SUL
and makes them neat. The behavior of the determinizer is specified by the mapper D
defined below. As part of its state D maintains a finite one-to-one relation r describing
the current renamings, which grows dynamically during an execution (similar to the
functions sj and tj in the proof of Proposition 4.2). We write rˆ for an automorphism
that extends r (we may construct rˆ using the construction described in the proof of
Proposition 4.2). Whenever the SUL generates an output n that does not occur in
dom(r), this output is mapped to a value m one less than the minimal value in ran(R),
and the pair (n,m) is added to r. Whenever the learner generates an input m, the
mapper concretizes this value to n = rˆ−1(m) and forwards n to the SUL. If n does
not occur in dom(r), then r is extended with the pair (n,m).
Definition 4.13 (Determinizer). Let I and O be finite, disjoint sets of input and
output symbols. The determinizer for I and O is the mapper D = 〈(I × Z) ∪ (O ×
Z), (I × Z) ∪ (O × Z), R, r0, δ, λ〉 where
• R = {r ⊆ Z× Z | r finite and one-to-one},
• r0 = ∅,
• for all r ∈ R, i ∈ I, o ∈ O and n ∈ Z,
λ(r, i(n)) = i(rˆ(n))
λ(r, o(n)) =
{
o(r(n)) if n ∈ dom(r)
o(min(ran(r) ∪ {0})− 1) otherwise
δ(r, i(n)) =
{
r if n ∈ dom(r)
r ∪ {(n, rˆ(n))} otherwise
δ(r, o(n)) =
{
r if n ∈ dom(r)
r ∪ {(n,min(ran(r) ∪ {0})− 1)} otherwise
Proposition 4.3. Let R be a register automaton with inputs I and outputs O, let D
be the determinizer for I and O, and let β be a trace of αD([[R]]). Then β has neat
outputs and is equivalent to a trace of R.
Proof. Let α be a run of αD([[R]]) with trace β. We claim that α does not contain
any transitions with output ⊥, that is, transitions generated by the second rule in
Definition 4.9. This is because, for any state r of mapper D and any ‘abstract’ input
i(d), there exists a ‘concrete’ input i(d′) such that λ(r, i(d′)) = i(d). In fact, since rˆ is
an automorphism, we can just take d′ = rˆ−1(d). Hence run α takes the form
α = ((l0, ξ0), r0) i0(d0) o0(e0) ((l1, ξ1), r1) i1(d1) o1(e1) ((l2, ξ2), r2) · · ·
· · · in−1(dn−1) on−1(en−1) ((ln, ξn), rn).
Since the transitions in run α have been derived by repeated application of the first
rule in Definition 4.9, there exist d′j , e
′
j and r
′
j such that [[R]] has a run α′ of the form
α′ = (l0, ξ0) i0(d′0) o0(e
′
0) (l1, ξ1) i1(d
′
1) o1(e
′
1) (l2, ξ2) · · ·
98 4. Learning Register Automata with Fresh Value Generation
· · · in−1(d′n−1) on−1(e′n−1) (ln, ξn),
and D has a run
r0 i0(d
′
0) i0(d0) r
′
0 o0(e
′
0) o0(e0) r1 i1(d
′
1) i1(d1) r
′
1 o1(e
′
1) o1(e1) r2 · · ·
· · · in−1(d′n−1) in−1(dn−1) r′n−1 on−1(e′n−1) on−1(en−1) rn.
From Definition 4.13 we may infer that, for all j < n, (d′j , dj) ∈ r′j , (e′j , ej) ∈ rj+1,
rj ⊆ r′j and r′j ⊆ rj+1. Now let h = rˆn. Then h is an automorphism satisfying, for all
j < n, h(d′j) = dj and h(e
′
j) = ej . Let β
′ be the trace of α′. Then h(β′) = β and thus
traces β and β′ are equivalent.
Let Sj be the set of values that occur in β before input ij , and let Tj be the set of
values that occur in β before output oj . Then it follows by induction that Sj = ran(rj)
and Tj = ran(r
′
j). According to Definition 4.11, β has neat outputs if ej ∈ Tj ∪
{min(Tj ∪ {0}) − 1}, that is, if ej ∈ ran(r′j) ∪ {min(ran(r′j ∪ {0})) − 1}. But this is
implied by Definition 4.13.
Proposition 4.4. Any trace of R with neat outputs is also a trace of αD([[R]]).
Proof. Let α be a run of [[R]] with trace β. Then run α takes the form
α = (l0, ξ0) i0(d0) o0(e0) (l1, ξ1) i1(d1) o1(e1) (l2, ξ2) · · ·
· · · in−1(dn−1) on−1(en−1) (ln, ξn).
αD([[R]]) has a corresponding run α′ of the form
α′ = ((l0, ξ0), r0) i0(d′0) o0(e
′
0) ((l1, ξ1), r1) i1(d
′
1) o1(e
′
1) ((l2, ξ2), r2) · · ·
· · · in−1(d′n−1) on−1(e′n−1) ((ln, ξn), rn)
and D has a run
r0 i0(d0) i0(d
′
0) r
′
0 o0(e0) o0(e
′
0) r1 i1(d1) i1(d
′
1) r
′
1 o1(e1) o1(e
′
1) r2 · · ·
· · · in−1(dn−1) in−1(d′n−1) r′n−1 on−1(en−1) on−1(e′n−1) rn.
Let Sj be the set of values that occur in β before input ij , and let Tj be the set of
values that occur in β before output oj . Then it follows by induction that Sj = dom(rj)
and Tj = dom(r
′
j). Since β has neat outputs, ej ∈ dom(r′j)∪{min(dom(r′j)∪{0})− 1}.
Let Id denote the identity function on Z, that is, Id = {(n, n) | n ∈ Z}. Observe that
for any finite one-to-one relation r ⊆ Id , rˆ = Id . By induction on j, we may now
prove that rj , r
′
j ⊆ Id . It follows that dj = d′j and ej = e′j , for all j. Thus β is a trace
of αD([[R]]), as required.
Corollary 4.4. R and αD([[R]]) have equivalent traces.
Proof. Immediate from Propositions 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
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Example 4.9. The determinizer does not remove all sources of nondeterminism. The
login model of Figure 4.3, for instance, is not behavior deterministic, even when we only
consider neat traces, because of neat traces Register(1) OK(1) and Register(1) OK(−1).
This nondeterminism may be considered ‘harmless’ since the parameter value of the
OK-output is not stored and the behavior after the different outputs is the same. The
slot machine model of Figure 4.7, however, has real nondeterminism in the sense that
traces button(1) reel(−1) button(1) reel(−2) and button(1) reel(−1) button(1) reel(−1)
lead to states with distinct output symbols in the outgoing transitions.
The slot machine of Example 4.9 nondeterministically selects an output which ‘acci-
dentally’ may be equal to a previous value. We call this a collision.
Definition 4.14. Let β be a trace of register automaton R. Then β ends with a
collision if (a) the last output value is not fresh, and (b) the sequence obtained by
replacing this value by some other value is also a trace of R. We say that β has a
collision if it has a prefix that ends with a collision.
Example 4.10. Trace button(3) reel(137) button(8) reel(137) of the slot machine
model of Figure 4.7 has a collision, because the last output value 137 is not fresh, and
if we replace it by 138 the result is again a trace.
In many protocols, fresh output values are selected from a finite but large domain.
TCP sequence and acknowledgement numbers, for instance, comprise 32 bits. The
traces generated during learning are usually not so long and typically contain only a few
fresh outputs. As a result, chances that collisions occur during learning are typically
negligible. For these reasons, we have decided to consider only observations without
collisions. Under the assumption that the SUL will not repeatedly pick the same fresh
value, we can detect whether an observation contains a collision by simply repeating
experiments a few times: if, after the renaming performed by the determinizer, we
still observe nondeterminism then a collision has occurred. By ignoring traces with
collisions, it may occur that the models that we learn incorrectly describe the behavior
of the SUL in the case of collisions. We will, for instance, miss the win-transition in
the slot machine of Figure 4.7. But if collisions are rare then it is extremely difficult to
learn those types of behavior anyway. In applications with many collisions (for instance
when fresh outputs are selected randomly from a small domain) one should not use
the approach in this chapter, but rather an algorithm for learning nondeterministic
automata such as the one presented in [211].
Our approach for learning register automata with fresh outputs relies on the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.5. The set S of collision free neat traces of an input deterministic
register automaton R is behavior deterministic.
Proof. Let R = 〈I,O, L, l0, V,Γ〉 be an input deterministic register automaton and let
S be the set of collision free neat traces of R. Suppose that β i(d) o(e) and β i(d) o′(e′)
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are traces in S. Our task is to prove that o(e) = o′(e′). Since R is input deterministic,
there is a unique run α of [[R]] with trace β. Let (l, ξ) be the last state of this run. Since
β i(d) o(e) and β i(d) o′(e′) are traces of R, [[R]] has transitions (l, ξ) i(d)/o(e)−−−−−→ (l1, ξ1)
and (l, ξ)
i(d)/o′(e′)−−−−−−→ (l′1, ξ′1). Since R is input deterministic, there is a unique transition
that supports both transitions of [[R]] and thus o = o′. We consider two cases. If both
values e and e′ are fresh then, since traces β i(d) o(e) and β i(d) o′(e′) are neat, e and
e′ are both equal to the smallest preceding value minus one and thus e = e′. Now
assume that at least one value, say e, is not fresh. Then, since β i(d) o(e) is collision
free, no sequence obtained from β i(d) o(e) by replacing e by some other value can be
a trace of R. Thus e = e′ also in this case. We conclude o(e) = o′(e′), as required.
Our learning approach works for those register automata in which, when a fresh
output is generated, it does not matter for the future behavior whether or not this
fresh output equals some value that occurred previously. This is typically the case
for real-world systems such as servers that generate fresh identifiers, passwords or
sequence numbers. The slot machine of Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.9 is an example of a
system that we cannot learn.
Proposition 4.6. Let R1 and R2 be two input deterministic right invariant register
automata in which out does not occur negatively in guards. Then R1 and R2 are
equivalent iff they have the same sets of collision free traces.
4.6 The Lookahead Oracle
The main task of the lookahead oracle is to compute for each trace of the SUL a set
of values that are memorable after occurrence of this trace. Intuitively, a value d is
memorable if it has an impact on the future behavior of the SUL: either d occurs in a
future output, or a future output depends on the equality of d and a future input. The
notion of a memorable value is fundamental for register automata and was previously
studied e.g. in [31].
Definition 4.15. Let R be a register automaton, let β be a trace of R, and let d ∈ Z
be a parameter value that occurs in β. Then d is memorable after β iff there exists a
witness for d, that is, a sequence β′ such that β β′ is a trace of R and if we replace
each occurrence of d in β′ by a fresh value f then the resulting sequence β (β′[f/d]) is
not a trace of R anymore.
Example 4.11. In the example of Figure 4.2, the set of memorable values after trace
β = Push(1) OK Push(2) OK Push(3) NOK is {1, 2}. Values 1 and 2 are memorable,
because of the witness β′ = Pop Return(1) Pop Return(2). Sequence β β′ is a trace
of the model, but if we rename either the 1 or the 2 in β′ into a fresh value, then
this is no longer the case. In the example of Figure 4.3, value 2207 is memorable
after Register OK(2207) because Register OK(2207) Login(2207) OK is a trace of the
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automaton, but Register OK(2207) Login(1) OK is not.
The next theorem gives a state based characterization of memorable values: a value d
is memorable after a run of a deterministic register automaton iff the final state of
that run is inequivalent to the state obtained by replacing all occurrences of f by a
fresh value. Thus we can also say that a value d is memorable in a state of a register
automaton.
Theorem 4.4. Let R be a deterministic register automaton, let α be a run of M
with trace(α) = β, let (l, ξ) be the last state of α, let d ∈ Z, and let f 6= d be a fresh
value that does not occur in α. Let swapd,f be the automorphism that maps d to f ,
f to d, and acts as identity for all other values. Then d is memorable after β iff
(l, ξ) 6≈ (l, swapd,f (ξ)).
Proof. Suppose d is memorable after β. Then there exists a witness for d, that is,
a sequence β′ such that β β′ is a trace of R and β swapd,f (β′) is not a trace of R.
Since R is deterministic, α is the unique run of M with trace(α) = β. Therefore,
since β β′ is a trace of R, there exists a partial run α′ that starts in (l, ξ) such
that trace(α′) = β′. Moreover, since β swapd,f (β
′) is not a trace of R, swapd,f (β′) is
not a trace of (l, ξ). By Lemma 4.3, swapd,f (α
′) is a partial run of R that starts in
(l, swapd,f (ξ)). By Lemma 4.4, trace(swapd,f (α
′)) = swapd,f (β
′). Thus swapd,f (β
′) is
a trace of (l, swapd,f (ξ)), which in turn implies (l, ξ) 6≈ (l, swapd,f (ξ)).
For the other direction, suppose (l, ξ) 6≈ (l, swapd,f (ξ)). Then there exists a sequence
β′ that is a trace of (l, ξ) but not of (l, swapd,f (ξ)). We claim that β
′ is a witness for
d. Clearly, β β′ is a trace of R. Now suppose β swapd,f (β′) is a trace of R. Then,
since R is deterministic, swapd,f (β′) is a trace of (l, ξ). By Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4,
swapd,f (swapd,f (β
′)) is a trace of (l, swapd,f (ξ)). Therefore, since swapd,f is its own
inverse, β′ is a trace of (l, swapd,f (ξ)), and we have derived a contradiction. Thus our
assumption was wrong and β swapd,f (β
′) is not a trace of R.
The above theorem reduces the problem of deciding whether a value is memorable
to the problem of deciding equivalence of two states in a register automaton. It is
not hard to see that conversely the problem of deciding equivalence of states can be
reduced to the problem of deciding whether a value is memorable. The problem of
finding a witness for a memorable value is thus equivalent to the problem of finding a
distinguishing trace between two states.
Consider the architecture of Figure 4.1. Whenever the Lookahead Oracle receives an
input from the Abstractor, this is just forwarded to the Determinizer. However, when
the Lookahead Oracle receives a concrete output o from the Determinizer, then it
forwards o to the Abstractor, together with a list of the memorable values after the
occurrence of o. The ordering of the memorable values in the list determines in which
registers the values will be stored by the Abstractor. Different orderings are possible,
and the choice of the ordering affects the size of the register automaton that we will
learn (similar to the way in which the variable ordering affects the size of a Binary
Decision Diagram [50]). Within the Tomte tool we have experimented with different
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orderings. A simple way to order the values, for instance, is to sort them in ascending
order. An ordering that works rather well in practice, and on which we elaborate
below, is the order in which the values occur in the run.
Let R be the input deterministic register automaton that we want to learn, and let β
be a trace of R. Then, since R is input deterministic, it has a unique run
α = (l0, ξ0) i0(d0) o0(e0) (l1, ξ1) i1(d1) o1(e1) (l2, ξ2) · · ·
· · · in−1(dn−1) on−1(en−1) (ln, ξn).
such that trace(α) = β. For j ≤ n, we define rj ∈ Z∗ inductively as follows: r0 = 
and, for j > 0, rj is obtained from rj−1 by first appending dj−1 and/or ej−1 in case
these values do not occur in the sequence yet, and then erasing all values that are not
memorable in state (lj , ξj). Then the task of the Lookahead Oracle is to annotate each
output action of β with the list of memorable values of the state reached by doing
this output:
OracleR(β) = i0(d0) o0(e0r1) i1(d1) o1(e1r2) · · · in−1(dn−1) on−1(en−1rn).
In order to accomplish its task, the Lookahead Oracle stores all the traces of the SUL
observed during learning in an observation tree.
Definition 4.16. An observation tree is a pair (N ,MemV ), where N is a finite,
nonempty, prefix-closed set of collision free, neat traces, and function MemV : N → Z∗
associates to each trace a finite sequence of distinct values which are memorable after
running this trace.
In practice, observation trees are also useful as a cache for repeated queries on the
SUL. Figure 4.11 shows two observation trees for our FIFO-set example. For each
trace βj a list of memorable values is given.
β0
〈〉
β1
〈〉
β3
〈〉
Push(2)/OK
β4
〈〉
Pop/Return(1)
Push(1)/OK
β2
〈〉
.
.
.
Pop/NOK
β0
〈〉
β1
〈1〉
β3
〈〉
Push(2)/OK
β4
〈〉
Pop/Return(1)
Push(1)/OK
β2
〈〉
.
.
.
Pop/NOK
Figure 4.11: Observation trees for FIFO-set without and with Pop lookahead trace
Whenever a new trace β is added to the tree, the oracle computes a list of memorable
values for it. For this purpose, the oracle maintains a list L = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉 of lookahead
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traces. These lookahead traces are run in sequence after β to explore the future of β
and to discover its memorable values.
Definition 4.17. A lookahead trace is a sequence of symbolic input actions of the
form i(v) with i ∈ I and v ∈ {p1, p2, . . .} ∪ {n1, n2, . . .} ∪ {f1, f2, . . .}.
Intuitively, a lookahead trace is a symbolic trace, where each parameter refers to either
a previous value (pj), or to a fresh input value (nj), or to a fresh output value (fj).
Within lookahead traces, parameter p1 plays a special role as the parameter that is
replaced by a fresh value. Let σ be a lookahead trace in which parameters P refer
to previous values, and let ζ be a valuation for P . Then σ can be converted into a
concrete trace on the fly, by replacing each variable pj ∈ P by ζ(pj), picking a fresh
value for each variable nj whenever needed, and assigning to fj the j-th fresh output
value. If trace γ is a possible outcome of converting lookahead trace σ, starting from
a state (l, ξ) with valuation ζ, then we say that γ is a concretization of σ.
The following lemma implies that a finite number of lookahead traces will suffice to
discover all memorable values of all states in an observation tree. The idea is that if a
concretization of a lookahead trace is a witness that a value is memorable in some
state, the same lookahead trace can also be used to discover that a corresponding
value is memorable in any symmetric state.
Lemma 4.7. Let R be a register automaton and let (l, ξ) be a state of [[R]]. Let σ be
a lookahead trace in which parameters P = {p1, . . . , pl} refer to previous values, and
let ζ be a valuation that assigns to each parameter in P a distinct memorable value
of (l, ξ). Suppose γ is a concretization of σ starting from (l, ξ) with valuation ζ, and
suppose γ is also a witness showing that ζ(p1) is memorable in state (l, ξ). Let h be
an automorphism and suppose γ′ is a concretization of σ starting from state h(l, ξ)
with valuation h ◦ ζ. Then γ′ is a witness showing that h(ζ(p1)) is memorable in state
h(l, ξ).
If M is an overapproximation of the set of memorable values after some state (l′, ξ′)
then, by concretizing lookahead trace σ for each injective valuation in P → M ,
Lemma 4.7 guarantees that we will find a witness in case there exists an automorphism
h from (l, ξ) to (l′, ξ′).
Instances of all lookahead traces are run in each new node to compute memorable
values. At any point in time, the set of values that occur in MemV (β) is a subset of the
full set of memorable values of node β. Whenever a memorable value has been added
to the observation tree, we require the tree to be lookahead complete. This means
every memorable value has to have an origin, that is, it has to stem from either the
memorable values of the parent node or the values in the preceding transition:
β′ = β i(d) o(e) ⇒ values(MemV (β′)) ⊆ values(MemV (β)) ∪ {d, e},
where function values returns the set of elements that occur in a list. We employ a
similar restriction on any non-fresh output parameters contained in the transition
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leading up to a node. These too have to originate from either the memorable values
of the parent, or the input parameter in the transition. Herein we differentiate from
the algorithm in [2] which only enforced this restriction on memorable values at the
expense of running additional lookahead traces.
The observation tree at the left of Figure 4.11 is not lookahead complete since output
value 1 of action Return(1) is neither part of the memorable values of the node β1
nor is it an input in Pop. Whenever we detect such an incompleteness, we add a new
lookahead trace (in this case Pop) and restart the entire learning process with the
updated set of lookahead traces to retrieve a lookahead complete observation tree. The
observation tree at the right is constructed after adding the lookahead trace Pop. This
trace is executed for every node constructed, as highlighted by the dashed edges. The
output values it generates are then tested if they are memorable and if so, stored in the
MemV set of the node. When constructing node β1, the lookahead trace Pop gathers
the output 1. This output is verified to be memorable and then stored in MemV (β1).
We refer to [2] for more details about algorithms for the lookahead oracle.
4.7 The Abstractor
The task of the abstractor is to rename the large set of concrete values of the SUL to
a small set of symbolic values that can be handled by the learner.
Let w0, w1, . . . be an enumeration of the set V \ {in, out}. If the SUL can be described
by a register automaton in which each location has at most n variables, then the
abstract values used by the abstractor will be contained in {w0, . . . , wn−1,⊥}. We
define a family of mappers AF , which are parametrized by a function F that assigns
to each input symbol a finite set of variables from V \ {in, out}. Intuitively, w ∈ F (i)
indicates that it is relevant whether the parameter of input symbol i is equal to w
or not. The initial mapper is parametrized by function F∅ that assigns to each input
symbol the empty set. Using counterexample-guided abstraction refinement, the sets
F (i) are subsequently extended.
The states of AF are injective sequences of values (that is, sequences in which each
value occurs at most once), with the initial state being equal to the empty sequence.
A sequence r = d0 . . . dn−1 ∈ Z∗ represents the valuation ξr for {w0, . . . , wn−1} given
by ξr(wj) = dj , for all j. Note that r is injective iff ξr is injective. The abstraction
function of mapper AF leaves the input and output symbols unchanged, but modifies
the parameter values. The actual value of an input parameter is replaced by the
variable in F (i) that has the same value, or by ⊥ in case there is no such variable. Thus
the abstract domain of the parameter of i is the finite set F (i) ∪ {⊥}. Likewise, the
actual value of an output parameter is not preserved, but only the name of the variable
that has the same value, or ⊥ if there is no such variable. The (injective) sequence r′
of memorable values that has been added as an annotation by the lookahead oracle
describes the new state of the mapper after an output action. The abstraction function
replaces r′ by an update function % that specifies how r′ can be computed from the
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old state r and the input and output values that have been received. Upon receipt of
a concrete output o(e r′) from the lookahead oracle, the abstraction function replaces
e by a variable that is equal to e, or to ⊥ if no such variable exists.
Definition 4.18. We define AF = 〈I ′ ∪O′, X ∪ Y,R, r0, δ, λ〉 where
• I ′ = I × Z,
• O′ = {o(d r) | o ∈ O ∧ d ∈ Z ∧ r ∈ Z∗ injective},
• X = {i(a) | i ∈ I ∧ a ∈ F (i) ∪ {⊥}},
• Y = {o(a, %) | o ∈ O ∧ a ∈ V ∪ {⊥} ∧ % ∈ V 9 V injective with finite domain},
• R = {r ∈ Z∗ | r injective},
• r0 = ,
• δ(r, i(d)) = d r,
• δ(r, o(e r′)) = r′,
• Let r ∈ R and i(d) ∈ I ′. Then
λ(r, i(d)) =
{
i(ξ−1r (d)) if d ∈ ran(ξr) and ξ−1r (d) ∈ F (i)
i(⊥) otherwise
Let r = d s ∈ R and o(e r′) ∈ O′. Let ιi be the valuation that is equal to ξs if
d ∈ ran(ξs) and equal to ξs ∪ {(in, d)} otherwise. Similarly, let ιio be the valuation
equal to ιi if e ∈ ran(ιi) and equal to ιi ∪ {(out, e)} otherwise. Then ιio is injective
and ran(ιio) = ran(r) ∪ {e}. Suppose ran(r′) ⊆ ran(r) ∪ {e}. Then % = ι−1io ◦ ξr′ is
well-defined and injective, and
λ(r, o(e r′)) =
{
(o(ι−1i (e)), %) if e ∈ ran(ιi)
(o(⊥), %) otherwise
In the degenerate case r =  or ran(r′) 6⊆ ran(r) ∪ {e}, we define λ(r, o(e r′)) =
(o(⊥), ∅).
Example 4.12. Consider an SUL that behaves as the FIFO-set model of Figure 4.2.
As a result of interaction with mapper AF∅ , the learner may succeed to construct the
abstract hypothesis shown in Figure 4.12. This first hypothesis is incorrect since it
l0start l1 l2
Push(⊥)/OK
w1:=in
Pop/NOK Push(⊥)/OK
w2:=in
Pop/Return(w1) Pop/Return(w1)
w1:=w2
Push(⊥)/NOK
Figure 4.12: First hypothesis for FIFO-set
does not check if the same value is inserted twice. This is because the Abstractor
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only generates fresh values during the learning phase. Based on the analysis of a
counterexample (to be discussed in the next section), Tomte will discover that it is
relevant whether or not the parameter of Push is equal to the value of w1. Consequently
F (Push) is set to {w1} and Tomte constructs a next hypothesis, for instance the one
shown in Figure 4.13. Note that, as the list of memorable values in the initial state is
l0start l1 l2
Push(⊥)/OK
w1:=in
Pop/NOK
Push(w1)/⊥
Push(⊥)/OK
w2:=in
Pop/Return(w1)
Push(w1)/NOK
Pop/Return(w1)
w1:=w2
Push(w1)/NOK
Push(⊥)/NOK
Figure 4.13: Second hypothesis for FIFO-set
empty, there is no concrete action Push(d) that is abstracted to action Push(w1) in l0.
By the second rule from Definition 4.10, an abstract output ⊥ is generated in this case.
Theorem 4.5. Let R be an input deterministic register automaton with input symbols
I and output symbols O such that each location has at most n registers. Let S be the
set of collision free neat traces of R, and let T = {OracleR(β) | β ∈ S}, that is the set
of traces from S in which each output action is annotated with a list of memorable
values of the corresponding target state. Let F be a function that assigns to each input
symbol a subset of {w0, . . . , wn−1}. Then U = αAF (T ) is nonempty, prefix closed,
input complete and ≡U has finite index. If moreover F (i) = {w0, . . . , wn−1}, for all
i ∈ I, then U is behavior deterministic.
In order to show that an hypothesis is incorrect, we first need to concretize it. Using
the theory of [10] we get a concretization operator for free, but this concretization
operator produces unique-valued register automata in which each output is annotated
with the list of memorable values in the target state. Since unique-valuedness leads to
a loss of succinctness (and we no longer need the list of memorable values), we have
implemented in Tomte an alternative procedure to concretize an abstract deterministic
Mealy machine model to a right invariant register automaton:
1. Omit all transitions with output ⊥ (e.g. the Push(w1)-loop in location l0 of
Figure 4.13).
2. Whenever, for some location l and input symbol i, there are transitions l
i(⊥)/o(d),%−−−−−−−→
l′ and l
i(wj)/o(d),%−−−−−−−−→ l′, then omit the i(wj)-transition (e.g. the Push(w1)-loop in
location l2 of Figure 4.13; apparently it does not matter whether or not the
parameter of Push is equal to the value of w1).
3. If, for some location l and input symbol i, there are outgoing i(w)-transitions for
each w ∈W then add input guard ∧w∈W in 6= w to the i(⊥) transition.
4.8. The Analyzer 107
4. If a transition has input label i(wj) then add input guard in = wj .
5. If a transition has output label o(⊥) then add output guard true.
6. If a transition has output label o(wj) then add output guard out = wj .
7. Replace input labels i(d) by i, output labels o(d) by o, and leave all the updates %
unchanged.
Example 4.13. If we apply the above procedure to the Mealy machine of Figure 4.12,
then we obtain the register automaton of Figure 4.8 (modulo variable renaming), and if
we apply it to the Mealy machine of Figure 4.13, then we obtain the register automaton
of Figure 4.2 (again modulo variable renaming).
In case function F assigns the maximal number of abstract values to each input, the
above concretization operator will produce a unique-valued register automaton that is
equivalent to the register automaton produced by the concretization operator of [10]
(if we forget the lists of memorable values in output actions). In cases where F is not
maximal, our concretization operator will typically produce register automata that are
not unique-valued. In the next section we will show how, when a flaw in the hypothesis
is detected during the hypothesis verification phase, the resulting counterexample can
be used for abstraction refinement.
4.8 The Analyzer
During equivalence testing, a test generation component uses the abstract hypothesis
to generate abstract test input sequences. This approach allows us to use standard
algorithms for FSM conformance testing such as Random Walk or a variation of the
W-Method [137]. These test sequences are then concretized, run on both the SUL
and the concretized hypothesis, and the resulting outputs are compared. The result is
either a concrete counterexample or increased confidence that the hypothesis model
conforms to the SUL.
Parameter values in the abstract model can either be ⊥ or a variable name. If an
abstract value is a variable name then the corresponding concrete value is uniquely
determined. In contrast, an abstract value ⊥ allows for infinitely many concretizations
and suggests that the SUL behavior is independent of the value picked. By testing we
can verify that this is the case. If testing produces a counterexample then this may
be used to refine the abstraction and introduce additional abstract values. To more
quickly discover such refinements, we test by concretizing ⊥ to different memorable
values.
As example, consider the login model of Figure 4.5. Figure 4.14 depicts the hypothesis
built after the first iteration of learning this system. Using the testing approach
described, Tomte will eventually find a concrete counterexample trace, say Login(9,9)
NOK Register(9,9) OK Register(12,12) NOK Login(9,9) OK. This sequence is a
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l0start l1
Register(⊥,⊥)/OK
Login(⊥,⊥)/NOK
Register(⊥,⊥)/NOK
Login(⊥,⊥)/NOK
Figure 4.14: Initial abstract hypothesis for login system
valid trace of the SUL but not of the hypothesis, since according to the hypothesis
the last output should be NOK. Tomte applies heuristics to reduce the length of
the counterexample, in order to simplify subsequent analysis and thus to improve
scalability. Two reduction strategies are used: (1) removing loops, and (2) removing
single transitions. The first strategy tries to remove parts of the trace that form
loops in the hypothesis. These may also form loops in the system and thus not
affect the counterexample. The second strategy tries to remove single transitions
from the counterexample. The idea behind this is that often different parts of the
system are independent of each other, so transitions from the part not causing the
counterexample can be removed. Applied to the login case, Tomte first removes
loops from the concrete counterexample, which results in the reduced counterexample
Register(9,9) OK Login(9,9) OK. Tomte then tries to eliminate each transition, but
as the resulting traces do not form counterexamples, this heuristic fails. As a final
processing step, the counterexample is made neat, thus becoming Register(0,0) OK
Login(0,0) OK. This is done solely to improve the counterexample’s readability.
The reduced counterexample is then analyzed by the process depicted in Figure 4.15.
The counterexample is first resolved by abstraction refinement. If no refinement can
be done, then an abstracted form of the counterexample is sent to the Mealy machine
learner, which uses it to further refine the abstract hypothesis.
Abstraction refinement means finding the concrete input parameters that are abstracted
to ⊥ but nevertheless form ’relevant’ relations with previous parameters. We say
that a relation between two parameters is relevant if breaking it by changing a
parameter’s value also breaks the counterexample. Consequently, the concrete values
of these parameters no longer fit ⊥, as they can only take a specific value for the
counterexample to hold. Based on relevant relations, we then update the lookahead
oracle and construct refined abstractions, that would better fit these parameters.
Initially, all parameters values are abstracted to ⊥. This changes as more refined
abstractions are created.
A first step to refining is disambiguation, by which any relations between two para-
meters present that are not relevant for the counterexample, are broken by replacing
the latter parameter of the relation with a fresh value. In our running example the
trace Register(0,0) OK Login(0,0) OK is changed to Register(0,1) OK Login(0,1) OK,
by virtue of the irrelevant equality between the username and password. Breaking
relations further would change the observed behavior into one with which the concrete
hypothesis would agree.
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disambiguate CE
find missing mem. values
refine abstractions
reduced CE
disambiguated CE
decorated CE
with all mem.
succ. = newAbs.notEmpty() or 
newLts.notEmpty()
new lts
Abstraction Refinement
succ.
yes/no
no
form abstract CE
abstract CE
give CE to 
learner
yes
restart
new 
abstractions
Figure 4.15: Counterexample analysis in Tomte
The disambiguated trace is then sent to the next process, which looks for any missing
memorable values and adapts the lookahead oracle so these can all be discovered.
The current memorable values are obtained by running the counterexample through
the lookahead oracle, which then decorates the trace by placing memorable value
lists at the start and after each transition. Such a trace for the login case would be
 Register(0, 1) OK  Login(0, 1) OK . Notice that all the sequences are empty, since
initially the lookahead oracle does not find any memorable values. For the last output
to be OK, the SUL requires that values 0 and 1 are reused in the Login-input, meaning
that the SUL should have remembered them, hence these values should have been
found memorable by the lookahead oracle. We say that the lookahead oracle ‘misses’
these values. In more concrete terms, we say that a parameter value is missing if it is
equal to a value from a previous transition, but not contained in the list of memorable
values that directly precedes the transition. For the login example, we notice that
both 0 and 1 appear as missing values in Login(0,1), since they first emerged in the
Register action but they were not included in the memorable set before Login.
The process iterates over the input actions of the decorated trace. Once it passes by an
input parameter whose value is judged to be missing, it builds a symbolic lookahead
trace that would allow the lookahead oracle to uncover this value. The counterexample
is then re-decorated through the augmented lookahead oracle and iteration continues
with the next parameter. The end result is a decorated trace which contains no missing
values. For the login case, the process updates the lookahead oracle and re-decorates
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the trace for each of Login’s parameters. The end result is the decorated trace where
both 0 and 1 are no longer missing:  Register(0, 1) OK [0, 1] Login(0, 1) OK .
A trace decorated with all memorable values is then sent to the next process, which
further decorates the trace so that each concrete value is paired with its corresponding
abstract value. This is achieved by running the counterexample through both the
mapper (which adds the abstractions) and the lookahead oracle (which adds the
memorable values). In the login example, as initially ⊥ is the only abstract value
available, decoration results in the trace
 Register(0 :⊥, 1 :⊥) OK [0, 1] Login(0 :⊥, 1 :⊥) OK .
This trace is then iterated and whenever (1) a concrete value is equal to a memorable
value, and (2) the corresponding abstraction is ⊥, a new abstract value is created for
the corresponding input symbol and the mapper is updated accordingly. Equality
with a memorable value results in an abstraction which simply points to an index in
the memorable value list after the previous transition. In the login example, the new
abstraction values for the Login-action are w1 for the first parameter, respectively w2
for the second, transforming the decorated trace into
 Register(0 :⊥, 1 :⊥) OK [0, 1] Login(0 : w1, 1 : w2) OK .
The mechanisms of uncovering missing memorable values and new abstractions are
closely tied to proper disambiguation of the counterexample. Both these steps consider
any equalities between two parameters as relevant to the counterexample. Applying
the same process on an ambiguous counterexample might result in resolution of
false relations or missing relations which are confounded as was in the login case.
Without disambiguation, the counterexample Register(0, 0) OK Login(0, 0) OK would
have yielded only one missing value in 0, which would have lead to different refined
abstractions. One such abstraction would imply that it is relevant if the second Register
parameter is equal to the first, which is clearly not the case.
The final step of counterexample analysis is a simple check if new lookahead traces
or new abstract values have been discovered during the last pass. If so, learning
is restarted from scratch. Note that memorable values discovered by newly added
lookahead traces can have corresponding abstract values which have already been
created as a result of a previous refinements. Or the abstract values found might expose
relations with previous input values. Similarly, it may happen that the lookahead
oracle has already discovered all memorable values, yet for some of these values new
abstract values are defined. Learning needs to be restarted as LearnLib currently
does not accept on the fly changes to the input alphabet. Moreover, some of the
answers to queries from the learning phase might be invalidated by the discovery of
new memorable values.
If no new lookahead traces or abstract values have been discovered during a pass, then
an abstract version of the counterexample is forwarded to the Mealy machine learner.
Obtaining an abstract counterexample involves just running the counterexample
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through the mapper and lookahead oracle and only collecting the abstracted messages.
As an optimization, we also perform this step before abstraction refinement, as it is a
considerably cheaper yet just as likely.
According to Figure 4.15, counterexample analysis in Tomte has three possible outco-
mes: (1) a new lookahead trace is forwarded to the Lookahead Oracle and learning
is restarted, (2) a new abstract value is forwarded to the Abstractor and learning is
restarted, or (3) a counterexample is forwarded to the learner. By Lemma 4.7, step (1)
may only occur a finite number of times. Since the number of input symbols and the
number of abstract values are both finite, also step (2) may only occur a finite number
of times. If there are no more steps of type (1) or type (2) then, by Theorem 4.5 and
Theorem 4.3, the set of abstract traces that can be observed by the learner equals the
set of traces of some finite, deterministic Mealy machine. By correctness of the Mealy
machine learner, the learner will produce a correct hypothesis after a finite number
of queries. Thus we may conclude that our algorithm for learning register automata
terminates.
4.9 Evaluation and Comparison
In this section, we compare Tomte 0.41 to other learning tools on a series of benchmarks
including the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), the Alternating Bit Protocol, the
Biometric Passport, FIFO-Sets, and a multi-login system. Apart from the last one,
all these benchmarks have already been used in [8] for the comparison of Tomte
0.3, a previous version of Tomte, and LearnLibRA. In [5], we compared Tomte
0.4 with LearnLibRA and Tomte 0.3, concluding that Tomte 0.4 performed best
in all but two benchmarks. Since then, RALib [54] has been released, a learner
building on LearnLibRA, adding several optimizations as well as enabling support
for theories other than equality. This made RALib a strong competitor, reporting
better numbers for a number of benchmarks. Tomte itself was also improved and can
now work with TTT [122], a new and fast algorithm for learning Mealy machines.
We focus our evaluation efforts on the more novel Tomte 0.41 and RALib. Readers
are referred to [8] and [5] for benchmarking of the 0.3 and 0.4 versions of Tomte and
LearnLibRA. Tomte 0.41 generally replicates the numbers obtained by version 0.4 in
those benchmarks.
Each experiment consists of learning a simulation of a model implementing a benchmark
system or, as in the case of the multi-login system, learning of an actual implementation.
Whenever possible we verified the learned model by performing an equivalence check
against the simulated model. For the multi-login system we ran a thorough suite of
tests. For the FIFO-Set models, we checked the models manually by analyzing the
number of states and guards in the learned model.
Tomte 0.41 can now be configured to work with different Mealy machine learners.
Traditionally, we have used the Observation Pack algorithm [113], which is enabled
in all versions of Tomte. Recently, we have adapted Tomte 0.41 to support the new
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TTT algorithm [122]. Similarly, RALib adopts a series of optimizations. We enable all
these optimizations apart from the one exploiting parameter typing (unlike in [54]),
since all benchmarks used are not typed.
Table 4.1 provides benchmarks for Tomte 0.41 using each of TTT and Observation Pack,
and RALib with the optimizations mentioned. Results for each model are obtained by
running each learner configuration 10 times with 10 different seeds. Over these runs
we collect the average and standard deviation for number of reset queries and inputs
applied during learning (denoted learn res and learn inp), counterexample analysis
(denoted ana res and ana inp) and testing (denoted test res and test inp). The
numbers for testing do not include queries run on the final hypothesis. As RALib
does not distinguish counterexample analysis from learning and testing, we exclude
statistics for this phase. A final statistic is success (succ), denoting for each model the
number of successful experiments, that is, experiments which ended with the correct
model learned. Since Tomte 0.41 is always successful, we exclude this statistic from
its columns.
For consistency, we use the same equivalence oracle across all learners, namely, a
random walk oracle configured with a maximum test query length of 100 and an
average length of 10, with a maximum of 1000000 tests per equivalence query. The
probability of selecting a fresh value is set to 0.1 . We opted for this algorithm, since it
was the only algorithm supported RALib. In contrast, Tomte 0.41 can also use more
advanced testing algorithms. When learning FIFO-Set 30 we increase the average
query length to 100, otherwise testing would most likely fail to find all counterexamples.
Similarly, for FIFO-Set 14 we increase it to 50.
We omit running times, as we consider the number of queries to be a superior metric
of measuring efficiency, but the reader may find them at 6. All models apart from the
multi-logins and large FIFO-Set models are learned in less than one minute. We limit
learning time to 20 minutes.
Results show that TTT significantly brings down the number of learning queries
needed by Tomte 0.41, at the cost of more test and counterexample analysis queries.
This cost is offset for all but the first model benchmarked. The extent of improvement
when we consider the sum of all inputs varies from roughly a 23 % reduction for the
SIP model to a factor of 8 reduction for the Palindrome Checker. We also notice that
the gap widens with the growing complexity of the models. Furthermore, improvement
would likely have been greater had a smarter testing algorithm been used.
RALib beats Tomte 0.41 on several models, particularly SIP and FIFO-Set 7. Unfor-
tunately, its performance is highly erratic, as shown by the high standard deviation.
Moreover, RALib is only partially successful at learning some models, while failing
completely to learn others. Ultimately, RALib shows promising numbers for some
experiments, while for others it seems to suffer a blow up in its algorithm. For the
larger models, like the FIFO-Set 30, RALib fails completely.
6http://automatalearning.cs.ru.nl/
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A cause of RALib’s fluctuating performance may be the impact the lengths of counterex-
amples have on its performance. Long counterexamples may lead to often unnecessarily
long suffixes which are very expensive for RALib to process. RALib’s underlying
algorithm is an adaptation of L∗ [19] for register automata which, like L∗, uses an
observation table. The performance of such algorithms has been shown to suffer due
to long counterexamples. By contrast, Tomte 0.41 leverages more advanced algorithms
that more effectively process these counterexamples [122].
The multi-login system benchmark can only be properly handled by Tomte 0.41. The
benchmark generalizes the example of Figure 4.3 to multiple users, while adding an
additional user ID parameter when logging in and registering. A configurable number
of users may register, enabling simultaneous login sessions for different registered users.
Tomte 0.41 was able to successfully learn instantiations of multi-login systems for 1, 2
and 3 users. RALib struggled to learn configurations with 1 user, while completely
failing for those with more users.
That said, Tomte 0.41’s learning algorithm also does not perform nor scale well for
higher numbers of users. This can be ascribed to the high number of global abstractions.
Such a number is owing to not only the large number of registers, but also to the
varying order in which memorable values are found per state.
A memorable value, be it login id or password, can take one index in one state, but
another index in a different state. As we use global abstractions, the memorable value
would require two distinct abstractions, even though only one is useful in each state.
This leads to a large number of abstractions required to cover all indexes memorable
values can take.
4.10 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a mapper-based algorithm for active learning of register automata
that may generate fresh output values. This class is more general than the one studied
in previous work [2,7,8,37,55,56]. We have implemented our active learning algorithm
in the Tomte tool and have compared the performance of Tomte using each of the
Observation Pack or the novel TTT algorithms, to that of RALib on a large set of
benchmarks. We measured the total number of inputs required for learning, testing and
counterexample analysis. For a set of common benchmarks, TTT helps in significantly
bringing down the number of queries used overall. RALib proves competitive but
cannot reliably learn all models. In particular, RALib struggles to learn login systems
generating fresh passwords. In contrast, Tomte is able to learn models of register
automata with fresh outputs, including these systems. Our method for handling fresh
outputs is highly efficient and the computational cost of the determinizer is negligible
in comparison with the resources needed by the lookahead oracle and the abstractor.
Our next step will be an extension of Tomte to a class of models with simple operations
on data.
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Chapter 5
Learning-Based Testing the Sliding
Window Behavior of TCP Implementations
We develop a learning-based testing framework for register automaton models
that can express the windowing behavior of TCP, thereby presenting the first
significant application of register automata learning to realistic software for a
class of automata with Boolean-arithmetic constraints over data values. We
have applied our framework to TCP implementations belonging to different
operating systems and have found a violation of the TCP specification in Linux
and Windows. The violation has been confirmed by Linux developers.
5.1 Introduction
Automata provide both formal and intuitive means of specifying the behavior for a
wide range of applications, in particular network protocols. Unfortunately, protocol
specifications often are textual and rarely include state machine models. Without
such models, it is difficult to test if an application behaves as expected. Manual
construction of models is a laborious and error-prone process and models become
outdated as soon as the specification changes. Learning-based testing, as sketched in
Figure 5.1, alleviates this problem by generating models while testing a system. These
models cannot serve as specifications but can be used to check desired properties, which
are usually easier to formalize and maintain than complete behavioral models.
Integrating model learning, model-based testing, and model checking allows a tester
to automatically obtain a model for a system under test. For a set of test inputs,
model learning runs a series of tests on the system until, eventually, it will produce a
conjectured model of the system’s behavior. This model is used as the basis for model-
based testing. Testing can discover counterexamples, which indicate incorrectness
of the model. In such case, model learning is restarted, being provided with the
counterexample. Once no counterexample is found, the model can be used for checking
properties. The output of learning-based testing is threefold: model learning produces a
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Figure 5.1: Learning-Based Testing with Additional Checking of Properties.
conformance test suite for the model [29], checking of properties can produce examples
that document the violation of a specification, and in case no violation is found, testing
can yield a conformance guarantee.
In order to instantiate learning-based testing for a certain class of models, one needs a
learning algorithm and a testing algorithm for this class of models. In this chapter,
we present a learning-based testing framework for a class of register automata that
can express the windowing behavior of TCP. Our framework utilizes the SL∗ learning
algorithm for register automata [58] and a random walk testing algorithm for such
register automaton models. The testing algorithm ensures approximate correctness of
models with a high confidence. We manually inspect models and find a violation of
the TCP specification in Linux and Windows implementations.
Work in this chapter is the first significant application of register automata learning to
realistic software for a class of automata with Boolean-arithmetic constraints over data
values. Our results show that, on the one hand, learning more expressive models can
ease the burden of manually constructed sophisticated test harnesses. On the other
hand, experiments show that model learning for more expressive models is very expen-
sive. Future work will focus on scaling learning-based testing to industrial applications
as well as on integrating automated model checking into our approach.
Related Work. Learning-based testing in the form that we present here is based on
the observation that model learning and model-based testing are merely two sides of
the same coin [202]. The term has been introduced in [152] for a combination of model
learning, model checking, and random testing. In contrast to work in this chapter,
the approach is based on finite state models. On the other hand, model checking is
automated and feed the model learning algorithm with counterexamples, leading to
higher degree of automation.
Learning-based techniques have been steadily gaining traction for more than a decade,
after pioneering work on learning and testing CTI systems [101] and learning and
checking systems [170]. Previous applications of learning-based testing or checking
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have lead to the discovery of flaws in TLS implementations [181] and of various forms
of specification non-compliance in TCP [87,88] and SSH [89] implementations. What
all these case studies have in common, is the difficulty of manually constructing a
sophisticated test harness for the system. This is in large part caused by the need to
abstract away from system functionality, so that the functionality seen by the learner
fits within the less expressive formalism the learner can infer, typically mealy machines
or DFAs. Our learning setup can infer more expressive register automata, and requires
no form of abstraction other than a general one for handling fresh values.
Outline. We provide a brief introduction to TCP in the next section before pre-
senting our learning-based testing framework in Section 5.3. We discuss application
of our framework on real TCP implementations in Section 5.4, before concluding in
Section 5.5.
5.2 The Sliding Window Behavior of TCP
The Transport Control Protocol (TCP) is a widely used transport layer protocol of
the TCP/IP stack, with implementations provided by all operating systems. TCP
ensures reliable data transfer between parties. In order to communicate, a TCP client
and server application must first establish a TCP connection, which is done by way
of a handshake. They can then exchange data over the established connection until
one of the parties decides to terminate the connection. A closure procedure ensues,
which ultimately removes the connection. In all stages of the protocol, interaction
is done by exchanging TCP segments. These segments are often the result of calls
on the socket interface, which is available to each side and provides access to TCP
services. Moreover, each side keeps track of the state of the connection. TCP uses
sequence numbers and a sliding receive window to keep track of which segments have
been received and acknowledged by the other party. This helps compensate for a
potentially lossy communication channel in which reordering of segments can occur
(e.g., due to changing routing of segments).
For the sake of exposition, let us assume a setting in which all segments are 1 byte in
size. As sequence numbers encode the relative position of a segment in a byte stream,
this assumption allows us to confuse the relative position segment in a sequence of
segments with its position in a byte stream.
Sequence Numbers. To achieve reliable data transfer, TCP uses sequence and
acknowledgement numbers, and flags which are included in the header of all TCP
segments. In a stream of segments from a sender to a receiver, the sequence number
encodes the relative number of a segment in such a stream. The receiver acknowledges a
received segment by responding with a segment including as acknowledgement number
the next expected sequence number. Sequence numbers are generated relative to
an Initial Sequence Number (ISN), so the first segment has sequence number ISN,
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Figure 5.2: TCP handshake, connection closure, and data transfer with re-transmission.
Labels show flags, sequence and acknoweldgement numbers. 1 byte of payload marked
by (X). Initial Sequence Numbers marked by (ISN).
the second ISN+1... As data is sent, the sequence number increases, as does the
acknowledgement number in responses.
Receive Window. Segments received with a sequence number greater than the one
expected fall in two categories: those whose sequence number falls within a receive
window of that expected and those whose sequence number falls outside of the receive
window. The former should be processed by the receiver, the latter should be treated
as invalid. As a concrete example, only reset segments (segments with the RST flag
enabled) with the sequence number within the receive window are processed, and may
reset the connection, those whose number lies outside should be ignored. The receive
window is included in the TCP header and its value is communicated in each TCP
segment a side sends.
Sliding Windows. Once a received segment is successfully processed, the receive
window can be moved forward: if a sequence number of a received segment is equal
to the sequence number expected, the expected sequence number is increased. If not
equal, the expected sequence number is left unchanged. Acknowledgement numbers
are also checked. Those equal to the last sequence number sent acknowledge all
segments up to this last one. Those greater are unacceptable as they acknowledge
segments not yet sent. Those smaller than the last sequence number sent are old
acknowledgements. Segments with unacceptable or old acknowledgement numbers are
generally discarded.
As stated above, sequence numbers and receive windows are used, among other things,
to deal with reordering of routed segments and to prevent the processing of (bytes in)
old segments, which are segments carrying already seen data with sequence numbers
smaller than the those expected. Old segments are often the result of re-transmissions,
which happen when a timeout for receiving an acknowledgement has expired. TCP is
full duplex, which means communicating sides maintain two byte streams, one for each
direction. Each side keeps track of the next sequence number to be sent, as well as the
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Figure 5.3: Relevant Relations of Sequence Numbers in TCP.
sequence number expected from the other side. To open (via handshake), maintain
and close the two byte streams, TCP uses control flags. The SYN flag, for example,
marks the beginning of a byte stream, whereas the FIN flag marks the end. Figure 5.2
gives sequence diagrams for typical TCP scenarios.
The description so far assumed that all segments were 1 byte in size. In actuality, the
size of a segment is the size of the payload carried, plus 1 if either SYN or FIN flags
are enabled, or 0 otherwise. We restrict the learning setting to one where segments
carry no payload (thus segments are either of size 0 or 1).
Figure 5.3 depicts the relevant relations sequence numbers may have relative to a
current sequence number, in line with our earlier description. These relations are
equality and inequality over the current sequence number, and over its summation to
one (for segments including either FIN or SYN), and to the receive window size.
5.3 Instantiating Learning-Based Testing for TCP
In order to apply learning-based testing to the windowing behavior of TCP, we
instantiate the components of the framework that were sketched in Section 5.1. We use
the SL∗ active learning algorithm for learning register automaton models [58]. Active
learning algorithms rely on the existence of a minimally adequate teacher (cf. [19]) that
answers two kinds of queries for the learning algorithm: output queries (i.e., execution
of tests) and equivalence queries. The learning algorithm submits a conjectured model
to an equivalence oracle and expects a counterexample to the model (if one exists).
In our scenario, we implement this oracle by performing model-based testing on the
model.
The SL∗ algorithm additionally assumes the existence of a tree oracle. A tree oracle
produces register automata fragments that encode the relevant data relations for a
sequence of actions on a SUT. The resulting setup is shown in Figure 5.4. In order to
infer symbolic transitions, e.g., for input ACK(p1, p2) with two data parameters p1
and p2 from a state that is reached in the protocol by sending a message SY N(10, 0)
and receiving message SY N +ACK(20, 11), the SL∗ algorithm will perform a tree
query for prefix SY N(10, 0) and suffix ACK. The tree oracle will generate output
queries for all relevant concrete instances of ACK messages capturing possible relations
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Figure 5.4: Learning Register Automaton Models from Tests.
between values of p1, p2 and data values in the prefix (e.g., equality, being a sequence
number, or being in a window). The determinizer component will test if output queries
are valid traces of a TCP implementation by exchanging actual TCP packages with
a system under learning (sul). The tree oracle encodes the observed behavior and
relevant relations as a symbolic decision tree.
In the remainder of this section, we present register automata for the windowing
behavior of TCP, tree queries that capture all relevant data relations, and use the
presented ideas as a basis for instantiating model-based testing in our framework.
5.3.1 Register Automata
We assume a set Σ of actions, each with an arity that determines how many values from
N it takes as parameters (e.g., ACK takes two data values). To simplify presentation,
we assume that all actions have arity 1, but it is straightforward to extend to the case
where actions have arbitrary arity. A data symbol is a term of form α(d), where α is
an action and d ∈ N is a data value. A data word is a sequence of data symbols. The
concatenation of two data words w and w′ is denoted ww′. In this context, we often
refer to w as a prefix and w′ as a suffix. For a data word w = α1(d1) . . . αn(dn), let
Acts(w) denote its sequence of actions α1 . . . αn, and V als(w) its sequence of data
values d1 . . . dn. Let |w| denote the number of symbols in w.
While there are infinitely many data words for every sequence of actions with data
parameters, many of these data words are equivalent when considering only relations
between data values (e.g., equality, being a sequence number, or being in a window). For
a set of relations R, data words w = α1(d1) . . . αn(dn) and w′ = α1(d′1) . . . αn(d′n) are
R-indistinguishable, denoted w ≈R w′, if R(di1 , . . . , dij ) iff R(d′i1 , . . . , d′ij ) whenever R
is a relation in R and i1, · · · , ij are indices among 1 . . . n. We use [w]R to denote the
set of words that are R-indistinguishable from w. A data language L is a set of data
words that respects R in the sense that w ≈R w′ implies w ∈ L ↔ w′ ∈ L.
In order to capture the windowing behavior of TCP, we define the set of relations
R = {R⊗,c : ⊗ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >} ∧ c ∈ {0, 1, 100}}, and relation R⊗,c ⊂ N×N such
that xR⊗,cy iff x+ c⊗ y. Relations R⊗,0 encode equality and an order on the sets of
sequence numbers. Relations in R⊗,1 encode the successor relation between sequence
numbers and R⊗,100 describes windows (of size 100).
We assume a set of registers x1, x2, . . . that can store data values of data words. A
parameterized symbol is a term of form α(p), where α is an action and p a formal
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parameter. An atomic guard g over p is a logic formula of form (xi + c ⊗ p) with
⊗ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >} and c ∈ {0, 1, 100}. We allow for aggregation of atomic guards
into intervals of form (g1 ∧ g2), where atomic guards g1 and g2 specify a lower and an
upper bound on p, respectively. A valuation ν : {p, x1, x2, . . .} 7→ N satisfies a guard g
if g[ν] = g[ν(p)/p][ν(x1)/x1][. . .] is true and we write ν |= g in this case.
An assignment is a simple parallel update of registers with values from registers
or the formal parameter p. We represent an assignment which updates the regis-
ters xi1 , . . . , xim with values from the registers xj1 , . . . , xjn or p as a mapping pi
from {xi1 , . . . , xim} to {xj1 , . . . , xjn} ∪ {p}, meaning that the value of the register or
parameter pi(xik) is assigned to the register xik , for k = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 5.1 (Register automaton). A register automaton (RA) is a tuple A =
(L, l0,X ,Γ, λ), where
• L is a finite set of locations, with l0 ∈ L as the initial location,
• X maps each location l ∈ L to a finite set X (l) of registers, and
• Γ is a finite set of transitions, each of form 〈l, α(p), g, pi, l′〉, where
– l ∈ L is a source location,
– l′ ∈ L is a target location,
– α(p) is a parameterized symbol,
– g is a guard over p and X (l), and
– pi (the assignment) is a mapping from X (l′) to X (l) ∪ {p}, and
• λ maps each l ∈ L to {+,−}.
We require register automata to have no initial registers (i.e., X (l0) = ∅) and to
be completely specified in the sense that for each location l ∈ L and action α, the
disjunction of the guards on the α-transitions from l is equivalent to true.
RA Semantics Let us formalize the semantics of RAs. A state of an RA A =
(L, l0,X ,Γ, λ) is a pair 〈l, ν〉 where l ∈ L and ν is a valuation over X (l), i.e., a mapping
from X (l) to D. A step of A, denoted 〈l, ν〉 α(d)−−−→ 〈l′, ν′〉, transfers A from 〈l, ν〉 to
〈l′, ν′〉 on input of the data symbol α(d) if there is a transition 〈l, α(p), g, pi, l′〉 ∈ Γ
with
• ν |= g[d/p], i.e., d satisfies the guard g under the valuation ν, and
• ν′ is the updated valuation with ν′(xi) = ν(xj) if pi(xi) = xj , otherwise ν′(xi) = d
if pi(xi) = p.
A run of A over a data word w = α(d1) . . . α(dn) is a sequence of steps of A
〈l0, ν0〉 α1(d1)−−−−→ 〈l1, ν1〉 . . . 〈ln−1, νn−1〉 αn(dn)−−−−→ 〈ln, νn〉
for some initial valuation ν0. The run is accepting if λ(ln) = + and rejecting if
λ(ln) = −. The word w is accepted (rejected) by A under ν0 if A has an accepting
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x1[νu] = 1
x2[νu] = 2
(x1 + 1)[νu] = 2
(x2 + 1)[νu] = 3
(x1 + 100)[νu] = 101
(x2 + 100)[νu] = 102
p < x1
x1=p
x1 < p ∧ p < x2
x2=p
x2 < p ∧ p < x2 + 1
x2 + 1=p
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Figure 5.5: Potential (left), maximally refined (u, vˆ)-tree (center), and canonic guards
(right) for u with νu = {x1 7→ 1, x2 7→ 2} and vˆ with |vˆ| = 1. Actions omitted.
(rejecting) run over w which starts in 〈l0, ν0〉. An RA is determinate if there is no data
word over which it has both accepting and rejecting runs. In this case we interpret an
RA A as a mapping from the set of data words to {+,−}, where + stands for accept
and − for reject. When using register automata as models for reactive system, we
refine the set of actions into inputs and outputs (cf. [54]).
5.3.2 Tree Queries
For a data language L, a data word u with V als(u) = d1, . . . , dk, and a set V of
sequences of actions (so-called abstract suffixes), a (u, V )-tree is a decision tree (a
tree-shaped RA) T = (L, l0,X ,Γ, λ) with root l0 and X (l0) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk} that (1)
has runs over exactly all data words v with Acts(v) ∈ V and that (2) accepts a data
word v from 〈l0, νu〉 iff uv ∈ L. Please note, that we do not require X (l0) to be empty
for decision trees and let νu such that νu(xi) = di for xi ∈ X (l0) and di the i-th data
value of u.
A tree oracle for L is a function O that for any prefix u and set of abstract suffixes V
constructs a (u, V )-tree O(u, V ). In other words, O(u, V ) is the tree oracle’s answer to
a tree query with prefix u and abstract suffixes V . The SL∗ algorithm systematically
poses tree queries to a tree oracle, combining resulting symbolic decision trees (SDTs)
into a conjectured model. We can implement a tree oracle by starting with a maximally
refined symbolic decision tree that has one unique sequence of transitions for every
R-indistinguishable class of words [uv]R with Acts(v) ∈ V and then compute a more
concise tree by iteratively merging equivalent subtrees.
Maximally refined SDTs. For simplicity, we describe the generation of a maximally
refined symbolic decision tree for a prefix u and a single abstract suffix vˆ. This allows
us to omit actions from the presentation. For |V als(u)| = k, the potential of u is the
set of terms (xi + c) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and c ∈ {0, 1, 100} that can appear in guards
after u. The valuation νu (with νu(xi) = di for di ∈ V als(u)) induces an order on the
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Figure 5.6: Merging Sub-Trees of an SDT.
terms in the potential. An example of this order is shown on the left of Figure 5.5 for
a word u with two data values.
Omitting the trivial case of the empty sequence, let |vˆ| = 1 for the moment. We
generate guards for cases p smaller than the smallest term in the potential of u, p equal
to one of the terms, p in the interval between two successive terms, and p greater than
any term in the potential of u. These guards are maximally refined: each (satisfiable)
guard describes one class [uv]R of R-indistinguishable words. We instantiate each
guard with the help of a constraint solver and use an output query to determine if
uv ∈ L. Figure 5.5 (middle) exemplifies the construction. As indicated by gray lines
on the left of the figure, some terms in the potential are equal. For these cases we
pick one of the equal terms as the basis for guards. Gray colored guards cannot be
instantiated and are omitted.
In the general case of |vˆ| > 1, we apply the above technique iteratively, generating
sequences of guards and transitions for the parameters of vˆ. We maintain data values
of the suffix symbolically during sequence generation and only instantiate complete
sequences of guards. The approach scales to sets of suffix sequences as we construct
maximally refined paths: paths of suffixes with common prefixes will have common
guards for those prefixes and can be expressed as trees.
Maximally abstract SDTs and Monotonicity. In order to guarantee convergence of
learning on a canonical automaton, the SL∗ makes some monotonicity requirements
on tree oracles [58]. For growing sets of abstract suffixes V, V ′, . . . with V ⊂ V ′,
it has to be shown that O(u, V ′) refines O(u, V ) by only adding registers to X (l0),
and only refining guards of transitions. Additionally, if decision trees O(u, V ) and
O(u′, V ) cannot be made equal under some renaming of registers from X (l0) in one
tree, trees O(u, V ′) and O(u′, V ′) cannot become equal either by such a renaming.
These conditions trivially hold on maximally refined SDTs. Unfortunately, however,
maximally refined SDTs do not lead to finite models during learning as the shape of a
tree depends on the length of the prefix. We transform maximally refined SDTs into
more abstract trees by merging transitions and equivalent sub-trees (akin to BDD
minimization), thereby hiding irrelevant structural differences between trees.
The essential idea is that two (u, V )-trees T and T ′ are semantically equivalent after
u, denoted by T ≡u T ′, if both trees accept the same set of suffixes under initial
valuation νu with νu(xi) = di for di ∈ V als(u). We can check semantic equivalence
with finitely many test runs (i.e., one for each path in a maximally refined SDT for
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SY N, 10, 0
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. . .
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Figure 5.7: Translation between Neat Trace and sul Trace.
V ). Let now l be a location in T with outgoing transitions to la and lb, guarded by
ga and gb, respectively, as sketched in Figure 5.6. For some new guard gab, equivalent
to (ga ∨ gb), we construct T ′ from T w.l.o.g. by removing the transition from l to la
and the sub-tree rooted at la. On the transition from l to lb, we replace gb by gab (cf.
right part of the figure). We abstract ga and gb into gab if T ≡u T ′.
In order to arrive at a canonical representation, we perform merging in a fixed order:
we always merge guards for the smallest possible terms with respect to the order on
the potential (cf. maximally refined trees). This ensures that merging always results
in intervals. An example is shown on the right of Figure 5.5. Merged guards are
obtained from top (smaller terms) to bottom (greater terms).
Our semantic merging process satisfies all three requirements: Adding more suffixes
(and hence paths) cannot lead to merging subtrees that could not be merged before.
Guards are refined into finer intervals. Since the original boundaries will be maintained,
monotonic growth of registers follows. Finally, since abstract trees are semantically
equivalent to maximally refined trees, differences between trees are preserved when
adding suffixes.
Output queries observe the behavior of the sul on a sequence of test inputs. In
learning-based testing, these queries are computed by executing tests on the actual
system under test.
Testing has to be done in an adaptive fashion, synchronizing data values that are used
in test inputs by the learning algorithm and those used in actual tests as the sul may
introduce new sequence numbers during tests. As an example, the learning algorithm
may assume to receive a message SY N +ACK with (new) sequence number 1. Then,
in the actual communication the sul sends a random new sequence number.
To tackle this problem, the work [5] introduces a determinizer component, placed
between the learner and the sul. This component provides the learner with a
deterministic, or ’neat’ view of the sul, by constructing and applying a 1 to 1 mapping
from regular values to neat values. This mapping transforms all relation equivalent
traces (input/output sequences) encountered to a single neat trace. The learner then
infers the sul only in terms of its neat traces.
Output Queries.
We extend the determinizer concept to a setting with inequalities and sums. Our
definition focuses on data values and ignores actions, which are invariant under mapping.
The determinizer is the mapper D = 〈R, r0, δi, δo, λi, λo〉 over states R = {r ⊆ N×N |
r finite and one-to-one} with initial state r0 = ∅. Value transformations (λ) and
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mapper updates (δ) are defined for c ∈ 0, 1, 100 and x, y, n,m ∈ N as follows.
λi(r, n) =

x+ c if m+ c = n for some (x,m) ∈ r
smaller(dom(r)) if m+ c > n for all (·,m) ∈ r
fresh(dom(r)) if m+ c < n for all (·,m) ∈ r
(x+ y)/2 else; for (x− c1,ml − c1), (y − c2,mu − c2) ∈ r
s.t. (ml < n < mu) and (mu −ml) minimal
λo(r, x) =
{
n+ c if y + c = x for some (y, n) ∈ r
fresh(ran(r)) otherwise
δi(r, n) =
{
r if (·, n) ∈ r
r ∪ { (λi(r, n), n) } otherwise
δo(r, x) =
{
r if (x, ·) ∈ r
r ∪ { (x, λo(r, x)) } otherwise
There, dom and ran denote domain and image of a function. Functions fresh : N∗ → N
and smaller : N∗ → N generate fresh values and smaller values. For X ⊂ N we use
the concrete functions fresh(X) := (bmax(X)) ÷ suc + 1) × su and smaller(X) :=
(bmin(X)÷ slc − 1)× sl. Step sizes su and sl are fixed big enough to avoid collisions
(accidental relations between data values) during experiments.
Figure 5.7 shows an example application of the mapper, producing a neat trace from
Figure 5.2. Whenever the system generates an output, the determinizer processes it by
replacing the output values with neat values before delivering the output to the learner.
Conversely, on generating a concrete input, the learner passes it to the determinizer
which replaces neat input values with regular values, and sends the resulting input to
the sul. Every time it processes a value, the determinizer updates its state.
5.3.3 Model-Based Testing
We instantiate the testing part of our framework with a relative simple adaptation
of a random algorithm to the scenario of register automaton models. For a register
automaton model A, each test run begins by traversing the model to a randomly
selected location of A and is continued by a random sequence of inputs until either
a discrepancy is discovered between model and system under test, or until the run
terminates and a new run starts.
Our extension consists in selecting data values for inputs. For a run with current
prefix w and next input α, we use the machinery introduced above (the potential of a
word, and symbolic guards that describe classes [wα(d)]R of data words) as a basis for
computing a pool of data values for α. The pool contains one data value d for each
R-indistinguishable class [wα(d)]R of data words. We add a bias to the selection of
data values, so that values in or related to those stored in registers in A after running
over w are more likely to be picked.
We can easily obtain a PAC-inspired conformance guarantee (cf. [206]) with this
testing method for the probability distribution on the set of data words induced by a
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model A and the above strategy for selecting tests. With respect to this distribution,
A is an -approximation of sul if ∑w∈S Pr(w) ≤  for the symmetric difference
S of sets of words accepted by A and sul. The probability of A not being an -
approximation of the sul after performing k independent test runs is at most (1− )k.
For some confidence value δ, we simply choose k such that (1− )k < δ (i.e., such that
k > ln(δ)/ln(1− ).
5.4 Testing TCP Implementations
We have implemented the theories introduced earlier into RALib [54]. We then set
up an experimental setup through which we could connect RALib to various TCP
clients. RALib inferred models, which we checked manually for conformance with the
specification.
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup used to learn TCP is similar to the setup used in [87] and [88].
As in those works, the alphabet used to learn TCP defines two types of inputs. The
first type is packet inputs, used to describe TCP segments sent to the system. These
inputs are parameterized by TCP flag combinations, sequence and acknowledgement
numbers. The second type of inputs is socket inputs such as connect and close,
referring to the methods defined by the socket interface. Outputs defined are packet
outputs, which bear the same structure as packet inputs and describe TCP segments
generated by the system, and timeouts, which suggest that no output was generated
by the system. For model learning, we use the SL∗ algorithm with the theory and
optimizations discussed earlier. Additionally, we used techniques for reducing the size
of counterexamples as shorter counterexamples tend to lead to shorter suffixes, which
greatly decreases the number of inputs needed to run. For sample techniques and a
corresponding discussion we refer to [131]. Model-based testing was done using the
algorithm described in the previous section. Finally, to speed up learning, we used
multiple sul instances in parallel. In particular during testing, tests were distributed
and run evenly among the instances. We could reliably use up to 3 instances in parallel.
Above that number, we encountered instances of missed responses. This could be
improved upon with a more efficient setup.
5.4.2 Experiments and Results
We attempted to learn TCP client implementations of Linux, FreeBSD and Windows.
We chose clients, since they are simpler to learn and contain less redundancy compared
to servers (cf. [88]). In terms of the configurations used, we disabled adaptive receive
windows (or window scale), so that receive windows remain fixed over the course of
each test. Moreover, in the segments sent to the sul we advertise the same receive
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Table 5.1: Learning Statistics. BASE stands for Baseline. [T] marks Use of Typing.
SUL Alpha. Term.
Inp. Num. Learning Testing
Loc. Hyp. Inputs Resets Inputs Resets
Linux 3.19
[T]BASE yes 6 15 4,311 947 113,921 11,720
BASE yes 6 15 9,930 2,168 116,479 12,339
[T]BASE+ACK yes 8 21 77,922 13,414 119,768 12,289
FreeBSD 11.0
[T]BASE yes 6 16 4,239 933 113,953 11,708
BASE yes 6 16 9,958 2,152 116,446 12,333
[T]BASE+ACK no 8 21 418,977 80,200 81,024 8,367
Windows 10 BASE-CLOSE no 6 14 193,712 24,848 119,768 12,289
window as that of the sul. Doing so we avoid having to include an additional sum
constant for our own receive window.
Our baseline alphabet consists of the connect, SYN+ACK, ACK+RST, RST and close
inputs. This alphabet covers several states in the specification. The alphabet should
also reveal how suls in these states react to RST segments. These segments are
generated in cases where one side abruptly terminates a connection and should be
processed only if their sequence numbers are in window of the expected. We have also
extended the alphabet with the ACK input if learning with the baseline was successful.
To obtain models in an adequate time, we do not explore data relations between all
formal parameters in some experiments. This optimization has been introduced as
typing of symbolic parameters in [54].
Once a hypothesis was constructed, we tested it using the algorithm presented earlier.
We have set the size of the random sequence to 10 (sufficient for exploring the behavior
we are interested in) and ran 15, 000 tests on the final hypothesis. Using the confidence
metric from the previous section, this yields a confidence of more than 99, 9% that a
model is an 0.05%-approximation of the sul for data words up to a length of 10 —
relative to the probability distribution our randomized testing algorithm generates
over the set of data words.
Table 5.1 reports the setting, termination status and learning statistics for all expe-
riments done. The setting indicates the concrete sul, the alphabet relative to the
baseline and whether typing was used. Successful experiments took at most two days
to complete, the determining factors being the size in parameters of the suffixes and
the 0.3 seconds wait time used for each response before concluding a timeout. We
automatically terminated experiments still unresolved after 500, 000 inputs. For these
experiments, we still display the last hypothesis and learning numbers at the point of
termination. Results are available on RALib’s website.1
Using both un-typed and typed baseline alphabets we inferred models for Linux and
FreeBSD. We inferred a model for Linux using the ACK-extended typed alphabet, but
not for BSD. Learning FreeBSD for this setting followed a similar course to learning
Linux, leading to a similar hypothesis. Testing generated a counterexample, whose
1See: https://goo.gl/23VNfv
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l0
INIT
l1
SYN SENT
l5
CLOSED
l2
ESTABLISHED
l3
FIN WAIT
l4
FIN WAIT
CONNECT /
S|F (f ,0)
r1:=f
SA(p1,p2) | true
r1:=p2
/
R|F (r1,0)
−
SA(p1,p2) | r1+16=p2
r1:=p2;r2:=r1
/
R|F (r1,0)
r1:=r2
SA(p1,p2) | r1+1=p2
r1:=p1;r2:=p2
/
A|F (r2,r1+1)
r1:=p2
R(p1,p2) | r1<p1≤r1+29200
− ,
RA(p1,p2) | r1<p1≤r1+29200
− ,
SA(p1,p2) | true
− /
A|F (r2,r1)
−
CLOSE /
FA|F (r2,r1)
−
R(p1,p2) | r1<p1≤r1+29200
− ,
RA(p1,p2) | r1<p1≤r1+29200
− ,
SA(p1,p2) | true
− /
A|F (r2,r1)
−
R(p1,p2) | r1<p1≤r1+29200
− ,
RA(p1,p2) | r1<p1≤r1+29200
− ,
SA(p1,p2) | true
− /
A|F (r2,r1)
−
R(p1,p2) | r1=p1
− ,
RA(p1,p2) | r1=p1
− /TO
RA(p1,p2) | r1+1=p2
− /TO
Figure 5.8: Model of Linux Client. Flags are replaced by their starting characters
(i.e. FIN by F, SYN by S). TO denotes a timeout, f denotes a fresh value. We group
inputs with guards soliciting the same output and assignment over registers and use
input/output notation. Inputs have guards over parameters. In outputs, parameters
are instantiated.
processing resulted in a long new suffix. The suffix proved too expensive for tree
queries to terminate within the input bounds set.
We couldn’t learn Windows models even after removing the CLOSE input. Analysis of
the last conjectured model and the generated tests revealed behavior inconsistent with
the specification: Windows accepts sequence numbers up to and including window size
plus one in the ESTABLISHED state for RST inputs. This helps demonstrate a limitation
of our approach: relevant data relations R are an input to learning and convergence is
guaranteed only for systems that respect R (cf. Section 5.3.1).
5.4.3 Analysis of Conformance to RFC
Before reflecting upon the models learned, we mention a bug discovered while con-
ducting experiments. In our attempt to learn the TCP Linux client with an alphabet
comprising the baseline plus the ACK+FIN packet, we noticed that, while in the
FIN WAIT state, the Linux client upon receiving an ACK+FIN segment with an invalid
acknowledgement number, would still process and acknowledge the FIN flag. This
would have shown up in the learned model, unfortunately, poor scalability meant
we could not learn a model for this setup. The bug was reported and subsequently
fixed2.
2See: https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg436743.html
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#d e f i n e a f t e r ( seq2 , seq1 ) be f o r e ( seq1 , seq2 )
stat ic i n l i n e bool be f o r e ( u32 seq1 , u32 seq2 ) {
return ( s32 ) ( seq1−seq2 ) < 0 ;
}
stat ic i n l i n e bool tcp sequence (
const struct tcp sock ∗tp , u32 seq , u32 end seq ) {
return ! b e f o r e ( end seq , tp−>rcv wup) &&
! a f t e r ( seq , tp−>rcv nxt + tcp receive window ( tp ) ) ;
}
Listing 5.9: Relevant Code of TCP Implementation in Linux Kernel.
Figure 5.8 presents the model learned for Linux using the baseline alphabet. The models
learned for FreeBSD and Linux are near identical with one exception. Linux defines an
in-window sequence number as a value up to and including rcv.nxt+ win (for a next
expected sequence number rcv.nxt). FreeBSD excludes the upper bound. Windows,
on the other hand, even seems to include rcv.nxt+ win+ 1. RFC 793 [176, page 26]
specifies that an in-window sequence smaller is strictly smaller than rcv.nxt+ win.
Thus, FreeBSD conforms to the upper bound requirement whereas Linux and Windows
do not. For Linux, we trace this violation to code in the most recent kernel, v4.11.3
Listing 5.9 shows the relevant code snippets. To check whether a sequence number
is not after the window, they use the !(seq > rcv.nxt + win) conjunct, allowing
rcv.nxt+win to be within the window. We inquired Linux developers about this issue
and they confirmed it and said they would issue a fix for it. During our experiments,
we have uncovered a different, unrelated, bug relating to faulty re-transmissions for
which a fix has been issued.
Aside from that, reset processing seems to be implemented as stated in the RFC with
the remark that both systems implement the ’Blind Reset Attack Using RST Bit’ safe
guard introduced in RFC 5961 [179, page 7], by which only RST segments with the
sequence number equal to the expected sequence number cause the termination of
a connection. RST segments whose sequence number is in window but not equal to
the expected sequence number prompt a ’challenge ACK response’. We can verify
that this is the case by analyzing the Linux model’s responses to RST segments in
the ESTABLISHED and FIN WAIT1 states. As a note, RFC 5961 might have been the
cause of the inconsistency remarked previously. As of this writing, RFC 5961 gives a
wrong description of the within/outside window conditions of RFC 793. The error
had been reported in 2016 and is included in the RFC errata4.
5.5 Conclusion
Work in this chapter introduces the first application of register automata learning to
real networked systems, in the form of TCP clients. To that end, we have developed
3See: https://goo.gl/9A8ZYM
4See: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/rfc5961
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the theories needed to learn TCP into the learning framework of [58]. We implemented
heuristics that improve scalability of learning and developed a component that deals
with non-determinism in fresh data values. The application of our learning-based
testing setup resulted in models for TCP client implementations of Linux and FreeBSD.
Our setup helped reveal violation of the RFC 793 standard [176] in Linux and Windows.
In Linux we identified the root cause for the violation in the Kernel code.
In a next step, we plan to produce models for extended sets of inputs and models
of TCP servers. Despite the optimizations used, we eventually faced combinatorial
blow up in the number of required tests. Combining learning with static or symbolic
analysis methods may help reducing this blow up by identifying more precisely the
relations one should test for. This will also address the limitation of fixed relations
that prevented us from learning a model for Windows.
Chapter 6
Model Learning as a Satisfiability Modulo
Theories Problem
We explore an approach to model learning that is based on using satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) solvers. To that end, we explain how DFAs, Mealy
machines and register automata, and observations of their behavior can be
encoded as logic formulas. An SMT solver is then tasked with finding an
assignment for such a formula, from which we can extract an automaton of
minimal size. We provide an implementation of this approach which we use
to conduct experiments on a series of benchmarks. These experiments address
both the scalability of the approach and its performance relative to existing
active learning tools.
6.1 Introduction
We are interested in algorithms that construct black-box state diagram models of
software and hardware systems by observing their behavior and performing experiments.
Developing such algorithms is a fundamental research problem that has been widely
studied. Roughly speaking, two approaches have been pursued in the literature:
passive learning techniques, where models are constructed from (sets of) runs of the
system, and active learning techniques, that accomplish their task by actively doing
experiments on the system.
Gold [96] showed that the passive learning problem of finding a minimal DFA that is
compatible with a finite set of positive and negative examples, is NP-hard. In spite of
these hardness results, many DFA identification algorithms have been developed over
time, see [108] for an overview. Some of the most successful approaches translate the
DFA identification problem to well-known computationally hard problems, such as
SAT [107], vertex coloring [91], or SMT [161], and then use existing solvers for those
problems.
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Angluin [19] presented an efficient algorithm for active learning a regular language L,
which assumes a minimally adequate teacher (MAT) that answers two types of queries
about L. With a membership query, the algorithm asks whether or not a given word
w is in L, and with an equivalence query it asks whether or not the language LH of a
hypothesized DFA H is equal to L. If LH and L are different, a word in the symmetric
difference of the two languages is returned. Angluin’s algorithm has been successfully
adapted for learning models of real-world software and hardware systems [170,178,205],
as shown in Figure 6.1. A membership query (MQ) is implemented by bringing the
TQs
SUL
CT
MQs
EQ
Learner Teacher
Figure 6.1: Model learning within the MAT framework.
system under learning (SUL) in its initial state and the observing the outputs generated
in response to a given input sequence, and an equivalence query (EQ) is approximated
using a conformance testing tool (CT) [137] via a finite number of test queries (TQ).
If these test queries do not reveal a difference in the behavior of a hypothesis H and
the SUL, then we assume the hypothesis model is correct.
Walkinshaw et al. [213] observed that from each passive learning algorithm one can
trivially construct an active learning algorithm that only poses equivalence queries.
Starting from the empty set of examples, the passive algorithm constructs a first
hypothesis H1 that is forwarded to the conformance tester. The first counterexample
w1 of the conformance tester is then used to construct a second hypothesis H2. Next
counterexamples w1 and w2 are used to construct hypothesis H3, and so on, until no
more counterexamples are found.
In this chapter, we compare the performance of existing active learning algorithms
with passive learning algorithms that are ‘activated’ via the trick of Walkinshaw et
al. [213]. At first, this may sound like a crazy thing to do: why would one compare
an efficient active learning algorithm, polynomial in the size of the unknown state
machine, with an algorithm that makes a possibly superpolynomial number of calls [20]
to a solver for an NP-hard problem? The main reason is that in practical applications
i/o interactions often take a significant amount of time. In [184], for instance, a case
study of an interventional X-ray system is described in which a single i/o interaction
may take several seconds. Therefore, the main bottleneck in these applications is the
total number of membership and test queries, rather than the time required to decide
which queries to perform. Also, in practical applications the state machines are often
small, with at most a few dozen states (see for instance [3, 11,184]). Therefore, even
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though passive learning algorithms do not scale well, there is hope that they can still
handle these applications. Active learning algorithms rely on asking a large number
of membership queries to construct hypotheses. Passive learning algorithms pose no
membership queries, but instead need a larger number of equivalence queries, which
are then approximated using test queries. A priori, it is not clear which approach
performs best in terms of the total number of membership and test queries needed to
learn a model.
Our experiments compare the original L∗ [19] and the state-of-the-art TTT [122]
active learning algorithm with an SMT-based passive learning algorithm on a number
of practical benchmarks. We encode the question whether there exists a state machine
with n states that is consistent with a set of observations into a logic formula, and
then use the Z3 SMT solver [76] to decide whether this formula is satisfiable. By
iteratively incrementing the number of states we can find a minimal state machine
consistent with the observations. As equivalence oracle we use a state-of-the-art
conformance testing algorithm based on adaptive distinguishing sequences [136,191].
In line with our expectations, the passive learning approach is competitive with the
active learning algorithms in terms of the number of membership and test queries
needed for learning.
An advantage of SMT encodings, when compared for instance with encodings based
on SAT or vertex coloring, is the expressivity of the underlying logic. In recent years,
much progress has been made in extending active learning algorithms to richer classes
of models, such as register automata [5, 58, 115] in which data may be tested and
stored in registers. We show that the problem of finding a register automaton that
is consistent with a set of observations can be expressed as an SMT problem, and
compare the performance of the resulting learning algorithm with that of Tomte [5],
a tool for active learning of register automata, on some simple benchmarks. New
algorithms for active learning of FSMs, Mealy machines and various types of register
automata are often extremely complex, and building tools implementations often takes
years [5, 58, 122]. Adapting these tools to slightly different scenarios is typically a
nightmare. One such scenario is when the system is missing reset functionality. This
renders most active learning tools impractical, as these rely on the ability to reset
the system. Developing SMT-based learning algorithms in settings with and without
resets only took us a few weeks. This shows that the SMT-approach can be quite
effective as a means for prototyping learning algorithms in various settings.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes how one
can encode the problem of learning a minimal consistent automaton in SMT. The
scalability and effectiveness of our approach, and its applicability in practice are
assessed in Section 6.3. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.4.
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6.2 Model Learning as an SMT Problem
This section describes how to express this problem in a logic formula. If and only if
there exists an assignment to the variables of this formula that makes it true, then
exists an automaton A with at most n states that is consistent with S. We use an
SMT solver to find such an assignment. If the SMT solver concludes that the formula
is satisfiable, then its solution provides us with A.
We distinguish three types of constraints:
• axioms must be satisfied for A to behave as intended by its definition.
• observation constraints must be satisfied for A to be consistent with S.
• size constraints must be satisfied for A to have n states or less.
Hence, the problem can be solved by iteratively incrementing n until the encoding of
the axioms, observation constraints and size constraints is satisfiable.
In the following subsections, we present encodings for deterministic finite automata
(Section 6.2.1 and Section 6.2.2), Moore and Mealy machines (Section 6.2.3), register
automata (Section 6.2.4), and input-output register automata (Section 6.2.5). Exten-
sions for all automata without registers also appear in a preliminary version of this
work [192].
6.2.1 An Encoding for Deterministic Finite Automata
A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) accepts and rejects strings , which are sequences
of labels. We define a DFA as follows:
Definition 6.1. A DFA is a tuple (L,Q, q0, δ, F ), where
• L is a finite set of labels,
• Q is a finite set of states,
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state,
• δ : Q× L→ Q is a transition function for states and labels,
• F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states.
Let x be a string. We use xi to denote ith label of x. We use x[i,j] to denote
the substring of x starting at position i and ending at position j (inclusive), i.e.
x = x[1,|x|].
A DFA A accepts a string if its computation ends in an accepting state. This can be
formalized as follows. Let x ∈ L∗ be a string, then A accepts x if a sequence of states
q′0 . . . q
′
|x| exists such that
1. q′0 = q0,
2. q′i = δ(q
′
i−1, xi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|, and
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3. q′|x| ∈ F .
Let S+ be a set of strings that should be accepted, and let S− be a disjoint set of
strings that should be rejected. Let S be the set that contains all of these strings,
along with their labels, i.e. S = {(x, true) : x ∈ S+} ∪ {(x, false) : x ∈ S−}. A DFA
is consistent with S if it accepts all strings in S+, and rejects all strings in S−.
This leads us to a natural encoding for finding a consistent DFA in satisfiability
modulo the theories of inequality and uninterpreted functions. We encode a DFA as
follows:
• Q is a finite subset of the (non-negative) natural numbers N,
• q0 = 0,
• The set of accepting states F is encoded as a function λ : Q → B, such that
q ∈ F ⇐⇒ λ(q) = true.
The following size constraint ensures that A has at most n states:
∀q ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} ∀l ∈ L
n−1∨
q′=0
δ(q, l) = q′ (6.1)
If we assume without loss of generality that the initial state is 0, then we can add the
following constraints for the strings in S+:
∀x ∈ S+ λ( δ(. . . δ(δ(0, x1), x2), . . . x|x|) ) = true (6.2)
Similarly, we can add the following constraints for the strings in S−:
∀x ∈ S− λ( δ(. . . δ(δ(0, x1), x2), . . . x|x|) ) = false (6.3)
6.2.2 A Better Encoding for Deterministic Finite Automata
The nesting in the set of constraints given by Equation 6.2 and Equation 6.3 might
lead to many redundant constraints for the theory solver. To give an example, if two
strings share a non-empty prefix, the prefix is encoded twice, once for each string. One
solution is to define the constraints implied by strings in a non-nested way. Similarly
to Heule and Verwer [107], and Bruynooghe et. al. [49], we use an observation tree
(OT) for this. This can be considered a partial, tree-shaped automaton that is exactly
consistent with S, i.e. it accepts only the set S+ and rejects only the set S−. We
define an OT for a set of labeled strings in Definition 6.2.
Definition 6.2. An OT for a set of strings S = {S+, S−} is a tuple (L,Q, λ), where
• L is a set of labels,
• Q = {x ∈ L∗ : x is a prefix of a string in S+ ∪ S−},
• λ : S+∪S− → B is a output function for the strings, with x ∈ S+ ⇐⇒ λ(x) = true.
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Now, let us explain how one can construct a set of constraints for finding a DFA
A = (L,QA, q0, δ
A, F ) that is consistent with an OT T = (L,QT , λT ) for a given
set S = {S+, S−}. Let us (again) consider the set of states QA as a set of non-
negative integers with q0 = 0, and let us encode the set of accepting states F as
a function λ : Q → B, such that q ∈ F ⇐⇒ λ(q) = true. Recall that a DFA is
consistent if and only if it accepts all strings in S+ and rejects all strings in S−, i.e.
for each x in S λA(δA(q0, x)) = λ
T (x) (we slightly abuse notation here by extending
δA : Q× L∗ → Q to strings). Such a DFA has at most as many states as the OT (but
typically significantly less). Therefore, there must exist a surjective (i.e. many-to-one)
function from the strings of the OT to states of the DFA:
map : QT → QA (6.4)
Our goal is to find a set of constraints for map that make sure that our target DFA A
is consistent. For this we define the following observation constraints:
map() = q0 (6.5)
∀xl ∈ QT : x ∈ L∗, l ∈ L δA(map(x), l) = map(xl) (6.6)
∀x ∈ S+ ∪ S− λA(map(x)) = λT (x) (6.7)
Equation 6.5 maps the empty string to the initial state of A. Equation 6.6 encodes the
observed prefixes as transitions of A while Equation 6.7 encodes the observed outputs,
with λA encoding F .
To meet the minimality requirement, we are interested in finding the ‘smallest’ map
function; i.e. there should be no function with a smaller image that satisfies these
constraints. For this purpose we can re-use one of the size constraints presented earlier
(Equation 6.2).
6.2.3 Adaptations for Moore and Mealy Machines
An advantage of the encoding presented in Section 6.2.2 (as opposed to the one
presented in Section 6.2.1) is that it can easily be modified to learn transducers.
Transducers are automata that generate output strings. As such, they can be used to
model input-output behaviour of software.
A Moore machine is a transducer that generates an output label initially and each
time it (re-) enters a state. We define a Moore machine in Definition 6.3.
Definition 6.3. A Moore machine is a tuple (I,O,Q, q0, δ, λ), where
• I is a finite set of input labels,
• O is a finite set of output labels,
• Q, q0 and δ are a set of states, the initial state, and a transition function respectively,
and
• λ : Q→ O is a output function that maps states to output labels.
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A set of observations S for a Moore machine consists of traces , which are pairs (xI , xO)
where xI ∈ I∗ is an input string and xO ∈ O∗ is an output string with |xO| = |xI |+ 1.
A Moore machine is consistent with a set S if for each (xI , xO) ∈ S it generates xO
when provided with xI .
A Mealy machine is a transducer that generates an output label each time it makes a
transition. We define a Mealy machine in Definition 6.4.
Definition 6.4. A Mealy machine is a tuple (I,O,Q, q0, δ, λ), where
• I,O,Q, q0 and δ are the same as for a Moore machine (Definition 6.3), and
• λ : Q× I → O is a output function that maps transitions to output labels.
A set of observations S for a Mealy machine consists of traces (xI , xO) where xI ∈ I∗
is an input string and xO ∈ O∗ is an output string with |xO| = |xI |. Similarly to a
Moore machine, a Mealy machine is consistent with a set S if for each (xI , xO) ∈ S it
generates xO when provided with xI .
It has been shown that Moore and Mealy machines are equi-expressive if we neglect
the initial output label generated by a Moore machine (see e.g. [110]). Therefore, we
can define an OT for a set S of traces for a Moore or Mealy machine A = (I,O,QA,
q0, δ
A, λA) in a similar way. We choose to define such an input-output observation tree
(IOOT) as follows.
Definition 6.5. An IOOT for a set of traces S is a tuple (I,O,Q, λ), where
• I and O are sets of input labels and output labels respectively,
• Q = {x ∈ I∗ : x is a prefix of an input string of a trace in S},
• λ : Q → O is a output function with λ(xI[0,i]) = xOi for all (xI , xO) ∈ S and
1 ≤ i ≤ |xI |.
Observe that λ is defined for all states. Also, observe that there is no need for λ to be
a transition output function for Mealy machines, because there is only one string that
ends in each state of an IOOT.
Let T = (I,O,QT , λT ) be an IOOT for a set of traces S, then we can determine if
there is a Moore or Mealy machine A with at most n states that is consistent with S by
using the set of constraints and axioms from Section 6.2.2, if we replace Equation 6.7
with Equation 6.8 (Moore machines) or Equation 6.9 (Mealy machines).
∀x ∈ QT λA(map(x)) = λT (x) (6.8)
∀xl ∈ QT : x ∈ I∗, l ∈ I λA(map(x), l) = λT (xl) (6.9)
6.2.4 An Encoding for Register Automata
DFAs and Mealy machines typically do not scale well if the domain of inputs, or
the domain of data parameters for inputs, is large. The reason for this is that the
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semantics of the data parameters are modeled implicitly using states and transitions;
inputs with different parameters are simply regarded as different inputs. A better
solution is to use a richer formalism that can model them more efficiently and exploit
the resulting symmetries in the state space.
A register automaton (RA) is such a formalism. An RA can be seen as an automaton
that is extended with a set of registers that can store data parameters. The values
in these registers can then be used to express conditions over the transitions of the
automaton, or guards. If the guard is satisfied the transition is fired, possibly storing
the provided data parameter (this is called an assignment) and bringing the automaton
from the current location to the next. As such, an RA can be used to accept or reject
sequences of label-value pairs. In contrast to automata without memory, the “states”
in a register automaton are called locations because the state of the automaton also
comprises the values of the registers. Therefore, an exponential number of possible
states can be modeled using a small number of locations and registers.
The RAs that we define here have the following restrictions:
right invariance Transitions do not imply (in) equality of distinct registers.
non-swapping Values are never moved from one register to another.
unique values Registers always store unique values.
The first two restrictions are inherent to the definition used, the third is necessary
to avoid the non-determinism caused by two used registers holding the same value.
While these restrictions may cause a blow-up in the number of states required to be
consistent with a set of action strings [53], it has been shown that they do not affect
expressivity [6, Theorem 1], i.e. for any register automaton that does not have these
restrictions, there exists an equivalent register automaton in the class that we are
concerned with. For a formal treatment of these restrictions and their implications,
we refer to [5] and [53].
We define an RA as follows.
Definition 6.6. An RA is a tuple (L,R,Q, q0, δ, λ, τ, pi), where
• L, Q, q0 and λ are a set of labels, a set of locations, the start location, and a location
output function respectively,
• R is a finite set of registers,
• δ : Q× L× (R ∪ {r⊥})→ Q is a register transition function,
• τ : Q×R→ B is a register use predicate, and
• pi : Q× L→ (R ∪ {r⊥}) is a register update function.
We call a label-value pair an action and denote it l(v) for input label l and parameter
v. We assume without loss of generality that parameter values are integers (Z). A
sequence of actions is called an action string , and is denoted by σ. A set of observations
S for an RA consists of action strings that should be accepted S+, and a set of action
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strings that should be rejected S−. An RA is consistent with S = {S+, S−} if it
accepts all action strings in S+, and rejects all action strings in S−.
Formally, an RA can be considered as a DFA (Definition 6.1) enriched with a finite
set of registers R and two additional functions. The first function, τ , specifies which
registers are in use in a location. In a location q there can be two types of transitions
for a label l and parameter value v:
• If the value v is equal to some used register r, then the transition δ(q, l, r) is taken.
• Else (if the value v is different to all used registers), the fresh transition δ(q, l, r⊥)
is taken.
The second function, pi, specifies if and where to store a value v when this fresh
transition (δ(q, l, r⊥)) is taken:
• If pi(q, l) = r⊥ then the value v on transition δ(q, l, r⊥) is not stored.
• Else (if pi(q, l) = r for some register r ∈ R), the value v on transition δ(q, l, r⊥) is
stored in register r.
Let us describe the axioms that we need for the RA to behave as intended. First, we
require that no registers are used in the initial location:
∀r ∈ R τ(q0, r) = false (6.10)
Second, if a register is used after a transition, it means that it was used before, or it
was updated:
∀q ∈ Q ∀l ∈ L ∀r ∈ R ∀r′ ∈ (R ∪ {r⊥})
τ(δ(q, l, r′), r) = true =⇒ ( τ(q, r) = true ∨ (r′ = r⊥ ∧ pi(q, l) = r) ) (6.11)
Third, if a register is updated, then it is used afterwards:
∀q ∈ Q ∀l ∈ L ∀r ∈ R pi(q, l) = r =⇒ τ(δ(q, l, r⊥), r) = true (6.12)
Our goal is to learn an RA that is consistent with a set of action strings S = {S+, S−}.
For this, we need to define a function that keeps track of the valuation of registers
during runs over these action strings. Let A = (L,RA, QA, q0, δ
A, λA, τA, piA) be an
RA, and let T = (L × Z, QT , λT ) be an OT for S. In addition to the map function
(Equation 6.4), we define a valuation function val that maps a state of T and a register
of A to the value that it contains:
val : QT ×RA → Z (6.13)
Before we construct constraints for the action strings, we determinize them by making
them neat [10, Definition 7]. An action string is neat if each parameter value is
either equal to a previous value, or equal to the largest preceding value plus one.
Let a be a parameterized input, and let a(3)a(1)a(3)a(45) be an action string, then
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a(0)a(1)a(0)a(2) is its corresponding neat action string, for example. Aarts et al. show
that in order to learn the behavior of a register automaton it suffices to study its neat
action strings, since any other action string can be obtained from a neat one via a
zero respecting automorphism [10, Section 5].
Constructing constraints for an RA is a bit more involving than for the formalisms
that we have discussed so far. First, we map empty string to the initial location of A
(Equation 6.5). Second, we assert that a register is updated if its valuation changes,
and that it is not updated if it keeps its value:
∀σl(v) ∈ QT ∀r ∈ RA
val(σl(v), r) 6= val(σ, r) =⇒ piA(map(σ), l) = r (6.14)
∀σl(v) ∈ QT ∀r ∈ RA
val(σl(v), r) = val(σ, r) =⇒ piA(map(σ), l) 6= r (6.15)
Additionally, we assert the inverse (i.e. that a register’s valuation changes if and only
if it is updated):
∀σl(v) ∈ QT ∀r ∈ RA
val(σl(v), r) =
v
if δA(map(σ), l, r⊥) = map(σl(v))
∧ pi(map(σ), l) = r
val(σ, r) otherwise
(6.16)
Third, we encode the observed transitions:
∀σl(v) ∈ QT
map(σl(v)) =
δ
A(map(σ), l, r)
if ∃!r ∈ R : τA(map(σ), r) = true
∧ val(σ, r) = v
δA(map(σ), l, r⊥) otherwise
(6.17)
Finally, we encode the observed outputs. This can be done in the same way as for
DFAs (see Equation 6.7).
The task for the SMT solver is to find a solution that is consistent with these constraints.
Obviously, we are interested in an RA with the minimal number of locations and
registers. The number of locations can be limited in the same way as states were
limited for DFAs (see Equation 6.1). The number of registers is defined by the variables
r that we quantify over in the presented equations. Therefore, they can be limited as
such. In our case, the number of registers is never higher than the number of locations
(because we can only update a single register from each location). Hence, the learning
problem can be solved iteratively incrementing the number of locations n, and for
each n incrementing the number of registers from 1 to n, until a satisfiable encoding
is found.
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6.2.5 An Extension for Input-Output Register Automata
An input-output register automaton (IORA) is a register automaton transducer that
generates an output action (i.e. label and value) after each input action. As in the
RA-case, we restrict both input and output labels to a single parameter. Input and
output values may update registers. Input values may be tested for (dis-)equality with
values in registers. Output values can be equal to the stored values, or may be fresh.
As such, an input-output register automaton can be used for modeling software that
produces parameterized outputs.
For a formal description of IORAs we refer to [10]. We define an IORA in Definition 6.7.
Again, in the interest of our encoding, our definition is very different from that in [10].
Despite this, the semantics are similar.
Definition 6.7. An IORA is a tuple (I,O,R,Q, q0, δ, λ, τ, pi, ω), where
• I and O are finite, disjoint sets of input and output labels,
• R, Q, q0, τ and pi are the same as for an RA (Definition 6.6),
• δ : (Q∪{q⊥})× (I ∪O)× (R∪{r⊥})→ (Q∪{q⊥}) is a register transition function
with a sink location,
• λ : (Q ∪ {q⊥})→ B is a location output function with a sink location, and
• ω : Q→ B is a location type function that returns true if a location is an input
location, and false if it is an output location.
A set of observations S for an IORA consists of action traces, which are pairs (σI ,
σO) where σI ∈ (I × Z)∗ is an input action string , and σO ∈ (O × Z)∗ is an output
action string with |σI | = |σO|. An IORA is consistent with a set S if for each pair
(σI , σO) ∈ S it generates σO when provided with σI .
Despite that semantically an IORA is a transducer, we define it as an RA (Definition 6.6)
which distinguishes between input and output labels, and which defines an additional
function ω for the location type. From an input location transitions are allowed only
for input actions. After an input action the IORA reaches an output location, in which
a single transition is allowed. This transition determines the output action generated
in response, as well as the input location the IORA will transition to. Transitions that
are not allowed lead to a designated sink location, which is denoted q⊥.
Using this definition allows us to incorporate the axioms defined for our RA encoding
(Equations 6.10–6.12) also in our IORA encoding. To these, we add the following
axioms for an IORA to behave as intended.
First, observe that we do not use λ as an output function for an IORA. Instead, we
use it to denote which locations are allowed. Hence, we require that the sink location
q⊥ is the only rejecting location:
∀q ∈ (Q ∪ {q⊥}) λ(q) =
{
false if q = q⊥
true otherwise
(6.18)
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Second, we require that transitions do not lead to the sink location:
∀q ∈ Q ∀o ∈ O ∀r ∈ (R ∪ {r⊥}) ω(q) = true =⇒ δ(q, o, r) = q⊥ (6.19)
∀q ∈ Q ∀i ∈ I ∀r ∈ (R ∪ {r⊥}) ω(q) = false =⇒ δ(q, i, r) = q⊥ (6.20)
∀l ∈ I ∪O ∀r ∈ (R ∪ {r⊥}) δ(q⊥, l, r) = q⊥ (6.21)
Finally, we require that input locations are input enabled (Equation 6.22), and that
there is only one transition possible in an output location (Equation 6.23):
∀q ∈ Q ∀i ∈ I ∀r ∈ (R ∪ {r⊥}) ω(q) = true =⇒ δ(q, i, r) 6= q⊥ (6.22)
∀q ∈ Q ∃!o ∈ O ∃!r ∈ (R ∪ {r⊥}) ω(q) = false =⇒ δ(q, o, r) 6= q⊥ (6.23)
Our goal is to learn an IORA A = (I,O,RA, QA, q0, δ
A, λA, τA, piA, ωA) that is consis-
tent with a set of action traces S. Because of the nature of our encoding, we consider
each action trace σ = (σI , σO) in S as an interleaving of the input action string σI and
the output action string σO, i.e. σ = σI1σ
O
1 . . . σ
I
|σI |σ
O
|σI |. Let T = ((I ∪O)×Z, QT , λT )
be an OT for such strings.
The constraints for an IORA can now be constructed in the same way as for an RA
(Equation 6.5 and Equation 6.14–6.17). Observe that we do not use λ to encode the
observed outputs (this is already done by encoding the transitions of the OT). Instead,
λ is used to denote which locations are allowed. All the locations in Q are allowed
(because we have observed them) and q⊥ is the only location that is not allowed
(λ(q⊥) = false by Equation 6.18). As such, we add the following constraint:
∀σ ∈ QT map(σ) 6= q⊥ (6.24)
We can now determine if there is an IORA with at most n locations and m registers
in the same way as for RAs, i.e. by iteratively incrementing the number of locations n,
and for each n incrementing the number of registers from 1 to n, until a satisfiable
encoding is found.
6.3 Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented our encodings using Z3Py, the Python front-end of Z3 [76]1. Our tool
can generate an automaton model from a given set of observations (passive learning),
or a reference to the system and a tester implementation (active learning), also when
this system cannot be reset. We have also implemented a tester for the classes of
automata supported. The tester generates test queries (or tests) each test consisting
of an access sequence to an arbitrary state in the current hypothesis, and a sequence
generated by a random walk from that state. In experiments, we configure the tester
to build shorter tests. Longer tests worsen the scalability of our tool, and are unneeded
1See https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/rick/z3gi/tree/lata
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for learning small models. All experimental results shown were obtained using our most
efficient encodings, namely, those involving an OT and not relying on linear equalities
(all other encodings performed considerably worse in terms of scalability).Validity
of the learned models was ensured by running a large number of tests on the last
hypothesis and checking the number of states. We conducted a series of experiments
to assess the scalability and effectiveness of our approach.
Our first experiment assesses the scalability of our encodings by adapting the scalable
Login, FIFO set and Stack benchmarks of [5] to DFAs, Mealy machines, RAs and
IORAs. The systems benchmarked are IORA by nature, and are parameterizable by
their size, which refers to either the maximum number of registered users, or to the
size of the collection. The systems only generate ok and nok labels as output, joined
by no parameters. This facilitates the generation of RA/Mealy/DFA representations
by applying an adapter over the system, exposing an interface corresponding to the
respective formalism. The RA adapter, for example, accepts a sequence of inputs
only if all outputs generated by the system are ok, otherwise it rejects the sequence.
Our adaptation made the Mealy and DFA versions of FIFO set and Stack systems
equivalent, hence we only consider FIFO sets for these formalisms. The Login systems
are simplified by removing the password parameter (so login, register and logout
are done solely by supplying a user id), as our implementation does not yet support
actions with multiple parameters. To generate tests, we used the testing algorithm
described earlier. The maximum length of the random sequence is 3 + size, where size
is the number of users or elements in the system. The solver timeout – the amount of
time the solver was provided to compute a solution or indicate its absence – was set to
10 seconds for the DFA and Mealy systems, and to 10 minutes for the RA and IORA
systems whose constraints could take considerably longer to process. We initially
terminated learning runs whenever the SMT solver failed to return a result within this
time bound (or the SMT solver timed out). We then realized that even in cases where
the SMT solver timed out, it might still find a solution in a subsequent iteration (for
a greater n). This solution might not be minimal, but it was nevertheless consistent
with past observations. We thus allowed each learning run to iterate until an upper
bound was reached. For each system we performed 5 learning runs and collated the
resulting statistics.
Results are shown in Table 6.1. Columns describe the system, the number of successful
learning runs, the number of states/locations (which may vary due to loss of minimality)
and registers (where applicable), average and standard deviation for the number of
tests and inputs used in learning except for validating the last hypothesis, and for the
amount of time learning took. The table only includes entries for systems we could
learn.
In our second experiment we used our tool to learn simulated models obtained by
the learning case studies described in [3,11,184]. These models are Mealy machines
detailing aspects of the behavior of bankcard protocols, biometric passports and
power control services (PCS). For the purpose of this experiment we connected the
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Table 6.1: Scalable experiments
Model succ states regs tests inputs time(sec)
loc avg std avg std avg std
DFA FIFOSet(1) 5 3.0 17.0 8.28 53.0 36.35 0.44 0.07
DFA FIFOSet(2) 5 4.0 19.0 10.33 80.0 45.58 0.68 0.11
DFA FIFOSet(3) 5 5.0 28.0 12.71 141.0 69.99 1.83 0.46
DFA FIFOSet(4) 5 6.0 48.0 41.12 294.0 293.18 3.44 0.42
DFA FIFOSet(5) 5 7.0 108.0 19.62 788.0 161.23 7.24 1.54
DFA FIFOSet(6) 5 8.0 125.0 42.06 953.0 361.76 22.34 9.03
DFA FIFOSet(7) 5 9.0 136.0 34.52 1126.0 344.18 28.55 12.65
DFA FIFOSet(8) 5 10.0 228.0 81.11 2156.0 832.02 76.28 42.49
DFA FIFOSet(9) 2 11.5 413.5 161.93 4194.0 2104.35 199.99 26.1
DFA Login(1) 5 4.0 100.0 30.8 432.0 140.46 3.06 0.52
DFA Login(2) 5 7.0 167.0 95.4 932.0 618.15 14.94 2.54
DFA Login(3) 5 11.0 446.0 100.18 3092.0 781.73 131.84 39.26
Mealy FIFOSet(1) 5 2.0 4.0 1.1 14.0 5.12 0.13 0.0
Mealy FIFOSet(2) 5 3.0 9.0 2.51 39.0 12.54 0.49 0.09
Mealy FIFOSet(3) 5 4.0 16.0 5.32 90.0 30.96 0.71 0.07
Mealy FIFOSet(4) 5 5.0 14.0 8.64 108.0 62.35 1.44 0.64
Mealy FIFOSet(5) 5 6.0 24.0 11.03 166.0 86.08 1.96 0.27
Mealy FIFOSet(6) 5 7.0 36.0 14.85 307.0 151.59 3.81 0.8
Mealy FIFOSet(7) 5 8.0 41.0 14.38 373.0 138.2 9.7 2.57
Mealy FIFOSet(8) 5 9.0 90.0 26.53 928.0 310.48 20.87 2.73
Mealy FIFOSet(9) 5 10.0 131.0 22.68 1547.0 296.28 34.64 5.67
Mealy FIFOSet(10) 5 11.0 162.0 66.45 1948.0 787.28 60.08 12.93
Mealy FIFOSet(11) 5 12.0 280.0 110.65 3694.0 1722.57 79.75 23.69
Mealy FIFOSet(12) 4 15.5 370.0 200.12 5021.0 3312.85 227.15 290.99
Mealy FIFOSet(13) 2 14.5 526.5 318.91 8021.5 5608.06 190.36 51.96
Mealy Login(1) 5 3.0 12.0 5.45 52.0 21.43 0.78 0.07
Mealy Login(2) 5 6.0 44.0 12.15 264.0 83.27 6.37 1.09
Mealy Login(3) 5 10.0 104.0 10.03 726.0 69.93 52.4 4.83
Mealy Login(4) 1 16.0 241.0 0.0 2094.0 0.0 370.19 0.0
RA Stack(1) 5 3.0 1 32.0 21.18 109.0 90.48 3.18 0.86
RA Stack(2) 5 5.0 2 202.0 71.88 1018.0 394.58 124.72 53.41
RA FIFOSet(1) 5 3.0 1 49.0 12.92 180.0 52.56 4.94 6.07
RA FIFOSet(2) 5 6.0 2 365.0 88.41 2025.0 578.33 333.09 334.12
RA Login(1) 5 4.0 1 306.0 163.18 1336.0 765.23 54.96 9.99
RA Login(2) 3 8.0 2 1606.0 345.22 9579.0 2163.67 6258.11 1179.27
IORA Stack(1) 5 2.0 1 7.0 1.58 24.0 6.63 8.77 1.92
IORA FIFOSet(1) 5 2.0 1 8.0 3.27 31.0 9.36 6.45 0.84
IORA Login(1) 5 3.0 1 33.0 6.65 152.0 29.89 1509.18 477.04
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open-source tester used in [191]2. This produces tests similar to our own, but extended
by distinguishing sequences. These tests are parameterized by both the length of
the random sequence and a factor k. We set both the length and the k factor to
1. We note that our simple tester (which doesn’t append distinguishing sequences)
could not reliably found counterexamples for several of these models. We attribute
this to the large size of the models’ input alphabets. The solver timeout was set to 1
minute.
Table 6.2: Case-study experiments
Model succ states alpha tests inputs time(sec)
size avg std avg std avg std
Biometric Passport 5 6 9 173.0 90.75 848.0 574.57 28.85 3.82
MAESTRO 5 6 14 1159.0 280.78 6193.0 1690.15 330.87 15.33
MasterCard 5 6 14 703.0 192.03 3560.0 1133.96 337.44 80.17
PIN 5 6 14 767.0 188.76 3825.0 1095.39 328.0 41.85
SecureCode 5 4 14 290.0 67.33 1340.0 318.29 82.25 29.46
VISA 5 9 14 839.0 169.53 5005.0 1161.63 1933.03 498.98
PCS 1 5 8 9 704.0 178.94 3861.0 1123.0 201.74 19.68
PCS 2 5 3 9 72.0 7.96 284.0 22.01 8.89 1.3
PCS 3 5 7 9 555.0 175.55 2973.0 1078.96 146.89 21.89
PCS 4 5 7 9 583.0 224.07 3029.0 1626.2 158.33 18.66
PCS 5 5 9 9 1158.0 163.37 6218.0 1165.34 750.83 135.16
PCS 6 5 9 9 778.0 517.2 4087.0 3204.23 735.55 75.77
Results are shown in Table 6.2. Columns are as in the previous experiment, with an
additional column used to describe the size of the input alphabet. Our approach is
able to learn all models, though it takes a considerable amount of time for the larger
models. There are no cases where we cannot learn the model.
Our third experiment pits our approach against LearnLib (v0.12.1) [119] and Tomte
(v0.41) [5]. LearnLib is a known FSM learning framework, while Tomte is a learner
for IORAs. Both LearnLib and Tomte are configured to use TTT, a state-of-the-art
learning algorithm within Angluin’s framework. LearnLib is additionally configured
to use the original L* learning algorithm. The setups for all learners use caching to
ensure that only tests uncovering new observations are included in statistics. We
compare our approach to LearnLib on both the scalable and case study models, and
to Tomte on the scalable models. The testers are the same as in previous experiments.
Due to the high standard deviation, we ran 20 experiments for each benchmark.
A comparison between the learners is drawn in Table 6.3. Our approach needs fewer
tests than L*. However, it requires more inputs on several of the PCS case study
models. This can be attributed to L* being able to learn these systems without
processing any counterexamples. By contrast, L* severely lags behind on the scalable
systems benchmarks, which require a series of counterexamples. Our approach also
largely defeats TTT on these benchmarks, and even on some of the case study models.
2See https://gitlab.science.ru.nl/moerman/Yannakakis
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Our approach defeats Tomte on all (admittedly very basic) models. In summary,
although the approach appears less effective than TTT, it is still competitive and
mostly outmatches Tomte and L*.
Table 6.3: Comparison with other learners
Model SMT TTT L* Tomte
tests inputs tests inputs tests inputs tests inputs
Biometric Passport 220 1057 220 941 333 1143
MAESTRO 835 4375 860 4437 1190 4718
MasterCard 839 4379 996 5260 1190 4718
PIN 757 3945 911 4769 1190 4718
SecureCode 313 1485 194 682 798 2758
Visa 796 4770 750 4094 2040 9015
PCS 1 629 3530 417 2179 657 2682
PCS 2 71 279 75 196 252 657
PCS 3 508 2651 476 2472 576 2196
PCS 4 559 3024 451 2297 576 2196
PCS 5 1120 6260 417 1753 1308 5340
PCS 6 1158 6442 457 1977 1308 5340
Mealy FIFOSet(2) 6 27 12 38 14 38
Mealy FIFOSet(7) 52 481 71 588 235 2494
Mealy FIFOSet(10) 179 2152 163 1822 486 6743
Mealy Login(2) 37 214 57 242 57 219
Mealy Login(3) 89 644 120 704 240 1720
IORA Login(1) 33 152 157 580
IORA FIFOSet(1) 9 31 21 36.5
IORA Stack(1) 8.5 33 19 34
A reason to why our approach performs worse than TTT on the case study models
may have to do with how hypotheses are constructed. Hypotheses constructed by
TTT are completed in terms of their output behavior by running new tests. In
contrast, our approach constructs hypotheses solely on the basis of counterexamples.
For states whose output behavior has not yet been covered by counterexamples, the
solver just produces a guess which is likely wrong. This may decrease the efficacy
of test algorithms which actively use output behaviors to compute distinguishing
sequences (as does the algorithm used in the case study models).
We remark that the seemingly better results we achieved on the scalable systems may
be due to their simplistic nature. Having only few inputs, these systems don’t benefit
as much from the smart exploratory tests a learner may execute.
Although the sample size is small, results seem to indicate that whereas FSM learners
are efficient, active register automata learners are yet to reach this level of optimization.
These learners often resort to expensive counterexample analysis procedures in order to
simplify the counterexample, as in shortening it or isolating the relevant data relations.
This simplification is needed in order to minimize the counterexample’s subsequent
impact on the performance of learning. By contrast, our approach does not need such
a procedure. One should note however, that the models our approach can learn lack
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Table 6.4: Learning models without resets. Last two columns show results from [171].
States succ inputs time(sec) inputs time(sec)
avg std avg std avg avg
1 5 2.0 0.0 0.03 0.0 3 0.01
2 5 6.0 9.55 0.13 0.07 9 0.01
3 5 21.0 6.4 0.43 0.11 18 0.01
4 5 47.0 32.9 0.88 0.21 30 0.01
5 5 48.0 21.48 1.89 0.6 43 0.02
6 5 76.0 53.18 12.95 7.7 57 0.05
7 2 71.5 10.61 25.65 2.59 69 0.13
8 1 288.0 0.0 106.35 0.0 83 0.32
succintness (they are unique valued and non-swapping). Consequently, the number of
tests may be adversely affected by the number of registers in a system.
The previous experiment compares our passive learning approach used actively, with
active learning approaches. Readers might wonder how our approach and implementa-
tion perform relative to similar passive learning algorithms. The preliminary version
of our work [192] compares an earlier implementation of our SMT-based approach to
DFASAT [107], which implements an efficient SAT-based algorithm for DFAs. Results
show that our implementation is competitive. These results are very much in line with
those of Neider et al. [162]. Therein, an SMT-based approach for DFAs similar to ours
compares favorably when matched against other passive learning approaches.
Our final experiment assesses our extension for learning systems without resets using
benchmarks from recent related work [171]. These benchmarks involve learning
randomly generated Mealy machines of increasing size with 2 input labels and 2 output
labels. These models are connected though they may not be minimal. We adapted our
random walk algorithm for setting without resets, using a fixed random length of 3.
The solver timeout was set to 10 seconds. Table 6.4 illustrates results. Our extension
performs and scales worse than the approach in [171] (which scales up to models of 11
states) and does not provide any guarantees of correctness. However, being able to
learn such systems by a simple extension showcases the versatility of an SMT-based
approach.
Notes on scalability Scalability is the main weakness of our approach. The
IORA and RA encodings scaled up to only a maximum of size 2 for stacks and
FIFO sets. By comparison, Tomte can learn FIFO sets of size 30 [6]. The Mealy
machine encoding scaled up to a size of 13 for the FIFO set, besting the DFA encoding,
which only managed 9. Learning can take several minutes due to the large number
of times the solver has to be called. Our implementation calls the solver on every
new counterexample, and there can be hundreds of counterexamples in a learning
run.
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We note some of the measures adopted towards improving scalability while maintaining
simplicity of our encodings. These measures largely pertain to how the definitions were
implemented into Z3Py. We initially defined sorts for states, locations, labels, inputs
and outputs using Datatype constructs, which provide a natural representation for
expressing sets. We later found that defining a custom sort by using DeclaredSort was
more efficient (the Mealy machine and DFA FIFO set examples could only scale to 10
and 6 states respectively when using the Datatype formulation). This optimization was
used for the DFA and Mealy machine encodings. We also found that it was often useful
to avoid universal quantifiers (and instead expand them to quantifier-free formulas), in
particular when formulating constraints over nodes. Finally, the time the solver took
to provide a solution increased with the number of nodes in the OT. This number in
turn grows as the tests generated get longer, resulting in longer counterexamples. To
give an example of the implication, configuring the test algorithm of [191] to generate
longer tests using a random sequence of size 2 instead of 1, meant the VISA model
could no longer be learned reliably with a solver timeout of 1 minute.
While some measures where taken to improve scalability, we can definitely see further
room for improvement. In particular, the IORA encodings could be made a lot more
efficient by utilizing a more succint underlying definition. The current definition
requires roughly a doubling of the number of locations, as well as a function to
distinguish between input and output locations. A more succint definition would use
a transducer-style output function, with each transition encoding both input and
output semantics. Another hindering factor is that we still use Datatype constructs
for implementing both RA and IORA encodings.
6.4 Conclusions
We have experimented with an approach for model learning which uses SMT solvers.
The approach is highly versatile, as shown in its adaptations for learning FSMs
and register automata, and for learning without resets. We provide an open source-
tool implementing these adaptations. Experiments indicate that our approach is
competitive with the state-of-the-art. While the approach does not scale well, we have
shown that it can be used for learning small models in practice. In the future we wish
to improve the scalability of the approach via more efficient encodings. We hope this
chapter gives rise to a broader direction of future work, since the presented approach
has several advantages over traditional model learning algorithms. Notably, it appears
to be quite effective for rapid prototyping of learning algorithms for new formalisms
and settings.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Over the course of this thesis, we have explored two well established model learning
approaches for learning Register Automata. In doing so, we have brought each
approach closer to its applicability in practice. We have also proposed an alternative
approach based on SMT, and shown its effectiveness through a series of experiments.
Finally, we have showcased model learning as a viable means of conformance testing.
To that end, we have provided compelling applications of learning in the context of
two widely used protocols in TCP and SSH. These applications resulted in standard
violations, and a notable bug fix of the Linux kernel. Several steps are still needed
before learning can become widely applicable. This thesis, nevertheless, paves some
steps towards this objective, opening up new opportunities for future research.
7.1 Future Work
State-local automated abstraction refinement One of the key advantages of
automated RA learning using mappers as shown in Chapter 4, is its simplicity and
flexibility over other approaches. The decoupled architecture of Tomte, the reference
tool for this approach, enables us to replace the Mealy machine learner or Lookahead
Oracle implementation by any other. This made it possible to easily connect Tomte to
the TTT learning algorithm [122] provided by the LearnLib framework [123], resulting
in a significant drop in the number of tests. Unfortunately, Tomte’s decoupled nature
does come at a cost. Experiments revealed not only lack of succintness of the models
obtained for larger systems (like the multi-login system with 3 users), but also the
exploding number of tests needed to learn them. We attribute this, in part, to reliance
on a global set of abstractions, which are encoded in the mapper. This means that in
every state, Tomte explores all abstractions instead of only exploring those that are
relevant (like the ones that arose in counterexamples).
Isberner et al. [120] have formulated an algorithm that implements the abstractions at
the local (state) level. Its application resulted in more succint models and fewer tests
needed for learning. The challenge lies in adapting this strategy to the automated
abstraction refinement framework of Tomte, while still keeping the learner as decoupled
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as possible from the mapper. It could be that some integration is required, maybe the
learner will be expected to implement some interface, for example, one that would
give the suffix and the prefix of the current learning test. Such an interface might still
allow easy integration of other FSM learner implementations.
Trees in discrimination trees The tree query approach to learning introduced by
Cassel et al. [58] and adopted in Chapter 5, requires a tighter integration between
the learner and the tree oracle. The learner has to know about the tree structure,
and how different trees are compared, in order to complete its own observation
structure and generate a hypothesis out of it. This makes it unlikely that RALib,
the reference implementation for this approach, will be able to directly benefit from
the extensive framework for FSM learning LearnLib provides. Nevertheless, with
some technical effort, advancements from FSM learning can be incorporated into
RALib. This is particularly true for those relating to the data structure used to store
observations.
RALib builds upon the observation table Angluin introduced [19]. While this provides
for an intuitive way of storing observations, completing it requires a large number
of tests. Many of these tests are not truly needed in order to produce a hypothesis
consistent with the last counterexample. Isberner et al. [122] remarked this much, and
proposed a much more efficient structure for storing observations, in the form of a
discrimination tree. This can lead to a marked decrease in the number of tests for
learning and overall, as witnessed in Chapter 4. The scalability challenges encountered
in the application of RALib to TCP, make a compelling case for adapting RALib so
that it uses discrimination trees to store observations.
Passive learners for active learning We have experienced in Chapter 6 the bene-
fits an SMT-based learning approach can provide, namely, how simple it is to develop
efficient learners for advanced formalisms by just formulating a few SMT encodings.
We also benefited from not having to concern ourselves with counterexamples and
their impact on learning performance. On the flip side, we had to face up to the
poor scalability of our approach. Less elegant and more efficient encodings would go
some way towards improving it. We would have to scale our approach up to machi-
nes of moderate size (RAs with 10-30 states), as that’s the size protocols typically
have.
An alternative would be maintaining the learning framework, but choosing a conven-
tional passive learner instead of an SMT-based one. In other words, perform active
learning using a passive learner. That much was done by Walkinshaw et al. [213],
but applied to conventional FSMs. Within the same setting, it would be interes-
ting to replace the FSM learner by the MINT tool Walkinshaw et al. developed for
learning EFSMs [214,215]. One may also consider developing new passive learning al-
gorithms for EFSMs, which combine the more scalable SAT-based approaches for FSM
inference [106] with the extensive research done on learning EFSMs actively [58].
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Leveraging the white box It can sometimes happen that access to the system’s
code or binary is available. In such cases, techniques such as dynamic taint analysis
could be leveraged. These could give cheap answers (in terms of tests) to questions
such as:
1. What is the message format expected by the machine?
2. What values have been stored on processing the current input?
3. What checks and operations have been applied?
Answering the first question would enable a fully automated learning framework,
which also incorporates interface inference, not just model inference. We mention
Autogram [111], a tool which uses taint analysis to extract input formats from Java
programs. These formats could then be used in learning.
Answers for the follow-up questions could greatly improve scalability of RA learning
techniques. More specifically, in Tomte’s framework we could replace the expensive
lookahead oracle (the memorable value fetcher) by a simple query to a tainting tool,
which would yield the values stored so far without running any tests. Such a tool would
also benefit RALib’s framework, as knowing the memorable values can significantly
reduce the number of tests needed to answer a tree query. Not only that, but it could
also make visible to the learner internal operations, that is, operations which don’t
lead to an immediate output. In particular, it could make visible internal register
updates such as the increment of a variable. Determining that such updates took place
in a black-box setting can be difficult and may be necessary to learn the system.
Finally leveraging techniques such as symbolic execution and fuzzing could help us
develop more effective test algorithms for learning. The advantage of applying these
methods was already shown in previous works [94,145,196].
Case studies Learning can be applied to protocols not yet tackled such as QUIC or
LDAP. Also, as RA learning algorithms progress some of the previous case studies
may be re-visited. In particular, the TCP case study of Chapter 5 involving RALib
could only generate models with a limited alphabet due to poor scalability. With
future advancements in RALib, a larger alphabet may be used for learning. Case
studies where abstract alphabets and a manual mapper were used, such as those on
SSH (see Chapter 3) or TLS (see [181]), could be re-done using an RA learner instead
of an FSM learner. Some of the parameters abstracted away by the mapper, such as
SSH’s sequence number or session identifier, could be extracted from the mapper and
processed automatically by the learner instead. Once an RA model is learned, we can
then verify it against specifications using a model checker adequate for models with
data such as nuXmv [166].
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